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Abstract 
  
Much scholarly attention has focused on the incremental extension of criminal liability for 
‘terroristic speech’ (reflecting the widely acknowledged preventive turn in criminal law). This 
thesis examines the case law of Turkey's Yargıtay (Court of Cassation) and Constitutional Court 
on 'terroristic speech' in the light of regional (the European Court of Human Rights), and 
international (Human Rights Committee and CERD) standards. While this corpus of human 
rights law has obtained some positive traction in Turkey (resulting, for example, in the passage 
of a number of progressive Constitutional amendments), it is argued that the modern day 
regulation of 'terroristic speech' resembles in many ways the now outmoded offence of 
'sedition' for silencing political dissent. It must of-course be recognized that Turkey has 
experienced a protracted conflict, and that recent ‘terror’ attacks in European capital cities 
have reinvigorated the international ‘War on Terror’. At a deeper level, however, this 
observation evidences a troubling state of affairs, for, even in this ‘human rights era’, the 
imposition of far-reaching restrictions on speech continues seemingly without contradiction. 
Indeed, in many cases, the relevant criminal law offences, especially those pertaining to indirect 
incitement, were themselves been introduced at the behest of international instruments such 
as the UN Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005); the Council of Europe Convention on the 
Prevention of Terrorism, 2005; and the European Union Framework Decision on Combating 
Terrorism, 2008. It is argued that the regulation of ‘terroristic speech’ epitomizes the state-
centricity of human rights norms; (a phenomenon which Leigh and Lustgarten colourfully 
describe as assigning ‘the safekeeping of children in a school playground to a pit-bull terrier’). 
Moreover, it also reflects the fundamental inability of the international community to agree 
upon a definition of ‘terrorism’. The thesis thus draws on recent scholarship (Stampnitzky) to 
chart the ‘invention’ of ‘terrorism’ as a fundamentally political term involving moral judgment. 
It is argued that the infusion of this political concept into legal reasoning is inherently 
problematic. The binary nature of ‘terrorism’ belies the more spectral nature of ‘political 
violence’, and it is the latter which ought to inform a more nuanced judicial response to 
‘terroristic speech’. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1) Background and Motivation 
 
Sweepingly broad and deeply troubling restrictions have been imposed on freedom of 
expression in Turkey in recent years; largely, on account of ‘terrorism’. The relationship 
between the right to freedom of expression and the prevention of political violence and 
‘terrorism’ in Turkey has been a predominantly disquieting one. Turkey’s historical background 
and current political-legal conditions have played a crucial role in defining the scope of freedom 
of expression. The last five decades of military ‘guardianship’, were secured with military coups 
d'état in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997, and military’s bureaucratic allies restricted discussion of 
ethnic identity, religion, and history outside the narrow bounds of secular nationalism.1 In 1997, 
in the military intervention often called the ‘post-modern coup’, the governing party was forced 
by the military’s efforts, supported by leading media outlets, to withdraw from the 
democratically elected government.2 This was a military intervention in Turkish democracy 
which undermined the exercise of the right to freedom of expression. Generally, the Turkish 
Constitution and domestic law (particularly here, the Turkish Criminal Code (TPC) and the Law 
to Fight Terrorism (TMK)) have been used as a tool to regenerate the ideology of the state.3 
These military coups d'état have pushed the legal system to be defensive of and protectionist 
towards the `unalterable core` of the Constitution through the constitutional and criminal law.4 
Even two decades after the last military intervention, the TMK and TPK still contain numerous 
provisions that allow sweepingly broad restrictions, arbitrary enforcement and the censorship 
of critical and dissenting views. There are numerous prosecutions of journalists, writers, 
editors, publishers, translators, civil/political rights activists, lawyers, elected officials and 
students for their dissenting expression.5 There are a vast number of laws under which 
expression can be prosecuted, especially regarding criticism of the armed forces and critical 
speech regarding the Kurdish issue in the last two decades.6  
 
It is argued in this thesis that the absence of an internationally agreed definition of ‘terrorism’ 
is highly significant. This has led to human rights abuses, here in particular an over-inclusive 
                                                          
1 Markus Thiel, `The `Militant Democracy` Principle in Modern Democracies` (Ashgate, 2009) 263; See further, 
Kemal Karpat, Kısa Türkiye Tarihi: 1800-2012 (Timaş Yayınları, 2016) 187-242 
2 Freedom House, Democracy in Crisis: Corruption, Media, and Power in Turkey, (November 2013) p.3 
3 See for instance, Derya Bayir, `Representation of the `Kurds` by the Turkish Judiciary` (2013) 35 Human rights 
Quarterly 116-142, 137 
4 Thiel (n. 1) 264 
5 ARTICLE 19, the Committee to Protect Journalists, English PEN, Freedom House, P24 and PEN International 
Joint Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review of Turkey (14 June 2014) For consideration at the 21st 
session of the UN working group in January/February 2015, para 11-13; See further; Human Rights Council 
Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Twenty-first session 19–30 January 2015 
(A/HRC/WG.6/21/TUR/3) paras 46, 50, and 70 
6 Amnesty International, 104TH Session of the Human Rights Committee – Pre-Sessional Meeting on Turkey (22 
December 2011) p.4 
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range of restrictions on freedom of expression.7 National authorities may resort to the 
deliberate misuse of ‘terrorism’ in particular situations regardless of whether they are confining 
themselves to actually countering ‘terrorism’.8 Walter argues that ‘terrorism’ is a deeply 
subjective concept involving an assessment of the motives and intentions of perpetrators.9 Its 
scope and limits are changeable and unstable depending both on historical and political 
contexts, and on the personal values and beliefs of the individuals who define it. It is thus a 
complicated and subjective term rather than a neutral, technical term for a specific form of 
violence.10 For that reason, prosecuting ‘terrorism’ related offences may impose broad 
restrictions on civil and political rights, because, ‘terrorism’ is a label relying on political context 
and political decisions.11 The definition of ‘terrorism’, thus, plays a crucial role in defining the 
extent of the right to freedom of expression. 
 
The TMK and TPC have numerous articles (especially article 6 and 7 of the TMK and articles 220 
of the TPC) with broad and vague definitions of ‘terrorism’, ‘organised crime’, and 
‘propaganda’, which have enabled authorities to impose extensive restrictions on freedom of 
expression.12 Furthermore, there are also articles 215 (on praising a crime or criminal), 216 (on 
inciting hostility within the society or humiliating the society), 217 (on provoking the society to 
not abide by the law), 299 (on insulting the president), 213-222 (those pertaining to protection 
of public order), 300 (the denigration of the Turkish flag or anything carrying its replica and the 
national anthem), 318 (the alienation of the people from the army) and 226 (obscenity); which 
have likewise led to many prosecutions for expressing non-violent opinions.13 Moreover, 
articles 285 (violating the confidentiality of an investigation), and 288 (trying to influence the 
course of a trial) of TPC have limited coverage of major political trials in the press and media.14 
TCK article 301 criminalises the ‘public denigration of Turkishness’, ‘the State of the Turkish 
Republic, the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the Government of the Republic of Turkey 
or the judicial organs of the state’. This article is notorious for its application against numerous 
journalists and writers. Article 301 has provided a legal ground for public scrutiny ever since its 
enactment in 2005. In its original form, it led to hundreds of prosecutions, scores of them 
                                                          
7 See Further, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms while countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin, E/CN.4/2006/98, para 27 
8 Ibid 
9 Christian Walter, 'Defining Terrorism in National and International Law' 6-8, to be published in Christian Walter, 
Silja Vöneky, Volker Röben, Frank Schorkopf (Eds), Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law: 
Security versus Liberty? (Springer, 2003) 
https://www.unodc.org/tldb/bibliography/Biblio_Int_humanitarian_law_Walter_2003.pdf accessed 19.07.1014 
10 R. English, Terrorism; How to Respond (OUP, 2009) 19 
11 R. Jacson, L. Jarvis, J. Gunning, and M. Smyth (Eds), Terrorism: A Critical Introduction (New York, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011) 15; see also Jenny Hocking, ‘Counter-Terrorism and the Criminalisation of Politics: Australia’s 
New Security Powers of Detention, Proscription and Control’ (2003) 49 Australian Journal of Politics and History 
355, 
12 Human Rights Council, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Twenty-first session 19–30 January 
2015 (A/HRC/WG.6/21/TUR/3) para 8 
13 Freedom House, Turkey in Transit Democratization in Turkey, (2008) p.16-17 
14 Media Freedom is Part of the Solution to the Kurdish Issues: Turkey October 2015, Reporters Without Borders 
for Freedom of Information, p.23 
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against writers, journalists and publishers.15 The sheer breadth and frequency of prosecutions 
on individuals is posing a threat to the principle of freedom of expression.16 A number of human 
rights defenders and activists have also been prosecuted under specious charges of such as 
“publicly insulting religious values” under article 216 of the Penal Code.17 Admittedly, there 
have been judicial reform packages endorsed between 2010 and 2014 which aim at widening 
the space for freedom of expression. Yet in Turkey, in the last decade, restrictions on freedom 
of expression have increased; particularly noticeable have been new bans on the media, free 
speech and social media. 18 The internet law, for instance, has become another restrictive 
instrument on freedom of expression, leading to an increase in broad measures to block or 
remove online content. There are no official statistics on blocking, but according to 
‘Engelliweb.com’, an independent tracking site, from 2007 to 11 June 2014, an estimated 
48,537 websites have been blocked since the introduction of Law No. 5651 on ‘Regulation of 
Broadcasts via Internet and Prevention of Crimes Committed through Such Broadcasts’.19 Many 
news sites and social platforms, such as YouTube and Twitter have been blocked at different 
stages in the period under review.20 Turkish authorities lifted a ban on Twitter and later on 
YouTube following constitutional court rulings.21 
 
The vague wording of the TPC and TMK has allowed national authorities to prosecute legitimate 
expression without showing any causal link between violent acts and expression.22 Failure to 
seek a causal link between expression and violent acts by the legal and administrative 
authorities has narrowed down the opportunity for freedom of expression in Turkey. This 
situation is exacerbated by the lack of methodological rigour on the part of the authorities (and 
particularly the courts) when assessing restrictions on speech, and attempting to differentiate 
between ‘terroristic speech’ and legitimate expression. For instance, in 2011, investigative 
journalists Ahmet Şık and Nedim Şener were among 14 people arrested during the criminal 
investigation against OdaTV, a news portal known for their dissenting views. This website was 
                                                          
15 International PEN, International Publishers Association and Index on Censorship (NGOs in Consultative Status 
with ECOSOC): Contribution to the 8th session of the Working Group of the Universal Periodic Review Submission 
on Turkey (9 November 2009) p.3 
16 See further, Amnesty International, Turkey: Article 301: How the Law on "Denigrating Turkishness" is an Insult 
to Free Expression, 3 January 2006, EUR 44/003/2006, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/44c611504.html [accessed 11 August 2016] 
17 Joint NGO Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review (CIVICUS and hCa) 21st Session of the UPR Working 
Group (15 June 2014) 3.6 
18 Universal Periodic Review – 21st Session CSW – Stakeholder Submission Turkey (June 2014) 3 
19 ARTICLE 19, the Committee to Protect Journalists, English PEN, Freedom House, P24 and PEN International 
Joint Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review of Turkey (14 June 2014) For consideration at the 21st 
session of the UN working group in January/February 2015, para 61 
20 YOUTUBE and Twitter were blocked few times in 2007-2015 by both court decision or the BTK (Information and 
Communication Technologies authority). See further; 
http://bianet.org/archives/search?utf8=%E2%9C%93&q=youtube&sec=bianet (Accessed on 03.09.2016) 
21 See further; Constitutional Court (App no: 2014/4705) 29/5/2014, Constitutional Court (App no: 2014/3986) 
2/4/2014 
22 ARTICLE 19, the Committee to Protect Journalists, English PEN, Freedom House, P24 and PEN International 
Joint Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review of Turkey (14 June 2014) For consideration at the 21st 
session of the UN working group in January/February 2015, para 31 
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accused of being the ‘media arm’ of illegal organisation ‘Ergenekon’23, and were accused of 
‘knowingly and willingly aiding and abetting an illegal organisation’ (TCK 220/7) and of 
‘membership of an armed organisation’ (TCK 314).24 Again, in 2011, there were a series of 
coordinated operations called ‘the ‘KCK’25 Press operation’, in which 46 journalists working for 
Kurdish media outlets were arrested for their alleged membership of ‘KCK’.26 In January 2016, 
three Turkish academics were arrested on charges of ‘terrorism’ propaganda on the basis that 
they had signed a declaration and read it in a press meeting which accuses the Turkish 
government of carrying out “deliberate massacre and deportation of Kurdish and other peoples 
in the region”.27 Dissenting views on controversial political issues and criticism of public officials 
and institutions have been frequently targeted with criminal prosecutions through the TPC and 
TMK.28 Human Rights Watch (HRW) has extensively reported arbitrary and abusive ‘terrorism’ 
trials of individuals who are mainly political activists, journalists, lawyers, and students. HRW 
also added that it is mainly activities like joining protests, being a member of a pro-Kurdish 
associations, and journalism which were being prosecuted by the authorities in Turkey.29 I 
regard these restrictions – which are surely premised on a highly attenuated causal relationship 
between the speech concerned and any violent act – as demonstrating the troublingly 
precarious level of protection afforded to freedom of expression in present-day Turkey. 
 
In addition to this, most international human rights NGOs agree that Turkey is a place where a 
high number of journalists are jailed or fined due to their professional activities.30 In recent 
                                                          
23 Ergenekon was the name given to an alleged clandestine, secularist ultra-nationalist organization in Turkey with 
possible ties to members of the country's military and security forces. 
24 ARTICLE 19, the Committee to Protect Journalists, English PEN, Freedom House, P24 and PEN International Joint 
Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review of Turkey (14 June 2014) For consideration at the 21st session of 
the UN working group in January/February 2015, para 35; see also, A special report by the Committee to Protect 
Journalists, the Committee to Protect Journalists, Turkey’s Press Freedom Crisis The Dark Days of Jailing Journalists 
and Criminalizing Dissent (October 2012) p.12 
25 KCK is considered as an umbrella organization of PKK, an affiliated terrorist organization of PKK. PKK organizes 
its activities in the urban and rural areas as well as abroad through this new structure. KCK, as an umbrella terrorist 
organization, which aims to put pressure on non-governmental organizations, political parties, local administrators 
and religious leaders in east and south-east of Turkey. 
26 ARTICLE 19, the Committee to Protect Journalists, English PEN, Freedom House, P24 and PEN International 
Joint Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review of Turkey (14 June 2014) For consideration at the 21st 
session of the UN working group in January/February 2015, para 36 
27 See, for example; those were among a group of more than 1,000 scholars who in January 2016 signed a 
declaration denouncing military operations against the PKK. http://turkishmonitor.com/3-turkish-academics-
arrested-over-terror-propaganda-charges-1438/ 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/three-academics-arrested-on-charges-of-terror-
propaganda.aspx?pageID=238&nID=96517&NewsCatID=509See the text of the petition here; 
http://bianet.org/english/human-rights/170978-academics-we-will-not-be-a-party-to-this-crime 
28 Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review of the Republic of Turkey for consideration by the Office of the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights for the 21st session of the UPR Working Group in 2015, para 5 
29 Human Rights Watch, Turkey’s Human Rights Rollback Recommendations for Reform, (2014) p.14 
30 ARTICLE 19, the Committee to Protect Journalists, English PEN, Freedom House, P24 and PEN International 
Joint Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review of Turkey (14 June 2014) For consideration at the 21st 
session of the UN working group in January/February 2015, para 14 
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years, especially after the ‘Gezi Park protests’31 (2013), scores of media workers were unjustly 
dismissed or forced to quit in retaliation for their reporting.32 An increasing number of 
restrictions on freedom of expression have been imposed, inhibiting freedom of the press, 
internet and television content. A number of television stations which had transmitted live 
coverage of the Gezi Park protests were warned, by The Radio and Television Supreme Council 
(RTÜK), that they were “violating the principle of objective broadcasting” and fined them for 
“inciting violence”.33 Recently, after the failed military coup on July 15, 2016,34 16 TV channels, 
3 news agencies, 45 newspapers and  23 radio stations were closed down by governmental 
decree, which is declared only in time of state of emergency, because these media outlets 
belonged to or were associated with ‘Fettullahçı Terör Örgütü (FETÖ/PDY) – Fettulahist 
Terrorist Organisation’ which constituted threat to national security.35  
 
It should of course be recognized that governments must put in place measures aimed at 
preventing violent attacks, and corresponding threats to international and national peace, 
stability and security. Indeed, States have a positive obligation (deriving in part from their 
obligations to ensure the effective protection of rights such as life and property) to take pre-
emptive action to forestall terrorist activities.36 To this limited extent, efforts to eradicate 
                                                          
31 A wave of demonstrations and riot in Turkey began on 28 May 2013, initially to contest the urban development 
plan for Istanbul's Taksim Gezi Park. There was no centralised leadership beyond the small assembly that organized 
the original environmental protest. The sit-in at Taksim Gezi Park was restored after police withdrew from Taksim 
Square on 1 June, and developed into an Occupy-like camp, with thousands of protesters in tents, organising a 
library, medical center, food distribution, and their own media. After the Gezi Park camp was cleared by riot police 
on 15 June, protesters began to meet in other parks all around Turkey and organised public forums to discuss ways 
forward for the protests. Social media played a key part in the protests. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan dismissed the protesters as "a few looters" on 2 June. Police suppressed the protests with tear gas and 
water cannons.3.5 million people are estimated to have taken an active part in almost 5,000 demonstrations 
across Turkey connected with the original Gezi Park protest. 11 people were killed and more than 8,000 were 
injured. 
32 Joint NGO Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review (CIVICUS and hCa) 21st Session of the UPR Working 
Group (15 June 2014) 4.9 
33 European Commission, “Turkey 2013 Progress Report” 16 October 2013 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/brochures/turkey_2013.pdf Accessed on 
25 August 2016, p.52 
34 On 15 July 2016, a coup d'état was attempted in Turkey. The attempt was carried out by an organised faction 
within the Turkish Armed Forces that called themselves the ‘Peace at Home Council’. They attempted to seize 
control of several key places in Ankara, Istanbul, and elsewhere, but failed to do so after forces loyal to the state 
defeated them. Turkish people took over the streets and stood against the coup plotters. 265 people were killed 
and 1440 people were wounded by the plotters. Berktay argues that this coup attempt “was spearheaded by an 
ominously significant number of divisional or brigadier (one-star and two-star) generals belonging to the Gulenist 
congregation, and imbued with a cultic belief in its founder, Fethullah Gulen.” (Halil Berktay, ‘What if the 
attempted coup in Turkey had succeeded?’ http://serbestiyet.com/yazarlar/halil-berktay/what-if-the-attempted-
coup-in-turkey-had-succeeded-710217) 
35 Governmatal Decree, Karar No: KHK/668, Sayı: 29783 2. Mükerrer (27 July 2016) p.61-3 
36 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
while countering terrorism, Ben Emmerson: Framework principles for securing the human rights of victims of 
terrorism* (A/HRC/20/14) 4 June 2012 at 29; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the protection and promotion 
of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Mr. Abid Hussain: (E/CN.4/1999/64) 29 January 1999 at 20 
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‘terrorism’ – potentially including 'terroristic speech',37 may be regarded as being in pursuit of 
a justified goal. Many ‘terrorist’ constitute serious human rights violations, especially the right 
to life, liberty and security, as well as the full range of civil and political, and economic, social 
and cultural rights, due to their effect, scale or intensity.38 Indeed, ‘criminalisation of incitement 
to violence’ can also be justified in order to deny proponents of ‘terrorism’ the ‘oxygen of 
publicity’.39 As this thesis will argue, however, the potential for such ‘positive obligations’ to be 
given an unduly expansive interpretation pointedly illustrates the paradox of ‘state centricity’ 
at the heart of human rights law. 
 
Political violence and ‘terrorism’ have been one of the long lasting and major problems 
challenging Turkey’s political, legal, economic and security matters. The majority of the terrorist 
incidents in the 1970s were carried out by leftist and rightist groups, and Kurdish armed 
extremists also contributed to the spiralling of political violence, particularly during the 1980s 
and 1990s.40 Ideological battles between leftist and rightist groups turned into armed clashes 
in the 1970s.41 The Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) was responsible for the escalation of violence 
in Eastern and South-eastern Turkey.42 The PKK has involved in drugs, arson and human 
trafficking and had been responsible for the deaths of 40,000 people all of whom were 
members of the security forces, civilians, civil servants (including teachers), medical doctors 
and nurses.43 In 2016 alone, over 500 members of the security forces and 300 civilians were 
killed by PKK attacks (including suicide bomb attacks).44 It is crucial, therefore, to identify to 
what extent expressive acts (propaganda, praising, indoctrination or justification) played a role 
in this violent context. For instance, Watts argues, that there are important organisational 
differences between the PKK and pro-Kurdish political institutions, even though most of their 
members have close personal relationships with the PKK and support it ideologically.45  
 
                                                          
37 For an explanation of the use the term ‘terroristic speech’ in this thesis, see the section on ‘Methodology’ below. 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
while countering terrorism, Ben Emmerson: Framework principles for securing the human rights of victims of 
terrorism* (A/HRC/20/14) 4 June 2012 at 19; see for instance, ECHR, Osman v. The United Kingdom (App no: 
87/1997/871/1083), paras. 115-116 
38 Ben Saul, Defining 'Terrorism' to Protect Human Rights. D. Staines, ed., Interrogating the War on Terror: 
Interdisciplinary Perspective, (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, UK, 2007) 191-2 
39 Martin Scheinin, “Limits to freedom of expression: lessons from counter-terrorism” in Tarlach McGonagle and 
Yvonne Donders (Ed.), The UN and Freedom of Expression (CUP: 2015) 428 
40 Sabri Sayari, ‘Political Violence and Terrorism in Turkey, 1976–80 A Retrospective Analysis’, (2010) 22/2 
Terrorism and Political Violence, 198-215, 203 
41 Ibid, 201 
42 See further; Andrew Mango, Turkey and the War on Terror: For Forty Years We Fought Alone (London: 
Routledge, 2005) 31-57 
43 Human Rights Council Fifteenth Session Agenda item 6 Report of the Working Group on the Universal 
Periodic Review on Turkey (A/HRC/15/13) 17 June 2010 para 63 
44 See further; http://www.internethaber.com/tsk-1-yillik-pkk-bilancosunu-acikladi-1595693h.htm; 
http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2016/03/29/terorun-bilancosu 
45 Nicole F. Watts, ‘Activists in Office: Pro-Kurdish Contentious Politics in Turkey’ (2006) 5/2 Ethnopolitics 125-144, 
127  
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Turkey again encountered intense violent attacks after the civil war started in Syria and Iraq 
when many new armed groups appeared. Some of these groups such as Al-Qaida,46 and ISIS 
(DAESH)47 have also been active in Turkey committing suicide bombing attacks among civilians 
and launching rockets at Turkish cities near the Syrian border. The PKK is also one of the players 
in the Syrian conflict causing Turkey security problems through the Democratic Union Party 
(PYD) which is its branch in Syria.48 The threat of violent ‘terrorist’ attack poses a serious and 
growing danger to Turkey, damaging the country’s social and economic development and its 
citizens’ freedom to enjoy their human rights. For these reasons, Turkey must endeavour to 
take affective, but narrowly-targeted measures in accordance with its obligations under 
international law.49 Turkey must avoid broad sweep of restrictions on the right to freedom of 
expression because of threat of ‘terrorism’. Seeking a causal link between expression and act 
of terrorism gives a strong position for Turkish courts to stop criminalising broad range of 
expression. 
 
Turkey signed the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), where the right to freedom of expression is 
enshrined. The European Union granted full membership candidacy status to Turkey in 1999, 
which was a political turning point leading the country to progress. Since then Turkey has 
invested in the European Union guidelines and recommendations via constitutional 
amendments and reform packages on human rights, especially on freedom of expression. 
Turkey’s human rights commitments under ECHR and ICCPR have resulted in progressive 
developments in domestic free speech jurisprudence. Here, not only have a number of 
progressive Constitutional amendments been passed (seemingly conferring greater protection 
on freedom of speech), but the doctrinal principles that structure the reasoning of both the 
Strasbourg court and the UN Human Rights Committee, and the Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination (CERD) have also been imported, to some degree, into the reasoning 
of the domestic courts.50 These amendments aim at expanding the scope and the extent of 
right to security of person, freedom of opinion and expression, privacy of individual life, 
freedom of association, and right to participate in political life.51 As a consequence of one these 
                                                          
46 The al-Nusra Front, or Jabhat al-Nusra sometimes called al-Qaeda in Syria or al-Qaeda in the Levant. 
47 The self-proclaimed “Islamic State” is a militant movement that has conquered territory in western Iraq and 
eastern Syria. It is also called Daesh. 
48 This is a left-wing Kurdish political party established in 2003 in northern Syria. The PYD is a member organisations 
of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK). It considers jailed PKK and KCK founder Abdullah Öcalan as its 
ideological leader and Democratic Confederalism its ideology. It incorporates into the United Kurdish Community 
in Western Kurdistan (KCK – Rojava) with its own organisational identity. 
49 Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005) (emphasis added)  
50 Human Rights Council Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review Eighth session Geneva, (3-14 May 2010) 
National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 15 (a) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 
5/1 (A/HRC/WG.6/8/TUR/1) para 15; See further, H. Keller, and A. Stone Sweet, A Europe of Rights: The Impact of 
the ECHR on National Legal Systems (OUP: 2008)  
51 Human Rights Council Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review Eighth session Geneva, (3-14 May 2010) 
National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 15 (a) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 
5/1 (A/HRC/WG.6/8/TUR/1) para 15 
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amendments, it is now possible for an individual to lodge a complaint concerning a violation of 
Convention rights with the Constitutional Court, following a milestone Constitutional 
amendment in 2010 (which came into force in 2012). This has, at a minimum, served to 
enhance the rigour with which restrictions on speech are scrutinized at the national level.52 In 
overarching terms of ‘terrorism’ and political violence, however, a contradiction emerges in 
which human rights norms appear to pull in opposite directions. States can, apparently without 
contradiction, ratify human rights treaties protecting speech; whilst at the same time rely on 
‘anti-terror’ laws to impose far-reaching restrictions upon it. This contradiction ultimately 
stems from the state-centricity of human rights law.53 It is always an issue of critical importance 
to find a fine tune balance between national security problems (terrorism) and the right to 
freedom of expression, in order to achieve a democratic society and to apply the principles of 
freedom of expression in a political-legal system.  
 
In this thesis, particular attention is given to the impact of Turkey’s anti-terrorism regime on 
the freedom of expression of individuals, journalists, academics and politicians, with 
consideration of the right to freedom of expression under the ECHR and ICCPR. The thesis 
evaluates the extent to which Turkey can be said to satisfy its obligations under these treaties 
to protect freedom of expression in the context of Turkey’s fight against ‘terrorism’.  
 
1.2) Methodology 
 
The term ‘terroristic speech’54 is used here as an umbrella term which captures not only speech 
that might be regarded as direct incitement to acts of ‘terrorism’ but also indirect incitement 
(including ‘propaganda’, ‘incitement’, ‘call for violence’, ‘glorification’, ‘apology’ and ‘praising’) 
and indeed other offences (such as incitement to hatred or animosity) which might be used to 
impose criminal liability on speech that, in the State’s view, encourages or otherwise relates to 
‘terrorism’.55 Acts of terrorism are broadly defined in the criminal law. This extends criminal 
liability beyond the broadly defined terrorist offences to include inchoate forms.56 'Terroristic 
speech' thus embraces a wide range of seemingly discrete offences, differentiated primarily by 
                                                          
52 H. A. Özhan, ‘Application of Decisions of European Court of Human Rights in Contracting Parties’, (2001) 6 Liberal 
Thought, p.51.  
53 As David Kennedy has argued: ‘Although the human rights vocabulary expresses relentless suspicion of the State, 
by structuring emancipation as a relationship between an individual right holder and the State, human rights 
places the State at the centre of the emancipatory promise.’ See, D Kennedy, ‘The international human rights 
movement: part of the problem?’ EHRLR (2001) 245, at 255-256. 
54 Similar use can be seen in other academic papers, for example, Michael Hamilton, ‘The Misrule of Law? 
“Terrorist Speech”, Human Rights and the Legal Construction of Risk’, in P. Bard, (ed.) The Rule of Law and 
Terrorism (HVG-ORAC: 2015), 151-174; Laura Donohue, ‘Terrorist Speech and the Future of Free Expression’, 
(2005) 27Cardozo Law Review, 233-341 
55  See, for example, Shawn Marie Boyne, ‘Free Speech, Terrorism, and European Security: Defining and Defending 
the Political Community’, (2010) 30/2 Pace Law Review 417-483 
56 Craig Forcese & Kent Roach, ‘Criminalizing Terrorism Babble: Canada’s Dubious New Terrorist Crime’, (2015) 
53/1 Albert Law Review 35-84, 53 
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the active verb (e.g. disseminating; supporting; propagating; apologizing for; advocating; 
encouraging; promoting; defending; glorifying; venerating; provoking; inciting, praising etc.). 
This term covers expression which may fall within the bounds of ‘hate speech’, ’incitement to 
hatred or animosity’ or other discriminatory expression, to limited extent in which the courts 
may use them to criminalise expression related to terrorism. 57  In addition to this, while 
analysing three different jurisprudences in this thesis, giving to very limited and particular scope 
to ‘terroristic speech’ does not provide inclusive approach to cover all the relevant offences 
given in these legal systems.58 For that reasons, this term provides a pragmatic and convenient 
shorthand reference in this thesis for all sorts of expressions which may directly or indirectly 
incite acts of terrorism.  
 
This thesis takes an exclusively doctrinal approach. Its focus is on case law analyses of Turkey's 
Yargıtay and Constitutional Court, of the European Court of Human Rights, of the UN Human 
Rights Committee and the UN Committee on the UN Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD). The thesis also incorporates and evaluates various observations, legislative discussions, 
reports, comments and solutions that have been generated by legislators, courts, authorities, 
and academics. While primarily legal in origin, the thesis draws on inter-disciplinary work from 
the fields of politics and political theory, ‘terrorism’ studies and sociology. In consideration of 
these primary and secondary sources, this thesis offers its own analysis, inference and 
suggestions, which renders it an original doctoral thesis.  
In broad terms, the thesis contains an original comparative assessment of the interplay 
between on one hand the right to freedom of expression (specifically ‘terroristic speech' and 
its echo (sedition) from the past), and on the other the national security narrative under three 
related legal regimes. These regimes are national, regional and international: the Turkish 
Constitution, the European Convention, the International Covenant (ICCPR and ICERD) 
respectively. This involved combing through these three jurisdictions’ ‘internet databases’59 
                                                          
57 In Turkey, for instance, domestic courts used article 216 (incitement to hatred and animosity) to prosecute 
individuals on the basis that their expression incites others to further acts of terrorism. Thus, such expression fits 
into the ‘terroristic speech’ category.  
58 For instance, Hupf defines “terroristic speech” as speech falling under the Homeland Security Act’s definition of 
“terrorism” - a) any activity that involves an act that i) is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of 
critical infrastructure or key resources; and ii) is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any State 
or other subdivision of the United States; and b) appears to be intended i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian 
population, ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or iii) to affect the conduct of 
a government by mass destruction, assignation, or kidnapping. 6 U.S.C. §101(16) (Supp. III 2009). See in, Robert 
Hupf. ""Step Into the Game": Assessing the Interactive Nature of Virtual Reality Video Games Through the Context 
of "Terroristic Speech"" ExpressO (2014) Available at: http://works.bepress.com/robert_hupf/3/ (accessed on 
22.09.1016) 
59 Turkey's Constitutional Court and Yargıtay case law database: 
http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/icsayfalar/kararlar/kbb.html (official) 
http://emsal.yargitay.gov.tr/VeriBankasiIstemciWeb/ (official); there are also unofficial databases: 
http://www.hukukturk.com/ictihat http://legalbank.net/mahkeme-kararlari 
http://www.kazanci.com/kho2/ibb/giris.htm 
The European Court cases from the Council of Europe`s HUDOC database; Human Rights Bodies Jurisprudence: 
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights' database; http://juris.ohchr.org/ (official), There are two 
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searching for all freedom of expression cases, and given the focus of the thesis, limited to those 
which related specifically to 'sedition' and 'terroristic speech'. The selection of case-law for 
analysis and discussion was thus made after searching specific terms (such as 'terror', 
'terrorism', 'violence' or 'political violence' and linking each to ‘freedom of expression’ or 
‘freedom of speech’ or ‘free speech’) under the categories of article 10 of the Convention; 
article 19 and 20 of the ICCPR, article 4 of CERD, and article 29 of the Turkish Constitution, by 
using the databases. In Yargıtay’s case law, I searched by using those specific terms in relation 
to the specific offences of 'sedition' and 'terroristic speech' under the Turkish Criminal Code 
and the Law to Fight Terrorism. Yargıtay differs from the other courts because it is a court of 
last instance, for reviewing judgments of both criminal and civil courts as well as supervising 
the evidentiary findings of facts used in first instance courts. As a form of double-checking, the 
unofficial ‘internet databases’ were utilised, and each result was checked to see if it matched 
the parameters of relevance established for the official court reports. This was especially 
important for the case law of both Yargıtay and of the Committee. The case law of the 
Constitutional Court and Yargıtay was critical here to underpin the main argument in the thesis 
demonstrating that modern-day offences relating to ‘terroristic speech’ bear a striking 
resemblance to the older offences of ‘sedition’ and ‘treason’ so as to be able to analyse them 
critically in the light of regional and international standards. 
1.3) Thesis Outline 
This thesis is divided into parts and chapters each of which seeks to analyse Turkey’s High 
Courts’ legal responses to ‘terroristic speech’ in the light of regional (the ECtHR) and 
international (the Human Rights Committee) standards. In the light of the background and 
motivation above, the discussion chapters aim to determine potential answers to the thesis 
question. In this sense, the second chapter will provide background information for the analysis 
in the following chapters on the case laws of the Turkish 'High Courts’, the ECtHR and UN 
Human Rights Committee. In this chapter, the terms of ‘political violence’ and ‘terrorism’ will 
be closely examined in order to understand the definitional problem underlying modern-day 
offences of 'terroristic speech'. It will also be demonstrated that there is a close resemblance 
between 'terroristic speech' and ‘sedition’ because ‘terrorism’ is a form of ‘political violence’ 
and carries political nature. This resemblance is shown to rely on both the similarities and 
differences between the elements of these offences (namely, the mens rea, the actus reus, the 
weight placed on the content and context of expression). It will conclude by suggesting that 
rationales (self-fulfilment, truth, pluralist democracy, and tolerance) for the right to freedom 
of expression which may, on occasion, be important philosophical reasons for protecting 
‘terroristic speech’. The third chapter will explore the doctrinal principles relied upon within 
these different national and supra-national legal systems. It also provides a comparative 
overview of how these principles have impacted upon the protection of the right to freedom 
                                                          
amore unofficial case law databases that provide access to communications; http://www.ccprcentre.org/  and 
Netherlands Institute of Human Rights (http://sim.rebo.uu.nl/en/)  
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of expression in these three systems. This chapter will also explore some concepts which allow 
courts to diminish the protection of freedom of expression. 
In the next three chapters, case law analysis of Turkey’s Yargitay and the Constitutional Court 
(chapter 4), the ECtHR (chapter 5) and the Human Rights Committee (chapter 6) will be 
conducted through selected cases by using the methodology specified above. In these 
chapters, the first sections will analyse the courts’ response to freedom of expression issues 
where speakers have been convicted due to their purported connection with ‘terrorism’ or 
‘political violence’ under ‘sedition law’ or ‘anti-terrorism’ law. These sections will analyse these 
jurisprudences’ responses to expressions advocating ‘political violence’ and ‘terrorism’ 
separately, in order to capture a chronological perspective on how Turkey and Regional-
International Human Rights instruments have responded to ‘terroristic speech’. In the second 
sections of these chapters, further analyse the elements of these offences fall upon ‘sedition’ 
and ‘terroristic speech’, including actus reus, content and context of expression, publicity and 
audience exposure, probability of specific harm, and mens rea of the speaker. The analysis of 
these elements is important to know how these jurisprudences sought to differentiate 
legitimate political expression from ‘seditious’ and ‘terroristic expression’. While the ECtHR has 
provided a well-facilitated evidential doctrine, the Human Rights Committee and Turkey’s 
Courts have failed to generate a well-structured methodological rigour. Each of these elements 
will be evaluated separately under these sections. Lastly, chapter 7 brings all the findings of the 
previous chapters together, and evaluates Turkey’s High Courts response to ‘terroristic speech’ 
in the light of the ECtHR’s and Human Rights Committee’s response to the same.  
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CHAPTER 2: ‘TERRORISTIC SPEECH’ IN CONTEXT 
 
2.1) Introduction 
 
Much scholarly attention has focused on the incremental extension of criminal liability for 
‘terroristic speech’. Critics have properly focused on overbroad statutory provisions that 
impose sweeping restrictions on freedom of expression.1 It is argued in this thesis that not only 
do such enactments reflect the widely-acknowledged preventive turn in criminal law,2 but that 
this preventive turn is itself underwritten by positive obligations imposed by human rights law. 
In the realm of freedom of speech, these obligations most obviously derive from UN Security 
Council Resolution 1624 (2005); Article 5 of the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on the 
Prevention of Terrorism, and the Council of the European Union Framework Decision on 
Combating Terrorism of November 28, 2008.3 In short, the thesis argues that widely-framed 
anticipatory restrictions on freedom of speech have been introduced ostensibly in satisfaction 
of States’ positive obligations to protect others from the threat of terrorism. 
 
It will be demonstrated that modern-day offences relating to ‘terroristic speech’ bear a striking 
resemblance to older (and in some jurisdictions, now archaic) offences of ‘sedition’ and 
‘treason’. The second chapter thus traces the historical evolution of offences that impose 
criminal liability for ‘terroristic speech’, identifying how these are both similar to, and different 
from, offences falling within the category of ‘sedition’. The second chapter also sets out two 
further foundational arguments on which the thesis rests: (1) the implications of the failure to 
define ‘terrorism’ upon the protection of speech; and (2) the philosophical argument against 
restricting ‘terroristic speech’ (particularly speech that is vulnerable to restriction under 
broadly-framed offences that give primacy to the constitutional identity of the State). These 
two foundational arguments are summarized briefly in turn below. 
 
In order to clarify ‘terrorism’ as the basis for restricting freedom of speech, political violence as 
its actual root should be discussed. Political violence reflects some very similar features to 
terrorism, such as its being hard to define, having unstable boundaries, and having a political 
nature. In this regard, even before the terrorism era, certain specific forms and modes of 
expression have always been treated as a source of evil and a recourse to violence by states in 
particular periods, referring to political violence such as rebellion, revolution etc. The legal 
                                                          
1 Offences such as sedition, treason, praising, propaganda, encouragement, etc. 
2 See Further; J McCulloch, and D Wilson, Pre-crime: Pre-emption, precaution and the future (Routledge: 2015); 
Lucia Zedner, ‘Pre-Crime and Post-Criminology?’ (2007)11(2) Theoretical Criminology 261; Jude McCulloch and 
Sharon Pickering, ‘Pre-crime and counter-terrorism: imagining future crime in the ‘war on terror’’, (2009) 49 Brit. 
J. Criminology 628  
3 For example, M. Hamilton, ‘The Misrule of Law? “Terrorist Speech”, Human Rights and the Legal Construction of 
Risk’, in P. Bard, (ed.) The Rule of Law and Terrorism (HVG-ORAC: 2015), 151-174, 162. 
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pedigree of the speech-related offences upon which this thesis focuses (i.e. their close 
resemblance to the historical offence of ‘sedition’) points to a deeper-level problem concerning 
the invocation of ‘terrorism’ as the basis for restricting freedom of speech. In the past, 
perceived risks to the integrity and security of the State have emerged in the form of discrete 
ideological ‘-isms’ (such as ‘communism’ and ‘national socialism’). Today, however, these have 
been supplanted by more amorphous and all-encompassing ‘-isms’ – ‘fundamentalism’, 
‘radicalism’ and ‘extremism’.  
 
This thesis is premised on the argument that the reinvention of archaic offences of sedition 
during the modern ‘human rights era’, can be traced to the underlying failure to narrowly 
define the nature of the risk posed. This, at root, mirrors the fundamental inability of the 
international community to agree upon a definition of ‘terrorism’. Indeed, the paradigm of 
‘terrorism’ is used as a pejorative term and a delegitimizing tool by those in power:4 ‘terrorism’ 
has been used as a rhetorical instrument by State actors to deny the possible legitimacy, not 
only of particular acts of politically motivated violence, but also of a wide spectrum of 
‘terroristic speech’ that challenges a State’s constitutional identity.5 This lack of attention to 
the definition of ‘terrorism’ has contributed to clear deficits in the level of constitutional 
scrutiny afforded to restrictions on speech. Human rights law, in turn, has been emasculated – 
failing to reign in the excesses of terrorism-related offences that stand to seriously erode 
constitutional speech protections. States have been able to draw upon the seemingly 
unassailable counter-terrorism narrative (itself, grounded in inter-State consensus) that strong 
measures must be taken to combat international ‘terrorism’. On this basis, the conclusions of 
the thesis focus less on the development and entrenchment of human rights norms (which are 
inherently compromised because of their state-centricity), and emphasize instead the critical 
importance of precise and narrowly-drawn definitions in criminal law. By examining the specific 
elements of different criminal law offences, it is possible to assess the degree to which modern-
day offences related to 'terroristic speech' resemble, or differ from, ‘sedition’ and ’treason’. 
The elements of these offences also play a key role in producing narrowly-drawn definitions for 
these offences in criminal law, which may in turn determine the extent to which freedom of 
expression is likely to be protected. In particular, the thesis points to the importance of 
incorporating the requirements of ‘intent’ – which, as Leslie Kendrick has recently argued, helps 
provide ‘breathing space’ for protected speech.6 In contrast, having vague, broadly-defined and 
unclear criminal law offences which impose strict liability (irrespective of a speaker’s intention) 
in domestic criminal and anti-terror laws constitutes contradictions which ought to be 
                                                          
4 Richards Anthony, 'Conceptualizing Terrorism' (2014) 37/3 Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 213, 216. See also, 
Reuven Young, ‘Defining Terrorism: The Evaluation of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in International Law and Its 
Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation’ (2006) 29 Boston College International and Comparative Law 
Review 27 
5 L. Stampnitzky, Disciplining Terror: How ‘Experts’ Invented Terrorism (CUP: 2013); Martin Scheinin, ‘Politically 
Motivated Violence and Acts of Terror: Conceptual and Legal Issues’ (The International Council on Human Rights 
Policy: Eight Annual International Council Meeting: ‘Terrorism and Human Rights: Discussing Politically Motivated 
Violence’, Lahore, 2005) para 20. 
6 L., Kendrick, ‘Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect’ 54 William & Mary Law Rev 1633-1691 (2012-13), 
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incompatible with States’ human rights commitments. These also play a crucial role in deciding 
whether modern-day offences related to 'terroristic speech' resemble, or differ from, 
‘sedition’/’treason’. 
 
Former special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms Martin Scheinin, noted that there is the need for laws to adhere to the principle of 
legal certainty and to be clearly and precisely drawn while countering terrorism.7 The law which 
restrict the right to freedom of expression, must be precisely prescribed by law in Turkey. The 
thesis adopts as a benchmark, the model offence of incitement to terrorism proposed by the 
(then) UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, Martin Scheinin in 
December 2010.8 
 
‘It is an offence to intentionally and unlawfully distribute or otherwise make available a 
message to the public with the intent to incite the commission of a terrorist offence, 
where such conduct, whether or not expressly advocating terrorist offences, causes a 
danger that one or more such offences may be committed.’ 
 
This model definition provides a useful measure against which to assess the offences contained 
in the Turkish Penal Code (‘TPC’) and the Law on the Fight against Terrorism (‘TMK’) – and more 
broadly, to think about how criminal law provisions which purport to address harms arising 
from ‘terroristic speech’ might most appropriately be drafted. In this regard, definitional 
imprecision is a recurring theme in the thesis.  
 
This chapter aims to provide background information for the analysis, in the following chapters, 
of the case laws of the Turkish 'High Courts',9 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and 
UN Human Rights Committee. Furthermore, this chapter consists of three sections: Section 2.2 
                                                          
7 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
while countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin, E/CN.4/2006/98, para 45-47 
8 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
while countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin, 22 December 2010, A/HRC/16/51.; Human Rights Watch, Protesting 
as a Terrorist Offense The Arbitrary Use of Terrorism Laws to Prosecute and Incarcerate Demonstrators in Turkey, 
(November 2010) p.62 
9 The Turkish Constitutional Court was established by the 1961 Constitution of Turkey. The composition, powers 
and structure of the Court were changed considerably and the right to individual application to the Constitutional 
Court was introduced by constitutional amendments in 2010. With the actual implementation of the individual 
application started from 23 September 2012, the constitutional review has been implemented against any 
infringements of rights caused by persons or institutions exerting public authority. 
Yargıtay: The Supreme Court unifies judgements and supervises the evidentiary of facts of the crimes by evaluating 
the decisions of first instance courts. This Court is divided into civil law and criminal law chambers (hukuk ve ceza 
daireleri). There are 21 civil law and 21 criminal law chambers. Most of the cases subjected to this research were 
examined by the Criminal Chambers of the Supreme Court of Appeal hereinafter “YCD", (most of the relevant 
cases being evaluated by the 9th Criminal Law Chamber (hereinafter Y (9) C.D)) and the Supreme Court of Appeal 
Assembly of Criminal Chambers hereinafter “YCGK”. On 12.6.2016, the 9th Criminal Law Chamber’s assigned 
position was transferred to the 16th Criminal Law Chamber. Thereafter, relevant judgements on ‘terroristic 
speech’ are to be given by this chamber.  
21 
 
examines the related concepts of ‘political violence’ and ‘terrorism’ in order to understand the 
definitional problem underlying modern-day offences of 'terroristic speech'. Section 2.3 
observes that political dissent has faced extraordinary challenges during particular historical 
epochs, and drawing on the argument made by Vincent Blasi,10  proposed that the courts’ 
approach to restrictions on speech should therefore be informed and guided by the 
‘pathological perspective’ – a perspective which takes full account of the threat to freedom of 
speech in ‘the worst of times’. This section also argues that contemporary offences relating to 
'terroristic speech' bear a striking resemblance to older offences of ‘sedition’ and ‘treason’; 
identifying both the similarities and differences between the elements of these offences 
(namely, the mens rea, the actus reus, the weight placed on the content of expression and 
relative significance afforded to the context of expression). Section 2.4 emphasizes that there 
may, on occasion, be important philosophical reasons for protecting ‘terroristic speech’. 
Chapter 2 thus concludes by overviewing the rationales commonly relied upon to protect 
freedom of expression (self-fulfilment, truth, pluralist democracy, and tolerance), suggesting 
that these rationales hold equally true in relation to some categories of what might be classified 
as ‘terroristic speech’. 
 
2.2) Impact of Ill-Defined Basis of 'Political Violence' and 'Terrorism' on the Right to Freedom of 
Expression  
 
Perceived risks to the integrity and security of the State have often emerged in the form of 
political violence. As discussed below, some forms of ‘political violence’ have come to be 
regarded and labelled – often arbitrarily – as ‘terrorism’; in other words, ‘terrorism’ exists as a 
sub-category, carved out of the wider category of ‘political violence’. Both concepts share an 
essential core in that they are aimed, subjectively, at the overthrow or destruction of the 
existing political order. 11 At this basic level, it can be said that both ‘political violence’ and 
‘terrorism’ are threat to the creation of a stable, peaceful and democratic order.12 However, 
when such risks are believed to emanate from the spoken word, reliance on ‘terrorism’ as a 
basis for justifying and explaining restrictions on freedom of speech, becomes deeply 
problematic. To demonstrate this further, the following section examines the nature of 
‘political violence’ and ‘terrorism’ in order to highlight the deeper-level definitional problem of 
‘terrorism’. The failure to precisely define ‘terrorism’ has enabled it to be used to provide a 
justificatory narrative for the creation of sweeping and over-inclusive restrictions on freedom 
of expression. 
 
                                                          
10 V. Blasi, ‘The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment’ 85(4) Columbia Law Review 449-514 (April 
1985). 
11 Anthony (n. 4) 219 
12 Martha Crenshaw (Ed.), Terrorism, Legitimacy and Power: The Consequences of Political Power (Wesleyan 
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2.2.1) Political Violence 
The term ‘political violence’ is generally used to refer to attacks occurring within a political 
community against the incumbent political authorities by competing political groups, where 
the violence aims at challenging specific policies or the structures of political power.13 Political 
violence threatens the political system of a state in two main ways: firstly, it confronts the 
monopoly of force imputed to the state in political theory, and secondly, it interferes with 
normal and routine political processes.14 ‘Political violence’ however, is a difficult concept to 
classify and to analyse because, it is capable of subsuming the actions of individuals and 
collectives with widely varying motivations and psychological influences.15  
 
An act of political violence has two overlapping levels: one that is intended to achieve a specific 
physical result, and the other, generally claimed by perpetrators, intended to convey a message 
about the political system16 and related constitutional and policy issues.17 The concept of 
‘political violence’ thus embraces acts of revolution, guerrilla wars, coups d'états, rebellions, 
riots and similar attempts to bring about fundamental socio-political change through violent 
means.18 Wilkinson defines political violence as the infliction, or threat of infliction, of physical 
injury or damage in order to achieve one’s political will, which is committed either deliberately 
or which occurs unintentionally during political conflict.19 The basic condition for the 
perpetration of political violence is often thought to be discontent arising from perceptions of 
relative deprivation.20 The extent of political violence is, in turn, determined by the intensity of 
political discontent.21  
 
Furthermore, the types of violence used may differ based on the political purposes served. The 
following classification developed by Wilkinson can be used to explain different types of 
political violence by their general aims: 1) ‘inter-communal violence’ aims to defend (or extend) 
group interests in conflict with enemy ethnic or religious groups; 2) ‘remonstrative violence’ 
purports to persuade governments to remedy grievances by expressing anger through violent 
protest; 3) ‘praetorian violence’ (which is more severe) uses coercion in order to change a 
government's leadership and policy; 4) ‘repression’ seeks  to subjugate genuine or potential 
opposition and dissent, 5) ‘resistance’ is  aimed at opposition to, and prevention of, a 
government establishing authority and executing its laws, 6) ‘terroristic violence’ aims to 
compromise political will by systematically using murders and destruction or by threatening 
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murderer or distractions, 7) ‘revolution’ and ‘counter-revolution’ seek to overthrow the 
existing political system, to replace it with a new regime, and so any kind of violence to be used, 
and finally, 8) ‘war’ is designed to achieve political gains through military victory against an 
enemy.22 The main issue here is the legitimacy of these typologies, which may differ according 
to the political context, and those who define it. Thus perceived risks to the integrity and 
security of the State that emerged in the form of discrete ideological ‘-isms’, such as 
‘communism’ and ‘national socialism’, were considered as a source of revolution, counter-
revolution, repression, or war. 
 
Societies might experience some forms of political violence and not others,23 but Wilkinson’s 
typology importantly demonstrates that ‘terrorism’ can be understood as just one form of 
political violence (out of many) that can emerge in a given polity. 24 However, as the following 
section reveals, history tells us that perceived risks to the integrity and security of the State 
have often been attributed to ideological ‘-isms’ (such as ‘socialism’ or ‘communism’), and 
while these might be viewed as having resorted to ‘remonstrative violence’ or acts of 
‘resistance’, their proponents have, during particular historical epochs, also been labelled as 
‘terrorists’. As such, the typology raises a key question about who defines particular 
manifestations of violence. The following section argues that the power to define one’s 
opponent as a ‘terrorist’ has increasingly, in the latter part of the twentieth century, become a 
means of detracting legitimacy from oppositional or dissenting groups. This suggests a shift in 
the way that ‘terrorism’ is understood – no longer as merely one type of political violence, but 
rather as conceptually distinct on account of its international character and moral repugnance. 
 
2.2.2) Terrorism  
‘Terrorism’ was broadly studied, at least until the early 1970s, as a sub-category of ‘political 
violence’, capable of being committed by both state and non-state actors alike. The 
phenomenon of ‘terrorism’ was thus regarded as one type of ‘political violence’ amongst others 
(including war, insurgency, repression, and revolution), and was neither defined principally in 
moral terms, nor singled out from other forms of political violence for moralistic 
condemnation.25 Acts of ‘terrorism’ were generally reported descriptively, simply, for example, 
as ‘bombings’, ‘assassinations’, ‘armed assault’, ‘kidnappings’, and ‘hijackings’.26 It is important 
to point out that in the 1960s and 1970s, Western states and their allies were struggling with 
anti-colonial movements, as well as with left wing guerrilla groups and revolutionary 
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insurgencies in different parts of the world.27 These included `communist terrorism` in the 
Malayan insurgency, the Front de Liberation in Algeria, and the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation during the Cold War era.28 Brian Jenkins argues that ‘terrorism’ has evolved since 
the late 1960s when rural guerrilla movements in Latin America, inspired by Fidel Castro and 
leftist revolutionaries, paid more attention to moving their combat activities to cities.29 Rural 
guerrillas might win battles that nobody receives any news about, but when acts of violence 
occurred in a major city it became more newsworthy on national and international levels.30 This 
concerted shift to urban settings was accompanied by another tactic intended to capture media 
attention – the targeting of foreigners such as diplomats rather than locals, and sensational 
action such as the hijacking of airlines and seizing of hostages (for instance, by the Palestinian 
group ‘Black September’ during the Munich Olympics in 1972).31 Radical students also adopted 
terroristic tactics after turning away from mass protest in Europe, the US and Japan in the 
1960s.32 As such, some have explained the evolution of the concept of ‘terrorism’ since the 
1970s primarily in terms of the extreme nature of the attacks involved, and the fact that these 
are predominantly of an international character.33 As Brian Jenkins argues, international 
terrorism consists of incidents that have clear international consequences: such as the striking 
of targets abroad, attacking victims because of their connection to a foreign country, or 
attacking international commercial lines.34 
This way of understanding the shift in ‘terrorism’ discourse is underpinned by an emphasis on 
‘globalisation’ and related advances in communication technologies (thereby enabling greater 
access to explosives and weapons, and enhancing mobility for those seeking to engage in 
‘terrorist’ activity).35 These developments have also allowed groups to have a decentralised 
organisational structure with a horizontal network rather than a hierarchy.36 This purported 
shift was most obviously witnessed in the events of 11 September 2001, and the ensuing 
international reaction.37 The 9/11 attacks were planned abroad, committed by foreigners, 
supported by outsiders, the victims were from different countries and its influence was 
worldwide. They combined elements of ‘religious terrorism’, ‘right-wing extremism’, ‘low 
intensity conflict’, ‘weapons of mass destruction’, driven by religious, millennial, or even 
nihilistic motivation (in contrast, for example, with political nationalism, or Marxist 
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motivations).38 The attacks of 9/11 prepared the ground for national and international 
authorities to declare a `war on terror`.39   
Whereas traditional national terrorist groups such as IRA, ETA, LTTE, and PKK had limited goals 
of bringing about radical change in one particular state or region, the agenda of religiously 
motivated ‘terrorist’ organisations such as Al Qaeda was to change the whole international 
system, premised on a hatred for (and rejection of) Western and especially American values, 
culture, and civilization.40 For this reason, the US government stated that the ‘war on terror’ is 
against an ideology rather than an organised entity.41   
However, ‘terrorism’ is today simply a neutral, descriptive term reserved for dramatic attacks 
of an international character motivated by zealous extremism with no adequate explanation 
and it is often highly selective term used primarily by domestic actors. There is an alternative 
explanation for the growth of the term ‘terrorism’. Stampnitzky argues that so-called terrorism 
‘experts’ sought to replace the discourse of ‘political violence’ with the concept of ‘terrorism’. 
The concept of ‘terrorism’ was largely a response to perceived threats to the domestic US 
population. It was a term ‘quietly’ invented by the US executive branch specifically, the Cabinet 
Committee to Combat Terrorism. 42 It was then introduced in congressional hearings, which 
took place in a more public venue.43 Indeed, Stampnitzky illustrates how the US government 
spent a huge effort by sponsoring, funding and bringing together such experts and policy 
makers to foster the growth of terrorism ‘expertise’.44  Stampnitzky argues that the emergence 
of modern-day ‘terrorism’ was a process of redefining political violence by ‘terrorism experts’ 
as a category which implicitly entailed a moral evaluation, and for which the conclusion was 
one of inherent ‘evil’. 45 ‘Terrorism’, therefore, exists as a framework for explaining incidents 
which are deemed by those in power to involve illegitimate and unacceptable political 
violence.46 
Other scholars have similarly noted that ‘terrorism’ is ‘often used in a careless and pejorative 
way for rhetorical reasons’.47  Walter, for example, argues that ‘terrorism’ is a deeply subjective 
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concept involving an assessment of the motives and intentions of perpetrators.48  As such, its 
scope and limits are changeable and unstable depending both on historical and political 
contexts, and on the personal values and beliefs of the individuals who define it. It is thus a 
complicated and subjective term rather than a neutral, technical term for a specific form of 
violence.49  In some senses, this understanding verifies the famous cliché, ‘one person's 
terrorist is another person's freedom fighter’.50  ‘Terrorism’ is a label that relies on political 
context – and what constitutes ‘terrorism’ is essentially a political decision.51   
In conclusion, the shift to ‘terrorism’ is not only a linguistic transformation but also a rhetorical 
achievement.52  The term, as it is used today, implies moral characterisations of the enemy 
(depriving them of legitimacy)53 rather than a neutral definition of a method or motivation. The 
process of defining speech as ‘terroristic’ – just as proscribing an organisation as ‘terrorist’ – is 
thus a political, rather than juridical process.54 Legal responses to ‘terroristic speech’ (including, 
for example, the enactment of offences of the apology/glorification of terrorism) can thus be 
viewed as instruments within the global ‘war on terror’. If Justice Holmes’ famous aphorism 
that “every idea is an incitement” is to be accepted, it is crucial to further determine which 
incitements are truly dangerous and deserving of criminalisation.55 The philosophical difficulties 
of arriving at a universally accepted definition of ‘terrorism’ in relation to international law are 
explored further in the following section. 
2.2.3) Definitional Dilemmas: ‘Terrorism’ and ‘Terroristic Speech’ in International Law 
The absence of an internationally agreed definition of terrorism has allowed states to penalise 
a wide range of political dissent.56 In the last two decades, the UN, European Union, and the 
Council of Europe have developed counter-terrorism policies that have not only required the 
member states to introduce measures against ‘terrorism’, but have also encouraged states to 
take action against speech that might be thought to foster or to encourage ‘terrorism’ or to 
support it.  The concept of ‘terrorism’, therefore, has had a significant negative impact on the 
level of protection afforded to the right to freedom of expression – despite the lack of an 
objective and rigorous definition. The question arises; why is there no internationally agreed 
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definition of ‘terrorism’ in international law? In large part, this is because of political differences 
between states which would mean that any consensus-based definition would likely be diluted 
and exception- ridden, and would only give rise to further disputes in the international arena.57 
 
To resolve such issues, it is necessary to look at the right of self-determination. The principle of 
self-determination of the people (as enshrined in Articles 1(2)58 and 5559 of the Charter of the 
United Nations, and Article 160 of the two International Covenants (on Civil and Political Rights, 
and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) and references in the preamble of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights to the possibility of ‘rebellion against tyranny and oppression’), 
create a dilemma about whether violent acts committed in the name of '‘self-determination’ 
or ‘rebellion'’ should be excluded from the category of 'terrorism’. Yet, none of those 
instruments explicitly specifies whether (a) force may be used to achieve self-determination, 
or (b) what kinds of force may be used by those fighting for it. If there is no consensus on which 
use of force is included under self-determination, then any use of force by such movements 
may be criminalized as terrorism.61 It might be argued, for instance, that these provisions could 
be interpreted to uphold the legitimacy of violent struggle against colonial and racist regimes, 
or other forms of alien domination and foreign occupation (in particular the struggles of 
national liberation movements). Indeed, the United Nations has arguably failed to define 
‘terrorism’ precisely because some nations have insisted that freedom fighting, anti-colonial 
uprisings, or similar kinds of violence should not fall within the scope of the definition of 
terrorism.62  
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The first challenge in this regard appeared when the United Nations responded by objecting to 
the killing of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in September 1972, and earlier attacks at 
an Israeli airport and on a Soviet diplomat in New York.63 In the 1970s, Cold War politics enabled 
the UN General Assembly to reach an agreement on the definition and causes of terrorism.64 
The dispute between socialist states and western powers, and the ideological divide between 
developed and developing States on the use of force made defining terrorism more difficult.65 
For that reason, China and the Arab and African States believed that a US led conference 
adopting a treaty called ‘the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International 
Terrorism’ was an attempt to criminalize self-determination movements.66 Another key 
definitional issue regarding what would constitute ‘terrorism’ in the Draft Convention 
concerned whether the convention should exclude the activities of the ‘parties’ (as proposed 
by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference) rather than those of the ‘armed forces’ during 
armed conflict.67 This means that the wording of ‘parties’ aims to exempt groups such as the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah.68 Even the Council of 
Europe, which could be regarded as a more homogenous and harmonious organisation than 
the UN General Assembly, has failed to reach a definitional consensus in the context of the 
European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism.69   
 
Such dilemmas also remain among scholars who have generated a number of definitions of 
‘terrorism’. Schmid and Youngman have identified over one hundred definitions of terrorism, 
which they obtained in a survey of leading academics in the field. The most frequently used 
words occurring (their statistical appearance) in these definitions are: "violence and force 
(appeared in 83.5% of definitions), political (65%), fear, terror (51%), threat (47%), psychological 
effects and anticipated reactions (41.5%), discrepancy between the targets and the victims 
(37.5%), intentional, planned, systematic, organized action (32%)."70 Here in this thesis, one of 
these definitions is accepted as an valid definition because this definition includes the most 
frequently referred to elements of terrorism listed above namely, it is systematically organised, 
characterized by extreme violence, underpinned by political goals or demands, and capable of 
causing fear and terror. This means that Wilkinson’s definition of terrorism: “the systematic use 
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of murder and destruction, and the threat of murder and destruction in order to terrorize 
individuals, groups, communities or governments into conceding to the terrorists’ political 
demands”,71 fits into such definition. The emphasis in Wilkinson’s definition on the centrality 
to ‘terrorism’ of ‘political demands’ is similar to the emphasis placed by the former UN Special 
Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, Martin Scheinin, on the motivation of 
actors to advance a political, religious or ideological cause (rather than purely the use of 
extreme violence and force).72    
 
However, as Brian Jenkins argues, “a rough consensus on the meaning of terrorism is emerging 
without any international agreement on the precise definition.”73 Indeed, rather than agreeing 
a general definition of ‘terrorism’ deduced from core, commonly accepted principles, attempts 
to reach a definition in international law have instead largely followed what Golder and 
Williams describe as a ‘specific’ or ‘inductive’ model.74 In other words, international 
conventions have focused on its multiple manifestations, merely identifying certain activities 
as examples of ‘terrorism’.75 The UN, for example, has obliged member states to take 
appropriate law enforcement measures against specific incidents and types of terroristic act, 
set forth under a wide range of ‘Conventions and Resolutions’.76 Likewise, the EU Council 
Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism listed ‘terrorist’ offences as falling within very 
broadly framed categories attacks on life and physical integrity; extensive destruction of 
property, infrastructures or information systems; or threatening to commit any of these acts.77 
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While the aim and nature of these conventions are clearly the product of a broad consensus 
about the need to take action against ‘terrorism’,78 these Conventions were enacted through 
political negotiation and compromise rather than being derived from principle.79 In this way, 
international law has sidestepped the lack of a comprehensive and agreed general definition of 
‘terrorism’,80 and its conceptual boundaries thus remain difficult to draw.81 
 
Furthermore, and particularly relevant to this thesis, a number of regional and international 
conventions include provisions urging states to take action against 'terroristic speech'. For 
example, UN Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005) repudiated ‘attempts at the justification 
or glorification (apologie) of terrorist acts that may incite further terrorist acts’. Article 5 of the 
2005 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, and the Council of the 
European Union Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (discussed further in chapter 5) 
expressly provides that State Parties should ‘adopt such measures as may be necessary to 
prevent public provocation to commit a terrorist offence’. It defines ‘public provocation’ as “the 
distribution, or otherwise making available, of a message to the public, with the intent to incite 
the commission of a terrorist offence, where such conduct, whether or not directly advocating 
terrorist offences, causes a danger that one or more such offences may be committed”. In Article 
3, the Council of the European Union Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (2008) 
adopted the same definition of ‘public provocation to commit a terrorist offence’, and 
emphasized the importance of reducing ‘the dissemination of those materials which might 
incite persons to commit terrorist attacks’, noting that UN SC Res 1624 should be interpreted 
to provide ‘a basis for the criminalisation of incitement to terrorist acts and recruitment, 
including through the Internet.’ Notwithstanding, Greene argues that ‘intention to incite the 
commission of a terrorist offence’, by relying upon highly subjective and political term 
‘terrorism’ in the criminal law poses an inherent risk that freedom of expression will be seriously 
eroded.82    
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Indeed, definitions of ‘terrorism’ also often suffer from vague and unclear conceptual 
boundaries in national laws. For instance, as highlighted in the case of R. v. Gul,83 the definition 
of ‘terrorism’ in the UK Terrorism Act 2000 consists of three components:  
 
I) “use or threat of action”, inside or outside the UK, where that action consists of, inter 
alia, “serious violence”, “serious damage to property”, or creating a serious risk to public 
safety or health… II) the use or threat must be “designed to influence the government 
[of the UK or any other country] or an [IGO] or to intimidate the public” ... III) the use or 
threat is “made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological 
cause” ..."84  
 
The UK Supreme Court noted that the definition of terrorism “was indeed intended to be wide”, 
given its disparate forms and in order to be able to interpret it for “good reasons” in the legal 
and political context,85 (noting the inevitable changes in the political regimes in other countries, 
and by extension, in the UK’s foreign policy and international relations).86 Clearly, this definition 
allows consideration to be given to the political circumstances of the time,87 (for example, to 
the events of 9/11 or the bombings in London, Madrid and Istanbul).88 The problematic aspect 
of this definition, however, is the sheer breadth of its scope – whereby damaging property or 
creating a remote threat to public safety in order to seek to ‘influence’ a government in the 
pursuit of a political cause (which is surely a legitimate goal) could result in an individual being 
prosecuted for ‘terrorism’ offences. To emphasize, therefore, the point is that no matter how 
speech-related offences (such as ‘provocation’ or ‘glorification’) are qualified by requirements 
of ‘intention’ or ‘imminent danger’, if the underlying definition of ‘terrorism’ is so broad, then 
the ‘intention’ and ‘danger’ limbs will much more readily be satisfied. The flexibility that this 
definition affords also enables the authorities to selectively prosecute some cases as ‘terrorism’ 
cases, but to prosecute others as ‘mere’ acts of criminality. 
 
In conclusion, ‘terrorism’ is a highly malleable concept, determined on the basis of social, 
political or legal judgments rather than being assessed against an internationally accepted 
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standard or benchmark.89  As such, the concept of terrorism can be used as a tool by the states 
to suppress political dissent (and to claim some level of legitimacy in doing so)  and leads to 
broader restrictions on expression at both the national and international levels.90  As later 
chapters in this thesis demonstrate, such definitional hurdles underlie the vague and unclear 
legal offences that have been introduced to criminalize ‘terroristic speech’.91  Ironically, as 
noted at the outset of this chapter, this has occurred at the behest of international human 
rights law and the positive obligations which it has imposed on States. 
 
2.3) Legal Responses to ‘Terroristic Speech’ and their ‘historical evolution’ 
 
Political crimes are frequently fixed and defined by state elites who feel threatened by 
perceived political dangers, whether from political opponents, or foreign rivals.92 Head argues 
that such crimes are designed to prevent and to punish any conduct regarded as a threat to the 
tranquillity of the existing political and economic order.93 In different historical eras, specific 
forms of expression have been considered as a threat to national security or to the existence 
of the state.  Such speech has been criminalised under the guise of an offence such as ‘sedition’, 
and even ‘treason’. These offences are the forerunners to more recent offences that seek to 
criminalize the provocation of ‘terrorism’ (including ‘praising’ and ‘glorifying’).  All, however, 
were enacted and enforced in times of national crisis and used to restrain political dissent.94  
As Sorial notes, the most serious threats to liberty (including the right to freedom of expression) 
tend to occur during certain identifiable historical periods.95 Vincent Blasi regarded such 
periods as sharing certain `pathologies’ – specifically, “the existence of certain dynamics that 
radically increase the likelihood that people who had unorthodox views will be punished for what 
they say or believe“.96 Examples of such ‘unorthodox views’ have included conscientious 
objection against war, and advocacy of particular political ideals (whether left-wing or right-
wing, communist or fascist). Each has been treated as a threat to the very existence and 
functioning of the state, and thus in itself as endangering national security. Blasi argues that 
courts, in response, should adopt a ‘pathological perspective’ to preserve core constitutional 
norms and values: ‘fragile’ speech protections should be interpreted in a way that recognizes 
the pathologies of the political climate.97 In particular, courts should be sceptical of the claims 
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of government officials, and show a willingness to entertain and closely examine the arguments 
of litigants. It is instructive to briefly illustrate the nature of the offences enacted during 
pathological periods, in particular, to the elements of these offences (such as the mens rea, the 
likelihood of the proscribed harms materializing, the relevance of the specific content of the 
expression made, and the weight placed upon the context of expression). Doing so also helps 
to demonstrate the resemblance between the historical offence of ‘sedition’ and its more 
recent incarnations in the laws concerning provocation to ‘terrorism’.   
2.3.1) Pathological Period and ‘Terroristic Speech’  
The political atmosphere during periods of international conflict, domestic national crises, or 
(more recently) the ‘War on Terror’ has led States to criminalise particular types of 
expression.98 In such periods, certain forms of political expression have simply not been 
tolerated, but have instead been viewed as inherently predisposed to agitation or violent 
uprising.  The criminalization of such speech relies on the rationale of state security, since “all 
governments invoke raison d’état to suppress speech”.99  Moreover, laws in relation to the self-
preservation of the state impose the ‘greatest’ punishment upon any conduct deemed to 
threaten the state (notwithstanding a state’s public commitment to values such as liberty and 
democracy).100 In the modern liberal democratic state – known nominally at least, as ‘the era 
of human rights’ – the relevant laws have been broadly defined so as to limit political expression 
to an excessive degree.101 Indeed, there is much overlap between now-outmoded offences 
relating to ‘sedition’ and ‘treason’ and those, more recently, relating to 'terroristic speech'.102 
2.3.1.1) Pathologies of two World Wars and the Cold War  
During both World Wars, and the protracted Cold War periods that followed political 
expression that challenged State policies underlying the ‘war effort’ was often criminalised in 
the name of sedition, espionage, and even treason.103 The first important legal response to 
note occurred during World War I, with prosecutions in the United States under the Espionage 
Act of 1917.104 Dissent that questioned the conduct and morality of the war could be 
considered as seditious (potentially subverting the war effort) and even treasonous (if it had 
the result of strengthening the enemy).105 
The US experience regarding interferences with the right to freedom of expression was based 
on perceived consequences of anarchist, pacifist (anti-war rhetoric) and communist views in 
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the periods of WWI, WWII and the Cold War.106 Dissent that questioned the conduct and 
morality of a war was considered as seditious and treason by way of strengthening the enemy 
pole.107 In these times, perceived threat was felt as quite real by the legal and political 
authorities.108 During these periods, evaluation of US restrictions on political expression to 
prevent violent challenge suggested that Alien and Sedition Acts were used to suspend habeas 
corpus, and Espionage and Sedition Acts were used to silence the Red Scare.109 By these, the 
US governments not only challenged those engaged in political violence, but also interfered 
with political opponents.110 During the War periods, and the two so-called ‘Red Scares’ (in 
1919-1920, following the Russian Revolution, and the period of ‘McCarthyism’ between 1947-
1957, respectively),111 the Espionage and Sedition Acts were used to silence political 
detractors.112  Interferences with the right to freedom of expression were justified on the basis 
of the perceived threat to the State – believed by the legal and political authorities to be both 
real and serious.113 Through these laws, the US authorities not only challenged those who 
threatened to engage in acts of violence, but also interfered with those who espoused 
anarchist, pacifist (anti-war) and communist views.114 Many states enacted criminal statutes 
against communism, preventing both expression and association which might have promoted, 
or otherwise assisted, communism.  
Communism continued to be perceived as a serious national security threat throughout the 
Cold War period, and thus much of the Twentieth century. As had occurred during the inter-
war period, prosecutions of those who espoused communist (or socialist) ideals continued 
during the McCarthy period. The US Supreme Court noted that espousing Marxist-Leninist 
doctrine could be regarded as advocating a Communist form of government in an existing 
democratic state, thereby implying the use of force and violence.115 For instance, the members 
and leaders of communist associations were convicted on the basis of tending to incite to crime, 
disturb the public peace, or endanger the foundations of organized government and threaten 
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to overthrow by unlawful means,116 or on the basis of teaching and advocacy of the overthrow 
of the Government by force and violence.117  
Both the UDHR (adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1948) and the ECHR 
(drafted in 1950 by the newly founded Council of Europe) were adopted in response to the fear 
and mass destruction of World War II. Interestingly, however, the very same impulse that led 
to the adoption of these landmark declarations of human rights, also provided sovereign 
democratic states with a powerful argument to impose restrictions on certain forms of speech: 
the trauma of the war gave rise to an intense anxiety that the ideological conditions that had 
enabled totalitarianism in pre-war Europe to flourish should not be allowed to become re-
established.118 As such, the concept of ‘militant democracy’ (which describes a democratic 
order capable of defending itself) began to emerge, particularly in post-war Germany.119 This 
concept provides a preventative tool, justifying recourse to strict measures to penalize 
individuals or groups that aim to undermine the democratic system,120 (and thereby starving 
non-democratic ideals of oxygen and preventing them from taking hold).121 As such, a state 
may protect the foundation of its political order by prohibiting certain types of expression, and 
by banning political parties that seek to undermine societal order.122 Indeed, it may be that the 
concept of ‘militant democracy’ which emerged in response to totalitarianism in Europe123 will 
become reinvigorated as a means of responding to groups associated with fundamentalist 
interpretations of ‘Islam’,124 `Jihadism`,125 and organisations such as Al-Qaida and ISIS 
(DAESH).126   
2.3.1.2) The pathology of the ‘War on Terror’ 
Political violence intended to instil fear and intimidate populations is not a new phenomenon. 
Nonetheless, the frequent use of the term ‘terrorism’ in both legal and political discourse is a 
relatively recent development.127 Starting from the 1970s, the concept of ‘terrorism’ (as 
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critiqued above) has been used to describe a primary threat to States and their national 
security. The concept has been widely deployed in political debate, and is referred to 
extensively in national and international politics and law.128 It is suggested here that the 
rhetorical deployment of the concept of ‘terrorism’ – epitomized by the declaration of the ` War 
on Terror’ – has shifted ‘terrorism’ centre-stage and thus created a pathological environment 
which parallels those of previous eras. The incidents of 9/11,  the attacks in Madrid, and 
Istanbul in 2004, and in London on 7 July 2005, led the US, the Council of Europe, the EU and 
the UN to develop a regional and worldwide response against terrorism,129 – one which 
included the criminalisation of 'direct and indirect incitement to terrorism'.130 Indeed, these 
events, viewed alongside the most recent attacks in Paris, Ankara, Istanbul and Brussels in 2016, 
have resulted in the present day being described as ‘the age of terror’ which reflects how 
‘terrorism’ is presented as the pre-eminent threat to both national security, and world peace 
and order.131   
 
In this regard, national courts (particularly for the purposes of this thesis, the Turkish courts) 
the ECtHR and the UN Human Rights Committee have encountered expression related to 
organisations such as the IRA, ETA, PKK, RAF and Al-Qaida and their political wings. For example, 
the British government’s ban on the voice of representatives of Sinn Féin, (the political wing of 
the IRA) and several other Irish republican and loyalist groups from being broadcast on 
television and radio, was upheld by the European Commission in the 1980s.132 In recent 
decades, Turkey has been challenged in many cases regarding ‘terrorist’ related expressions.  
2.3.2) Offences in relation to ‘Terroristic Speech’ 
Certain criminal offences were typically used during these pathological periods. Firstly, offences 
such as `sedition’, treason, and espionage were applied in the aftermath of both of the First 
and Second World Wars and during the Cold War. Secondly, offences related to 'terroristic 
speech' have been enacted as an instrument in the `War on Terror'. The wording of these 
offences, and their specific elements – (a) the actus reus; (b) the mens rea; and (c) the 'content' 
and 'context' of expression will be evaluated and compared in the following sections.   
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2.3.2.1) Sedition, Treason and Espionage 
Judicial bodies have traditionally regarded the crimes of treason, sedition and espionage as 
political offences,133 and they have the common objective of imperilling the interests of the 
state.134 They are directed against the political and social organisation of the state rather than 
affecting the private rights of individuals.135 Moreover, while some countries do not use these 
formal titles (‘sedition’, ‘treason’) to describe such offences in criminal law, for example in 
Turkey, there is no crime of 'sedition' but there are a number of other offences that serve 
precisely the same function of insulating the state from the expression of critical views.  In 
chapter 4, therefore, the offences under the Turkish Penal Code are analysed bearing in mind 
their close conceptual (and instrumental) similarity to the offence of ‘sedition’ in other 
jurisdictions. 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the crime of ‘espionage’ can be quickly set aside. Although it is 
an offence under which dissenters have sometimes been charged, it generally refers to 
clandestine activity conducted by an individual on behalf of a foreign government, for the 
purpose of obtaining secret information regarding another State's national defence.136 As such, 
it is not centrally relevant to the focus of this research, which examines restrictions on public 
expression. On the other hand, ‘sedition’, discussed further below and ‘treason’, are both 
relevant to the present study. These two crimes are conceptually related because, like 
treasonous activity, seditious expression both aim at inciting opposition against a 
government.137 However, while there might not always be a clear bright line between the 
two,138 in practice, there remain important distinctions between them. For instance, while 
‘treason’ requires the existence of an overt act directed towards the execution of the 
treasonable intent, sedition can be made out if some "word, deed or writing" is calculated to 
incite persons to public disorder such as riot or rebellion.139 In other words, ‘sedition’ 
encompasses the mere expression of supposedly dangerous ideas,140 and can be constituted 
merely through the preliminary step of writing or speaking words, irrespective of whether or 
not acts of rebellion actually occur.141 Sedition thus usually discontinues when treason 
begins.142 
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In the light of these distinctions, this research concentrates on sedition due to its focus on 
"words, deeds or writings" designed to incite others to rebel against a government. Roger 
Douglas argues sedition has been used throughout history to “punish people for what they think 
(or what they are thought to think) rather than on the basis of the degree to which their activities 
actually pose a threat or danger to public order.”143 Indeed, sedition laws have been used to 
curtail a wide range of expression ranging from satirical comment and mere criticism of 
authority, to incitement to violent uprising.144 As Garcia-Mora observed, in principle, the 
statutes are directed against seditious acts and practices, but in practice, words, beliefs and 
opinions are likely to be restricted.145 ‘Sedition’ is thus a comprehensive term embracing any 
practices deemed to disturb the tranquillity of the state or to be aimed at turning individuals 
against the government.146 Sedition laws have lent themselves too readily to disproportionate 
interference with the right to freedom of expression and association,147 and have been used to 
silence any political opponents, not only those advocating violence.148  In this regard, the very 
existence of the crime of sedition creates a chilling effect, and undermines constitutional 
guarantees of the freedoms of speech and of the press.149 In this regard, the crime of sedition 
may be very broad, and likely punish beliefs and opinions may violate the constitutional right 
to freedoms of speech and of the press.150 As the Australian Law Reform Commission noted, 
the use of sedition laws has evolved based on the changing political climate and the degree of 
citizen support for the existing state system, which relies on the relationship between action, 
idea, association and responsibility.151  
 
Sedition originated in the UK under the Statute of Treasons of 1352.152 The offence of seditious 
libel was first created in 1606 by the infamous Star Chamber decision in de Libellis Famosis, and 
it has a long history of the cruel repression of political dissent by intolerant and intransigent 
regimes.153 The law of seditious conspiracy in the UK criminalised expression that was regarded 
as “inconsistent with the peace and good government of the country.”154 It originally covered 
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any attacks on any institutions of the state.155 Under the Royal Proclamation against seditious 
writings issued by the Government in 1792,156 for instance, Thomas Paine in England was 
prosecuted in 1792 for publishing ‘Rights of Man’ in defence of the French Revolution.157 
Sedition was used to protect not only the Crown or Parliament from unwanted criticism, but 
also to protect England’s social and economic hierarchy.158  
Notwithstanding these historical origins, the enactment of sedition laws was not limited to the 
UK but was a characteristic of many common law jurisdictions. These laws were used even to 
punish speech critical of the established order, far short of exhortations to the use of force or 
violence,159 and the prosecution of political dissent in Australia continued after World War I, 
and throughout the Cold War period.160 Similarly, in the US, members of socialist and 
communist associations who were critical of the American involvement in WWI,161 and who 
used “disloyal, scurrilous and abusive language” with intention “to incite, provoke and 
encourage resistance to the United States in said war"162 were convicted under the Espionage 
Act 1917 (and the Sedition Act 1918 which amended and extended the reach of the 1917 Act). 
As noted previously, the US Supreme Court held that the advocacy of Communism by 
proponents of Marxist-Leninist doctrine could legitimately be regarded as implying the 
overthrow of an existing democratic government through violent revolution.163    
Critics have argued that the offence of ‘sedition’ is outdated, and serves no purpose within a 
pluralist democracy – and indeed, that the offence itself is undemocratic because it silences 
minority-dissenting opinion.164 Democracy necessarily entails public debate and public 
participation in political and societal issues, as well as the toleration of dissenting views.  Thus, 
guarantees of the right to freedom of expression play a significant role in maintaining liberal 
democracy.165 Sedition laws in Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand have been 
criticised for being too broad in scope and for imposing unjustifiable limits on the right to 
freedom of expression.166 After the end of the Second World War, the rise of liberal 
democracies in some ways mitigated reliance upon the offences of treason and sedition (in 
accordance with the protections contained in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human 
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Rights.167 This is because, sedition as a concept is incompatible with the underlying premises of 
modern democracy and it has been repealed or became unusable in many legal systems.168  
However, while the decreasing reliance upon the offences of ‘sedition’ is welcome since it 
arguably leads to greater protection for freedom of expression,169 very similar broad 
restrictions on the freedom of speech have been retained under anti-terrorism laws.  Indeed, 
sedition and anti-terrorism laws are sometimes coterminous. As the Australian Government 
stated, sedition is just as relevant as it ever was in the counter-terrorist context, which means 
the Australian federal sedition law was extended to cover the urging of resistance to Australian 
military operations as part of anti-terrorism legislation.170 Furthermore, as Head stated, there 
has been a tendency to rely on sedition and seditious conspiracy provisions in cases relating to 
the ‘war on terrorism’.171 As such, sedition has in many ways continued its existence either 
alongside, or subsumed within, anti-terrorism and related criminal code provisions.  As Sorial 
notes, while anti-terrorism laws are not sedition laws per se, they have similar aims and 
objectives to traditional sedition laws.172 Consequently, there remains restrain on political 
dissent and a wide range of criminalisation measures on public - political expression. It is argued 
here that the offence of ‘sedition’ is thus critical to understanding the recent prosecution of 
‘political crimes’ against the state and its institutions. As with ‘sedition’, the substantive 
calculations involved in bringing a prosecution for ‘terroristic speech’ are political, not legal.173 
 
2.3.2.2) Offences related to 'Terroristic Speech': Direct and Indirect Incitement 
The enactment of new laws targeting the crime of expressive advocacy of ‘terrorism’ can be 
viewed as a substitute for the crime of ‘sedition’.  As Sorial noted, sedition statutes have been 
modernised under the guise of counter-terrorism measures, resulting in the enactment of a 
wide variety of ‘offences’, including religiously-motivated advocacy of violence, or glorification 
of ‘terrorism’.174  Counter-terrorism laws and prosecutions were considered as the foremost 
measures against expression or conduct threatening the interest of the state itself.175 Acts of 
terrorism are invariably motivated by a political, ideological or religious purpose to undermine, 
disturb or change the existing political order.176 Having said that, legislating against this has 
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caused the right to freedom of expression to be perverted or eroded, in particular by the 
concept that `praising` or `glorifying` terrorism with its broad and vague meaning, is an offence 
in the context of anti-terrorism legislation.177  
 
In order to respect the right to freedom of expression, Martin Scheinin the former Special 
Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, has suggested a model definition of 
incitement to terrorism. He refers to conduct that causes an objective danger of terrorist 
offences being committed whether or not “expressly” advocating a terrorist offence.178 This 
does not reduce the requirement to prove both an objective danger that a terrorist act will be 
committed, and a subjective intention to incite.179 The advocacy must be directed at a non-
specific and general audience rather than being private communication.180 Through this 
approach, the person who incites ‘terrorism’ is regarded as the ‘spiritual father’ of the criminal 
acts.181 Incitement is a tool for the mobilization of actual perpetrators (here, of ‘terrorism’).182  
 
Incitement to terrorism is mainly categorised under two subheadings I) direct incitement, and 
II) indirect incitement. Direct incitement is understood “as a direct call to engage in terrorism, 
with intention that this will promote terrorism, and in a context in which the call is directly 
causally responsible for increasing the actual likelihood of a terrorist act occurring.”183 However, 
indirect incitement or apology is defined as expressions “presenting a terrorist offence as 
necessary and justified”,184 and “the dissemination of messages praising the perpetrator of an 
attack, the denigration of victims, calls for funding of terrorist organisations or other similar 
behaviour”.185 The criminalisation of indirect incitement to terrorist acts is a questionable 
subject due to the predictable risk of criminalising merely dissenting expression.186 The most 
significant challenge is posed by the creation of a new offence of indirect incitement (apology, 
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and glorification) to terrorism.187 For that reason, the new offence of incitement can be 
problematic because it is an even more draconian imposition upon freedom of political 
expression than seditious libel.188  
 
Clearly articles 19 and 20 ICCPR, and article 10 ECHR allow for proportionate restrictions to be 
imposed on speech where doing so is necessary to protect public order or national security 
(amongst other aims – see further Chapter 3). In this way, these provisions themselves 
safeguard the right of every person to be free from the threat of violence.189 Nonetheless, the 
need specifically to criminalise incitement to terrorism has been given additional emphasis in 
international law.190 As noted previously in this chapter, UNSC Resolution 1624 (2005), the 
Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (2005) and the European Union 
Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (2008) are the primary sources of international 
law in this regard. These international initiatives have demonstrated something of a consensus 
regarding the need to respond to incitement to terrorism,191 premised on the idea that 
'terroristic speech' creates “an environment and psychological climate conducive to criminal 
activity”.192 Resolution 1624 calls upon all states to prohibit and prevent incitement to commit 
terrorist acts,193 and aims to prevent the inciters from winning the hearts and minds of their 
targeted audiences.194 States are thus under an obligation to confront not only the physical 
manifestations of ‘terrorism’, but also its purported causes.195 In other words, states have a 
positive obligation (also deriving from their obligations to ensure the effective protection of 
other rights such as life and property) to take pre-emptive action to forestall terrorist 
activities,196 and this includes preventing 'terroristic speech'.197 
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Returning to the distinction between direct and indirect incitement, it might at first appear that 
UNSC Res 1624 favours only the criminalisation of direct incitement and not the criminalisation 
of indirect incitement, the breadth of which concept risks arbitrary interference with freedom 
of speech. It was emphasized that incitement to terrorism on the one hand, and glorification 
or apologia of terrorism on the other, are two quite different notions.198 It is, however, unclear 
whether the Resolution extends to indirect incitement or not.199 Ian Cram properly notes that 
Resolution 1624, in its Preamble, refers to the need to repudiate “attempts at the justification 
of or glorification (apologie) of terrorist acts that may incite further acts”.200 Evidently, the 
Resolution does therefore provide some basis for states to criminalise indirect incitement,201 
even though, as Eric De Brabandere argues, the Resolution does not suggest to prohibit 
criminalising glorification and apology of terrorism.202 Similar to Cram, Yael Ronen argues that 
the Preamble to Resolution 1624 allows criminalisation of indirect incitement.203  
 
At the same time, the European instruments unambiguously urge States to introduce 
prohibitions of both direct and indirect incitement.204 Restrictions on incitement in the Council 
of Europe Convention covers "the dissemination of messages praising the perpetrator of an 
attack, the denigration of victims, calls for funding for terrorist organisations or other similar 
behaviour" and  “making available of a message to the public advocating terrorist offences”.205 
Yael Ronen suggests that criminalisation of indirect incitement might be tolerated in the 
European system due to the existence of internal (European) consensus.206 As noted above, 
however, such criminal law paves the way for the selective and arbitrary restriction of 
speech.207 Indeed, ‘indirect incitement' more closely resembles the concept of ‘sedition’ since 
it relies on a lower threshold of the likelihood of harm (see further, the discussion of ‘actus 
reus’ below). 
 
A further notable difference between the UN and European instruments is that while UNSC 
Resolution 1624 urges the criminalisation of advocacy of ‘terrorist acts’, the CoE Convention on 
the Prevention of Terrorism speaks of public provocation to commit a ‘terrorist offence’. The 
                                                          
198 Report of the Secretary-General, The Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering 
Terrorism (A/63/337 28 August 2008) paras 61-62 
199 Ben Saul, 'Speaking of Terror: Criminalising Incitement to Violence' (2005) 28/3 UNSW Law Journal 868, 870 
200 UNSC Resolution 1624 (2005) 
201 Cram (n. 56) 40 
202 Eric De Brabandere, ‘The Regulation of Incitement to Terrorism in International Law’ In: Hennebel, L. & 
Tigroudja, H. (Eds.), Balancing Liberty and Security: The Human Rights Pendulum 221, 233. (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal 
Publishers, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1992987 accessed 17.06.2014 
203 Ronen (n. 180) 663 
204 Article 5 of the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism 2005, Explanatory Report on 
Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, 16 May 2005, para 96 
205 Explanatory Report on Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, 16 May 2005, paras 95, 
96 
206 Yaël Ronen, Incitement to Terrorism in International Law, in Alan Baker, Incitement to Terror and Violence: 
New Challenges, New Responses. (the Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 
2011) 144 
207 Ibid 
44 
 
word ‘offence’ seems to be a much narrower term than ‘act’, since it would appear to cover 
only those ‘offences’ already established under domestic or international law.208 Although 
Resolution 1624 does not require the criminalisation of indirect incitement (and its reach may 
therefore appear to be more limited than that of its Council of Europe and European Union 
counterparts), use of the phrase “terrorist acts” arguably extends its reach beyond the 
European instruments so as to potentially encompass a wider range of conduct that might be 
(directly or indirectly) incited. This point, however, is likely only to be of semantic value since 
the definitional problems surrounding the very concept of ‘terrorism’ (see discussion above), 
ultimately mean that neither term (‘terrorist acts’ or ‘terrorist offence’) provides any real 
certainty or clarity when used to criminalise expression. In other words, the breadth of the 
concept of ‘terrorism’ itself means that the term ‘terrorist offence’ (in the CoE Convention) is 
unlikely, in reality, to correspond with a narrower understanding of the conduct covered than 
‘terrorist act’ (in UNSC Res 1624).   
 
In conclusion, and to reiterate the earlier argument, the very concept of ‘terrorism’ entails 
deeply subjective and political judgments that enable the authorities to proscribe a very wide 
range of conduct. This section has shown that, despite a number of apparent differences, both 
UNSC Resolution 1624 and the CoE Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism allow the 
criminalisation of indirect incitement to terrorism, and thus render an exceedingly wide range 
of expression vulnerable to criminal sanction. The following section outlines the elements of 
the offences relating to ‘terroristic speech’ since an understanding of these elements will assist 
with the case law analysis in chapters 4, 5 and 6.   
 
2.3.3) Elements of these Offences  
The elements of the offences that impose criminal liability for ‘terroristic speech’ (specifically, 
the ‘mens rea’, 'actus reus', ‘content of expression` and `context of expression`) play a crucial 
role in drawing the boundary between permissible and forbidden speech.209 It has been noted, 
for instance, that the legal elements of the offence of ‘sedition’ have traditionally been ill-
defined.210 Playing close attention to these elements has the potential to shield the exercise of 
legitimate expression from abuse of power.211  
 
2.3.3.1) Actus Reus 
Offences related to 'terroristic speech' can been regarded as inchoate offences which proscribe 
steps taken towards the commission of another offence which has not yet been committed.212 
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In English common law there are three general inchoate offences: attempt, conspiracy and 
incitement.213 In the case of incitement, the crime is completed despite the person incited 
failing to commit the act to which he or she has been incited.214 Thus, the offence of incitement 
relies on the rationale that ‘‘the concern [in criminal liability] is not merely with the occurrence 
of harm but also with its prevention’’.215 Yet, this link is rather vague and might also permit 
criminalising expression that poses only an abstract and remote risk of violence.216 
 
Importantly, the causal link between the preparatory step (expression) and the final offence 
(perhaps some specified act of terrorism) can be widened or narrowed by the inclusion of a 
probability test (ranging from the mere possibility that the offence will occur, to a strong 
likelihood that it will do so) and a temporal proximity test (for example, that it will occur 
imminently). In terms of the requisite of probability threshold, Ronen rightly argues that the 
criminalisation of ‘terroristic speech’ cannot be justified without harm being probable (rather 
than merely possible).217 To do otherwise would be to unduly expand the reach of the 
preparatory offence to include any danger or risk, thereby placing remote harm on a par with 
likely harm as an equally valid reason for criminalisation.218  
 
Ronen also suggests two further parameters to inform the probability threshold: “one is the 
scope of speech that may be prohibited; the other is the gravity of the offence (or the social 
interest which it protects).”219 In relation to the former, what constitutes 'terroristic speech' 
may be determined by the choice of verb used in the offence (e.g. disseminating; supporting; 
propagating; apologizing for; advocating; encouraging; promoting; defending; glorifying; 
venerating; provoking; inciting, praising etc.). In this regard, the distinction between ‘actus reus’ 
and ‘mens rea’ is difficult to draw, and the two elements become indistinguishably blurred. As 
suggested in the sub-section below, culpability should be reserved only for those forms of 
speech where the speaker actually intends to bring about the final offence. 
 
In relation to the gravity of the offence (and the corresponding social interest being protected), 
the question here is whether the final offence is ‘harmful enough’ to legitimize the 
criminalization of the preparatory expressive act.  The offence must be more precisely defined 
than simply ‘an act of terrorism’ since, as we have seen, there is no agreed definition of 
‘terrorism’. Moreover, great care must be taken not to also include acts of social protest, 
expression that might be regarded as ‘merely’ offensive, or speech that may have a tendency 
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to stir up inter-communal tensions. Indeed, a pluralist democracy should also be able to 
accommodate speech that addresses subjects such as the desirability of a change in 
government or even territorial secession. Given the penal consequences associated with 
terrorist offences, the offence must be one that involves serious violence or instability that 
would place a population in fear.220 Indeed, while it might be possible to allow for a variable 
threshold of probability based the particular legal interest at stake, where ‘terrorism’ is 
concerned, it is unlikely that the legal interest would be anything other than ‘national security’ 
(so this argument becomes redundant). 
 
A number of judicial formulations have successfully combined these elements. For example, 
the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) has affirmed that “speech should be criminalised 
where it is intended to incite imminent violence, is likely to incite such violence, and there is a 
direct and immediate connection between the speech and the likelihood or occurrence of such 
violence”.221 Similarly, the US Supreme Court does not permit the criminalisation of incitement 
unless it can be shown that violations of the law are not only ‘imminent’, but are also likely to 
occur.222 The Brandenburg test thus rejects a sliding- scale (or ‘bad tendency’) approach 
regardless of the magnitude of the harm.223 
 
In summary, ‘terroristic speech’ should not be criminalised when the risk of harm is remote and 
abstract.224  Close attention must be paid to the probability threshold, requirements of 
temporal proximity, the gravity of the final offence, and the nature of the speech act itself. 
These factors play a crucial role in determining the breadth and scope of the offences relating 
to ‘terroristic speech’ in national law, and their absence or dilution inevitably results in the over-
criminalization of speech.225 This is an area of law that must be rigorously defined, and both 
legislators and judicial institutions should remain acutely aware of the risks posed to freedom 
of speech by subjective and speculative evaluations of harm.226 In addition, offences relating to 
‘terroristic speech’ should also be qualified by a requirement of specific intent, as briefly 
examined in the following sub-section. 
 
2.3.3.2) Mens Rea of Speaker 
Through the concept of ‘mens rea’, criminal law doctrine provides a legal basis on which to 
assess a speaker’s culpability.227 The ‘mens rea’ requirement varies for different offences. For 
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example, an offence might require an intention to achieve a particular outcome, and this could 
be a subjective intention (i.e one that the defendant him/herself intended), or an objectively 
measured intention (requiring, for example, an assessment of what a reasonable person in the 
defendant’s position could be said to have intended). Furthermore, the mens rea requirement 
might not be ‘intention’ at all, but rather a lower mens rea requirement such as ‘recklessness’ 
or ‘negligence’ (as to whether a particular outcome may occur), or ‘knowledge’ (that a 
particular outcome may result). As such, intention is not a requisite element of all 
endangerment speech crimes.228 
 
However, both the UN Security-General and the CoE Convention on the Prevention of 
Terrorism have emphasized that intention should be required as an element of incitement 
offences.229 Similarly, the former Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, 
Martin Scheinin, argued that in addition to there being an objective danger that a terrorist act 
will be committed, incitement to terrorism (and related offences) should also require a 
subjective intention to incite the commission of a terrorist act.230 The Supreme Court in 
Brandenburg v Ohio required intention as an element of 'incitement' which is directed at 
producing and inciting to imminent lawless action.231 Indeed, the greater the role that can be 
given to the speaker’s subjective intention, the greater the chance of eliminating the possibility 
of arbitrary interferences with non-culpable expression. The requirement of specific intention 
to incite terrorism is especially important when offences including indirect incitement are 
involved.232  
 
2.3.3.3) Content of Expression and Context of Expression  
An assessment of content and context of expression can be viewed as integral to the questions 
of probability and temporal proximity of harm touched upon above.233 It is worth noting that, 
the ECtHR has often engaged in an examination of the content of speech, the states of the 
speaker, and the intended addressee of the message, as well as the context in which the words 
uttered.234 It has done so in to order to objectively determine the nature of the purported 
danger and thus to assess the necessity and proportionality of the restrictions imposed.235 This 
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evaluation of the content and context of expression will be more comprehensively analysed 
later in the chapter five, which focuses on ECtHR case law. 
 
2.4) Rationales against Restricting 'Terroristic Speech'  
 
There are a number of rationales within the free speech theory that serve to counter the 
impulse to restrict 'terroristic speech', noting, as previously discussed, that the latter concept 
is difficult to define.236 While in a non-democratic society, political dissent is repressed through 
criminal laws in order to protect the state and its institutions (rather than the rights of 
individuals), in a democratic system, criminal law should not be used to suppress political 
dissent or radical critiques. This final section seeks to identify the values that the right to 
freedom of expression serves, and to reflect upon how offences that criminalize ‘terroristic 
speech’ might ultimately undermine these values. It is structured around the four values, 
identified by Professor Emerson, that are served by the protection of speech: (1) "assuring 
individual self-fulfilment"; (2) "advancing knowledge and discovering truth"; (3) "provid[ing] for 
participation in decision-making by all members of society"; and (4) "achieving a more 
adaptable and hence a more stable community, maintaining the precarious balance between 
healthy cleavage and necessary consensus."237 
 
Firstly, Emerson described self-fulfilment as the realization of a man`s or woman’s character 
and potential in order to distinguish his/her mind. Humans have the potential to express their 
thoughts and emotions as communicative acts and to establish a culture as a way of life. They 
also have the capacity to imagine, show insight and feel, and thus to develop and find their 
place and meaning in life.238 This can be achieved by disclosure of information and the 
dissemination of ideas and opinions.239  
 
Secondly, Mill described the search for truth by considering ‘truth’ as the outcome of discussion 
of political, moral and social affairs (rather than as a scientifically or mathematically deduced 
proposition).240 In the market place for ideas, individuals will have opportunities to test the 
truth of different ideas and propositions, and try to convince others of their rectitude or error. 
The market place -without governmental suppression- thus works to eliminate falsehood and 
reveal the truth.241 As Justice Holmes argued, “the best test of truth is the power of the thought 
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”242 Similarly, Schauer argues that ‘the 
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marketplace of ideas’ is essential for the development of human knowledge and determining 
which propositions get accepted or rejected within a society.243 Furthermore, as Mill argued, 
“we can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavouring to stifle is a false opinion; and if 
we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still.”244   
 
Thirdly, democracy requires that all members of society participate freely in political activities 
and that they are free to express their own beliefs and ideas in the political debate.245 
Democracy cannot function without the freedom to discuss government, its policies and other 
political ideas. Greenawalt thus views ‘democracy’ as a preventative tool, one that serves to 
protect against governmental suppression, and to ensure that the people are not misled.246 
This happens by ensuring citizens’ participation in decision-making processes.247 By doing so, 
society can constitute a check on government. As Meiklejohn said, "the people need free 
speech" be-cause they have decided, in adopting, maintaining and interpreting their 
Constitution, to govern themselves rather than to be governed by others.”248 ‘Democracy’ as a 
rationale for protecting speech is thus closely related to the notions of self-government and 
collective self-determination.249  
 
Lastly, an adaptable and stable community can be achieved through tolerance and pluralism. 
Lee Bollinger argues the definition of tolerance as “showing understanding or leniency for 
conduct or ideas ... conflicting with one`s own”.250 ‘Tolerance’ is necessary for the coexistence 
of different beliefs and attitudes.251 Bollinger claims that the realisation of freedom of speech 
is entirely dependent on providing an organizing principle for acts of toleration. Otherwise, 
intolerance will simply become the main reason for governments to restrict speech.252 In 
addition, Joseph Raz argues that the right to freedom of expression serves to validate particular 
ways of life, individual behaviours and experiences.253 Such validation is necessary to the 
development of individual identity, but can only occur when these experiences are 
communicated to others.254 Pluralism offers multiple alternative ways of life and can only be 
fully realized through a process of cross-cultural transmission, and mutual relations.255 The right 
to freedom of expression is placed at the heart of this process.  
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In the light of these underlying values, one might question whether any of them justifies the 
protection of ‘terroristic speech’? This might be possible, for instance, with ‘the market place 
for ideas’. ‘The marketplace of ideas’ relies on the logic that all opinions ought to be allowed 
regardless of how offensive they may be.256 The opportunity to subject all these ideas to 
criticism ultimately means that better arguments will prevail.257 If, on the other hand, we are 
not able to hear and understand the views of our political adversaries, it is not possible to 
change their minds and convince them that they are wrong, or even to change our own 
behaviour to generate opposing views that turn out to be right.258 Justice Brandeis famously 
noted that  
 
“…no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present unless the 
incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is 
opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the 
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to 
be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”259 
 
In this regard, ‘terroristic speech’ might, in the long run, be exposed as falsehood by counter-
speech (presuming that it is not first stifled by the authorities).  More speech` or `counter 
speech` might even avert the dangers possibly caused by expression, and should be preferred 
over suppression given the intrinsic value of free speech. Indeed, it might be argued that the 
marketplace would be fundamentally impoverished if it was deprived of ‘terroristic speech’ (at 
least, ‘terroristic speech’ that does not incite violence that is likely to occur imminently).260 
There might also be good ‘public interest’ reasons to protect ‘terroristic speech’.261 Arguably, 
the public interest might be advanced through knowing that certain individual hold extreme 
views, through hearing why they hold those views.262 Barendt argues, allowing extremist 
speech in the market place also prevents extremist speech from being driven underground, and 
thus potentially operates as something of a safety-valve.263  
 
In addition to this, Dworkin proposes a ‘rule of law’ based argument concerning the impact of 
hate speech bans on the legitimacy of other laws (such as anti-discrimination provisions).264 It 
is argued here that Dworkin’s point can potentially be extended to laws which criminalize 
‘terroristic speech’ (at least, speech that falls short of intentional advocacy of imminent violent 
action). Dworkin argues that for a law’s coercive force to have political legitimacy, the decision 
                                                          
256 Sorial (n. 94) 14 
257 Ibid 129 
258 Saul (n. 199) 886 
259 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 para 377 Brandeis, J., Concurring Opinion 
260 Brandenburg v Ohio 395 US 444, 447 (1969). 
261 Eric Barendt, Threats to Freedom of Speech in the United Kingdom? (2005) 28/3 UASW Law Journal 895, 898 
262 Ibid 
263 Ibid 898 
264 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Foreword’, in Ivan Hare and James Weinstein, (eds.) Extreme Speech (OUP: 2009), at viii-ix. 
51 
 
to enact the law must have been taken in a way that affirms each individual as a responsible 
agent: ‘the majority has no right to impose its will on someone who is forbidden to raise a voice 
in protest or argument or objection before the decision is taken.’265 As such, it can be argued 
that the rule of law itself is undermined when it imposes criminal liability for ‘terroristic speech’ 
(widely defined): other laws which seek to enhance national security would thereby forfeit their 
legitimacy if overbroad laws criminalizing ‘terroristic speech’ were enacted. Dworkin thus 
defends maximum protection for all speech by suggesting that governments must be impartial 
and should not favour some forms of expression over others.266 This means that Sorial extends 
free speech protection equally to all groups and individuals, even to Communists, Nazis, and 
the Klu Klux Klan (KKK).267 Ultimately, he argues, interference with speech, once it is permitted, 
is hard to retract and easy to expand.268 Government is not entitled to deny freedom of speech 
where inflammatory effects are unclear.269  
 
2.5) Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to establish a foundation for the remainder of the thesis – specifically, 
by formulating a framework for the critical evaluation of legal responses to 'terroristic speech' 
in Turkey in light of regional and international standards. It has argued that the term ‘terrorism’ 
conspires against the successful attainment of a precise and clear criminal law doctrine. Since 
the term ‘terrorism’ seeks to present violence as self-evidently illegitimate, it at once renders 
nugatory free speech considerations (and the values that underpin freedom of speech, 
discussed above), and precludes any more nuanced consideration of the different categories 
of ‘political violence’ which ought properly to inform both the work of legislators and judicial 
scrutiny of restrictions on ‘terroristic speech’. The final section of the chapter identified a 
number of philosophical justifications for protecting ‘terroristic speech’. If there is no 
opportunity to hear and understand the views of our political adversaries, it will not be possible 
to change individuals' minds and persuade them that they are wrong, or even to generate and 
sharpen opposing views that might ultimately prevail.  It is suggested that this rationale extends 
to the protection of ‘terroristic speech’, and should only be departed from in exceptional 
circumstances where inflammatory speech is intended and likely to cause imminent violence 
or other serious unlawful conduct.270 The chapter also traced the historical evolution of 
offences that impose criminal liability for ‘terroristic speech’, demonstrating how these are 
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both similar to, and different from, offences falling within the category of ‘sedition’. Indeed, as 
Soriel argues, the sedition laws have simply been modernised under the guise of ‘counter-
terrorism’, which similarly criminalises advocacy of resistance to the state and its institutions.271  
Both types of offence have tended to be broadly framed, and clearly give primacy to the 
protection of the State over and above the protection of individual rights. 
 
That said, it has also been argued that not only do such enactments reflect the widely 
acknowledged preventive turn in criminal law, but that this preventive turn is itself 
underwritten by the positive obligations imposed by international human rights law (beginning 
with UN Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005), and then Article 5 of the 2005 Council of 
Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, and the Council of the European Union 
Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism of 28 November, 2008). Ultimately, these 
international instruments have encouraged national authorities to introduce new offences 
proscribing 'terroristic speech' (including direct and indirect incitement) notwithstanding the 
absence of an internationally agreed definition of ‘terrorism’. These instruments have thus 
resulted in the criminalisation of expression because they themselves reflect and reproduce 
the pathologies of the ‘war on terror’.   
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CHAPTER 3: DOCTRINAL PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO ‘TERRORISTIC SPEECH’ UNDER 
THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION BY TURKISH JURISPRUDENCE, ECtHR 
AND UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 
 
 
 3.1) Introduction 
 
The doctrinal framework within which restrictions on freedom of expression are scrutinized 
ultimately determines the scope of this fundamental right. While there are differences between 
the textual guarantees of freedom of expression under Article 261 Turkish Constitution, Article 
102 ECHR, and Article 193 ICCPR, the underlying doctrinal principles are broadly shared between 
the three jurisdictions. These shared principles include the requirement that restrictions have 
a clear and prospective legal basis, that they pursue a legitimate purpose, and that they are 
necessary and proportionate. These doctrinal principles serve to organise and give structure to 
legal reasoning. As such, they function as tools through which an appropriate balance may be 
struck between the right to freedom of expression and other legitimate State interests such as 
                                                          
1 Article 26 of Turkish Constitution: Everyone has the right to express and disseminate his/her thoughts and 
opinions by speech, in writing or in pictures or through other media, individually or collectively. This freedom 
includes the liberty of receiving or imparting information or ideas without interference by official authorities. This 
provision shall not preclude subjecting transmission by radio, television, cinema, or similar means to a system of 
licensing.  (As amended on October 3, 2001; Act No. 4709) The exercise of these freedoms may be restricted for 
the purposes of national security, public order, public safety, safeguarding the basic characteristics of the Republic 
and the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, preventing crime, punishing offenders, 
withholding information duly classified as a state secret, protecting the reputation or rights and private and family 
life of others, or protecting professional secrets as prescribed by law, or ensuring the proper functioning of the 
judiciary.  (Repealed on October 3, 2001; Act No. 4709) Regulatory provisions concerning the use of means to 
disseminate information and thoughts shall not be deemed as the restriction of freedom of expression and 
dissemination of thoughts as long as the transmission of information and thoughts is not prevented. (Paragraph 
added on October 3, 2001; Act No. 4709) The formalities, conditions and procedures to be applied in exercising 
the freedom of expression and dissemination of thought shall be prescribed by law. 
2 Article 10 of ECHR: 1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless 
of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema 
enterprises. 2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject 
to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing 
the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary. 
3 Article 19 of ICCPR: 1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 2) Everyone shall have 
the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas of all kinds, regard less of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other 
media of his choice. 3) The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries it special duties 
and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided 
by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national 
security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals. 
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the protection of national security and the maintenance of public order. This chapter analyses 
the importance of these principles for cases concerning ‘terroristic speech’. 
 
The emphasis which human rights law places upon the fundamental importance of a 
democratic polity’s freedom of expression has been responsible for the repeal, in other 
jurisdictions of the offences of sedition and treason, resulting in their gradual excision from the 
legal lexicon. Even in Turkey, the infusion of European human rights norms into domestic free 
speech jurisprudence has gone some way to expanding the space for political expression.4 
Nonetheless, as chapter two explained, a parallel development has given rise to a troubling 
paradox. While human rights law disfavours these archaic offences, it has, through the 
imposition of open-ended and widely-framed positive obligations, simultaneously paved the 
way for States’ enactment of a range of new offences criminalizing ‘terroristic speech’. These 
new offences have enabled States to increasingly silence political opposition and dissent due 
to its definitional imprecision. 
 
In this light, a key concern is the lack of traction which these doctrinal principles have ultimately 
had in curtailing States’ invocation of the ‘counter-terrorism’ narrative. In this regard, two 
further fundamental principles are of note. First is the ‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine, which 
confirms the subsidiary role of the European Court of Human Rights. This chapter examines the 
way in which the margin of appreciation has served to undercut the level of scrutiny afforded 
by the European Court of Human Rights to restrictions introduced by States on freedom of 
speech in general, and ‘terroristic speech’ in particular. Second, when considering restrictions 
on purported ‘terroristic speech’, questions immediately arise about the extent to which it is 
legitimate for States to restrict speech that may challenge or undermine a particular 
(democratic) political order. Arguments deriving from the notion of ‘militant democracy’ (a 
democracy capable of defending itself) thus come to the fore.5 As Clive Walker has 
acknowledged, ‘the state has a right and a duty to take action against significant forms of 
terrorism’, and thus ‘should indeed be ‘militant’ in certain ways.6 However, too often the focus 
upon ‘significant forms of terrorism’ is widened, and militant restrictions – what John 
Borneman refers to as ‘belligerent legal measures’7 – are more indiscriminately targeted. The 
historical-political context inevitably informs the target of any such measures that are 
                                                          
4 See, for example, Sir Geoffrrey Palmer, ‘Political Speech and Sedition’ (2009) 36; 11 and 12 Yearbook of New 
Zealand Jurisprudence, 36-51. 
5 The key text on militant democracy is Karl Loewenstein, ‘Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights’ (1937) 31 
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introduced. In the case of Turkey, this context is defined predominantly by the long-running, 
and frequently violent, mobilization for Kurdish independence struggle by the PKK. The concept 
of militant democracy implies that States may legitimately impose restrictions on activities 
considered to promote undemocratic ends. As Professor András Sajó noted, ‘militant 
democracy’ serves as a kind of ‘precautionary legality’ – one that prioritizes risk aversion and 
self-preservation in the face of incalculable harms.8 While the concept of militant democracy 
has rarely been expressly acknowledged in the Strasbourg court’s jurisprudence (and only then 
in cases concerning the dissolution of political parties),9 it is at least arguable that it operates 
at the national level as a tacit norm – as an unspoken background principle, harnessed 
putatively in the defence of ‘an effective political democracy’10 – in cases involving restrictions 
on ‘terroristic speech.’  
 
This chapter therefore aims to explore the doctrinal principles relied upon within these 
different national and supra-national legal systems. It also provides a comparative overview of 
how these principles have impacted upon the protection of the right to freedom of expression. 
Section 2.1 explores the scope of the right to freedom of expression, and section 2.2 elaborates 
further on the interpretation of the following doctrinal principles – ‘prescribed by law’, 
`legitimate aims`, `democratic necessity` and ‘proportionality’. In section 2.3, the concepts that 
have served to diminish the protection of freedom of speech – the ‘margin of appreciation’, 
and ‘militant democracy’ are analysed. 
 
3.2) The Right to Freedom of Expression  
 
The value that human rights law places upon the fundamental importance of freedom of 
expression to a democratic polity has been responsible for the repeal in other jurisdictions of 
the offences of sedition and treason. This has resulted in their gradual disuse and 
disappearance, in the national, regional and international legal context. Freedom of expression 
has been widely expounded in this, the human rights era, as a fundamental right within a 
democratic polity. The scope of the right to freedom of expression, set forth under the ECHR 
and ICCPR, covers a wide range of subject matter, including among others commercial, artistic, 
political, academic and religious arenas. As this right extends to the freedom both to receive 
and impart information and ideas, this provides us all with the opportunity to participate in the 
public exchange of cultural, political and social information and ideas of all kinds.11 This 
exchange process is critical for democratic society and as such it might require a state to 
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facilitate the enjoyment of the right.12 On an individual level, freedom of expression is also an 
essential condition for the full development of the person, which in turn constitutes the 
foundation stone for every free and democratic society.13 These human rights conventions are 
important for national authorities accepting their positive obligations as commitments. As the 
European Court has highlighted: 
 
“Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of such a society, 
one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every man. 
Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10 (art. 10-2), it is applicable not only to "information" 
or "ideas" that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of 
indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the 
population. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness 
without which there is no "democratic society". This means, amongst other things, that 
every "formality", "condition", "restriction" or "penalty" imposed in this sphere must be 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.”14 
 
Likewise, the right to freedom of expression under Article 19 of ICCPR consists of three 
elements: "(a) the right to hold opinions without interference; (b) the right to seek and receive 
information and the right of access to information; and (c) the right to impart information and 
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, 
or through any other media of one’s choice."15 More importantly, freedom to publicly criticise 
and evaluate one's governments without fear of interference or punishment falls under the 
protection of the right of freedom of expression.16 Additionally, the European Court gives more 
weight to political criticism and debate as being in the public interest. Criticism can even be 
provocative or insulting or involve serious allegations against public authorities.17 In this regard, 
the ECtHR noted that 
 
“… the limits of permissible criticism are wider with regard to the government than in 
relation to a private citizen or even a politician…the dominant position which a 
                                                          
12 Alınak v. Turkey App no. 40287/98 (ECtHR, 29 March 2005) para 42; see also in The Judgment of Republic of 
Turkey Constitutional Court, App no: 2013/2602, 23/1/2014 para 41 
13 General Comment No. 34 (2011) on Article 19, para. 2; Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-sixth 
Session, Supplement No. 40, vol. I (A/66/40 (Vol. I), annex V. see also Komarovsky v. Belarus Communication, 
CCPR/C/109/D/1839/2008 at 9.3, see also, Mecheslav Gryb v. Belarus, CCPR/C/103/D/1316/2004 (Human Rights 
Committee, Communication 2011-10-26) para 13.3; Ali Benhadj v. Algeria, CCPR/C/90/D/1173/2003 (Human 
Rights Committee, Communication 2007-07-20) para 8.10 
14 Handyside v the United Kingdom App no 5493/72 (ECtHR, 7 December 1976) para 46 
15 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, Mr. Frank La Rue (A/HRC/14/23) 20 April 2000 at 26, see also in, Avon Lovell v. Australia, 
CCPR/C/80/D/920/2000, (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2004-03-24) para 9.2; Kim Jong-Cheol v. the 
Republic of Korea, CCPR/C/84/D/968/2001, (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2005-07-27) para 8.2 
16 Aduayom et al. v. Togo, 422/1990, 423/1990 and 424/1990, (Human Rights Committee, Communication 1996-
07-12) para 7.4; Rafael Marques de Morais v. Angola, CCPR/C/83/D/1128/2002 (Human Rights Committee, 
Communication 2005-03-29) para 6.2 
17 Özgür Gündem v. Turkey App no 23144/93 (ECtHR, 16 March 2000) para 61 
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government occupies makes it necessary for it to display restraint in resorting to criminal 
proceedings ….18 
 
However, the right to freedom of expression can be restricted by state parties on the grounds 
that the rights or interests of other persons or of the community as a whole might be 
compromised. The Court sets the principle that although “freedom of expression may be subject 
to exceptions"; they “must be narrowly interpreted” and “the necessity for any restrictions must 
be convincingly established”.19 This is an accepted view of the Committee. Freedom of 
expression is not an absolute right and the exercise of the right to freedom of expression incurs 
certain special duties and responsibilities.20 At the same time, any restrictions on freedom of 
expression must conform to strict tests of necessity and proportionality;21 they must  seek to 
achieve one of the aims for which they were prescribed in article 19 paragraph 3, and must also 
be directly related to the specific necessity on which the restriction is predicated.22 It is crucial 
to establish a fine tune balance between the interest of freedom of expression and other rights.   
 
3.2.1) The Right to Freedom of Press 
Another principle asserted by the European Court is that the duties and responsibilities of the 
media play an essential role in the functioning of political democracy. The press plays a most 
                                                          
18 Castells v Spain App no 11798/85 (ECtHR, 23 April 1992) para 46; Şener v. Turkey App no 26680/95 (ECtHR, 18 
July 2000) para 40; İncal v. Turkey, App no 41/1997/825/1031 (ECtHR, 9 June 1998) para 54 
19 Şener v. Turkey App no 26680/95 (ECtHR, 18 July 2000) para 39 
20 Human Rights Instruments Volume I; Complaint of General Comments and General Recommendation Adopted 
by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I) 27 May 2008 p.182; see also Keun-Tae Kim v. Republic 
of Korea, CCPR/C/64/D/574/1994 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 1998-11-03) para 12.2; Vladimir 
Velichkin v. Belarus, CCPR/C/85/D/1022/2001 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2005-10-20) para 7.3; 
Viktor Korneenko v. Belarus,   CCPR/C/95/D/1553/2007 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2009-03-20) 
para 8.3; Salim Abbassi v. Algeria, CCPR/C/89/D/1172/2003 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2007-03-
28) para 8.8 
21 The Committee’s general comment No. 34 (2011) on freedoms of opinion and expression, para. 22, Official 
Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 40, vol. I (A/66/40 (Vol. I)), annex V ; see 
also, Human Rights Instruments Volume I; Complaint of General Comments and General Recommendation 
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I) 27 May 2008 p.182; Maria Tulzhenkova v. 
Belarus, CCPR/C/103/D/1838/2008 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2011-10-30) para 9.2; Komarovsky 
v. Belarus, CCPR/C/109/D/1839/2008 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2013-10-25) para 9.3; Denis 
Turchenyak v. Belarus, CCPR/C/108/D/1948/2010 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2013-07-24) para 
7.7; Galina Youbko v. Belarus, CCPR/C/110/D/1903/2009 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2014-03-17) 
para 9.3 
22 The Committee’s general comment No. 34 (2011) on freedoms of opinion and expression, para. 22, Official 
Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 40, vol. I (A/66/40 (Vol. I)), annex V ; see 
also, Human Rights Instruments Volume I; Complaint of General Comments and General Recommendation 
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I) 27 May 2008 p.182; Leonid Sudalenko v. 
Belarus, CCPR/C/104/1750/2008, (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2012-03-14) para 9.3; Syargei 
Belyazeka v. Belarus, CCPR/C/104/D/1772/2008, (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2012-03-26) para 
11.4; Vladimir Schumilin v. Belarus, CCPR/C/105/D/1784/2008, (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2012-
07-23) para 9.3; Vladimir Katsora v. Belarus,  CCPR/C/106/D/1836/2008, (Human Rights Committee, 
Communication 2012-10-24) para 7.3; Antonina Pivonos v. Belarus, CCPR/C/106/D/1830/2008, (Human Rights 
Committee, Communication 2012-10-29) para 9.2; Alexander Protsko and Andrei Tolchin v. Belarus, 
CCPR/C/109/D/1919-1920/2009 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2013-12-2) para 7.3 
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important “public watchdog” role by reporting news,23. For that reason, journalists should not 
be penalized simply for carrying out their legitimate professional duties and tasks, even 
reporting on acts of terrorism.24 States should also protect journalists from any kind of attack 
such as threats, intimidation, arbitrary arrest, torture, threat to life and killing because of their 
professional activities.25 The right to freedom of press covers not only imparting information 
and ideas but also receiving them.26 The press is in charge of discovering, forming and shaping 
opinions, ideas and attitudes in politics and politicians,27 including divisive ones. This function 
can be maintained not only by the media or professional journalists, but also by public 
associations or private individuals.28 Thus the free communication of information and ideas 
regarding public and political issues are essential for individuals to participate fully and properly 
in public affairs and to use their right to vote, both of which are at the core of democracy.29 It 
means that the freedom to publish political material, to campaign for election and to advertise 
political ideas must be free and without censorship or restraint, and individuals must be able 
to engage in political activity individually or through political parties and other organizations so 
as to debate public issues, to organise peaceful protest and to run a campaign for election.30 
 
Additionally, the European Court considers that a prior restraint on publication is a danger for 
free press because “news is a perishable commodity and to delay its publication, even for a 
short time may well deprive it of all its value and interest”.31 In this regard, the European Court 
noted in the case of Ürper that banning the future publication of periodicals was not ` necessary 
in a democratic society' and that this could be regarded as censorship of the press.32 However, 
the Court noted that "prior restraints may be more readily justified in cases which demonstrate 
no ‘pressing social need’ for immediate publication and in which there is no obvious contribution 
                                                          
23 Jersild v. Denmark App no 15890/89 (ECtHR, 23/09/1994) para 31; see also Saygılı and Falakaoğlu v. Turkey 
Application no. 39457/03 (ECtHR, 21/01/2009) para 23 
24 Human Rights Committee, General Comments 34 (102nd Session, 2011, Geneva) at 46 
25 Ibid at 23 
26 Jersild v. Denmark App no 15890/89 (ECtHR, 23/09/1994) para 31; Linges v Austria App no 9815/82) (EComHR 
Decision, 8 July 1986) para 41; Nurbek Toktakunov v. Kyrgyzstan, CCPR/C/101/D/1470/2006, (Human Rights 
Committee, Communication 2011-03-28) para 7.4; Mavlonov and Sa’di v. Uzbekistan, CCPR/C/95/D/1334/2004, 
(Human Rights Committee, Communication 2009-03-19) para 8.4; Gauthier v. Canada, CCPR/C/65/D/633/1995 
(Human Rights Committee, Communication 1999-3-7) para 13.4 
27 Linges v Austria App no 9815/82 (EComHR Decision, 8 July 1986) para 41, see also Şener v. Turkey App no 
26680/95 (ECtHR, 18 July 2000) para 42; Sürek v. Turkey (no. 3) App no 24735/94 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999) para 38 
28 Nurbek Toktakunov v. Kyrgyzstan, CCPR/C/101/D/1470/2006, (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2011-
03-28) para 7.4; Gauthier v. Canada, CCPR/C/65/D/633/1995 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 1999-3-
7) para 13.5   
29 CCPR General Comment No. 25: Article 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote), 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/ADd.7, 12 July 1996 para 25; see also, Viktor Korneenko v. Belarus, CCPR/C/95/D/1553/2007 
(Human Rights Committee, Communication 2009-03-20) para 8.4; Gauthier v. Canada, CCPR/C/65/D/633/1995 
(Human Rights Committee, Communication 1999-3-7) para 13.4 
30 CCPR General Comment No. 25: Article 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote), 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/ADd.7, 12 July 1996, para 19 
31 Observer and Guardian v. UK App no 13585/88 (ECtHR, 26 November 1991) para 60 
32 Ürper and Others v. Turkey App nos 14526/07, 14747/07, 15022/07, 15737/07, 36137/07, 47245/07, 50371/07, 
50372/07 and 54637/07 (ECtHR, 20/01/2010) para 44 
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to a debate of general public interest."33 The bounds are set for the press not to transgress or 
usurp crucial State interests such as national security or territorial integrity, prevention of 
terrorism or the prevention of disorder or crime.34 For instance, in the case of Saygılı and 
Falakaoğlu, the Court approved the national authorities` three-day ban on publication due to 
its content which was thought capable of inciting violence in the prisons, especially at a time 
when serious disturbances between the security forces and detainees had taken place in 
several prisons.35 The press is expected to act based on their `duties and responsibilities` in 
situations of conflict and tension by ensuring that their publication does not contain 
information that incites violence or that can be turned into or disseminated as an instrument 
of propaganda for terrorist organisations or a call for violence.36  
 
That said, in order for us fully to enjoy the right to freedom of expression as a fundamental 
right in a democratic society, particularly (but not exclusively) for its instrumental contributions 
to the marketplace of ideas and collective self-government, public authorities need either to 
provide or facilitate the provision of a wider communicative space for individuals and public to 
exercise their right to freedom of speech. This must include removing from the statute book, 
or limiting the ambit of, such vague and unclear offences as sedition. What we shall see in 
subsequent chapters is that while this has occurred in many states, the period since 2001 in 
particular, has witnessed the creation and rise of offences that are as vague and as unclear as 
sedition (and quite possibly more so), in the guise of 'terroristic speech'. Thus, as the public 
sphere has expanded in one direction by a lessening of restrictions on freedom of expression 
so it has also shrunk in another. The remainder of this thesis will identify and plot these 
developments. For now, we need to look in more detail at the approach by the European Court 
and Human Rights Committee has taken to the right to freedom of expression. 
 
 
3.3) The Doctrinal Principles under the Scope of the Right to Freedom of Expression 
 
The ECtHR and the Human Rights Committee, through their jurisdiction, have established 
doctrinal principles on freedom of expression. These doctrinal categories may be considered as 
general interpretations of article 10 of ECHR and article 19 of ICCPR when adjudicating on 
individual applications or communications. Although the ECtHR and the Human Rights 
Committee share many principles in freedom of expression cases, there are some differences 
between these two in their application of these doctrinal categories. The Turkish Constitutional 
Court has adopted these doctrinal principles into its own jurisdiction, since the right to 
                                                          
33 Mosley v. UK App no: 48009/08 (ECtHR, 15/09/2011) para 117 
34 Jersild v. Denmark App no 15890/89 (ECtHR, 23/09/1994) para 31; Linges v Austria App no 9815/82 (EComHR 
Decision, 8 July 1986) para 41 
35 Saygılı Saygılı and Falakaoğlu v. Turkey (no. 2) App no. 38991/02 (ECtHR, 17/05/2009) para 28 
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individual application to the Turkish Constitutional Court was introduced in 2010.37 The 
European Court has formulated the following framework by which to examine, and to assess, 
the lawfulness of any interference. 1) `Prescribed by law` means that interference must have 
some basis in national law, the law must be adequately accessible by citizens, and the law must 
be sufficiently foreseeable,38 2) `legitimate aim` means that the restriction should seek to 
achieve the aims listed in the common limitation clauses in the legal texts,39 3) `necessity in a 
democratic society` implies that the relation between interference and its aim must be 
legitimate, and that there be a rational connection between the two. This legitimate reason for 
interference must find ` democracy` and ` necessity`  compounded.40 The existence of a 'pressing 
social need' is implied here, but it goes hand in hand with European supervision to provide a 
certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists.41 This three-stage 
assessment test constitutes a very open-ended method by which the Court seeks to balance 
the competing individual right and the collective interest on a case-by-case basis.42 In other 
words, the Court takes the circumstances of each case into consideration, so the result of the 
case may be unpredictable for further implementation.43 While its individual application may 
be uncertain, the European Court implements the Convention with a uniform measure of 
proportionality while examining the democratic necessity of the interference. It is also 
important to highlight that in examining the proportionality of particular measures, the Court 
seeks to answer the question of whether there is an alternative means of protecting the 
relevant public interest without any interference with the exercise of the right, or where the 
interference is (significantly) less.44 This is also strongly connected to protecting and sustaining 
the values of democracy, and the exercise of freedom of expression. These are the doctrinal 
principles applied in the relevant cases whether that be for assessing offences of sedition or 
‘terroristic speech’. Let us now turn to exploring each of those doctrinal categories.   
 
                                                          
37 See for examples: The Constitutional Court, App No: 2012/1184, 16/7/2014 para 26; The Constitutional Court 
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received in confidence, and the maintenance of the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
40 Gerhard van der Schyff, `Limitation of Rights: A Study of the European Convention and the South African Bill of 
Rights` (Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2005) 196, 172, see also Stefan Sottiaux, `Terrorism and the Limitations 
of Rights: the ECHR and the US Constitution` (Hart Publishing, 2008) 44 
41 Observer and Guardian v. UK App no 13585/88 (ECtHR, 26 November 1991) para 59 
42 Schyff (n. 40) 213, see also Sottiaux (n.40) 46 
43 Steven Greer, `The Exceptions to Articles 8 to 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights` (Strasbourg, 
Council of Europe, 1997) 42; The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) App no 13166/87 (ECtHR, 26 
November 1991) para 50 
44 Phlip Leach, Taking a Case to the European Court of Human Rights, (Oxford, Second Ed. 2005) 163 
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3.3.1) Prescribed by law 
Many laws are legislated to some extent vaguely, and their interpretation and application 
depend on their practice.45 Yet state authorities are responsible for ensuring that vague terms 
are not used when imposing interference with freedom of expression as to do so would 
constitute a violation.46 The `prescribed by law` test is an important step to move forward on 
to the further assessment of the case in question. If the conviction and sentence of the 
applicant were not prescribed by law, then the European Court does not apply further doctrinal 
categories.47 The `prescribed by law` test has two requirements: first, the act representing the 
interference must have a legal basis grounded in national law in the form of legislation or case-
law; second, that law must be publicly accessible and sufficiently precise for citizens both to 
assess whether or not their conduct would breach the law, and to understand what the 
consequences of any such breach would be.48 However, this is not necessary for the 
consequences, since for the law to cause consequences to be foreseeable with absolute 
certainty “may bring in its train excessive rigidity and the law must be able to keep pace with 
changing circumstances”.49  
 
The Human Rights Committee decrees that any restriction on the right to freedom of 
expression must cumulatively meet the following conditions. It must be provided by law, it must 
address one of the aims set out in paragraph 3 of article 19, and it must be necessary to achieve 
one of these legitimate purposes.50 The law imposing restrictions or limitations must be clear, 
accessible and unambiguous so as to be understood by everyone.51 It must not be used in 
arbitrary or unreasonable ways, and as political censorship, or for silencing criticism of public 
officials or public policies.52 If any interference is based on administrative provisions, it prima 
                                                          
45 The Sunday Times v UK App no 6538/74 (ECtHR, 26 April 1979) para 49 
46 Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on protecting freedom of expression and 
information in times of crisis (1005th meeting – 26 September 2007) para V/19 
47 Ünsal Öztürk v. Turkey (Application no. 29365/95) 4 October 2005 at 63 
48 The Sunday Times v UK App no 6538/74 (ECtHR, 26 April 1979) para 49; see also Silver and Others v. UK App nos 
5947/72; 6205/73; 7052/75; 7061/75; 7107/75; 7113/75; 7136/75 (ECtHR, 25 March 1983) para 86; The Sunday 
Times v UK App no 6538/74 (ECtHR, 26 April 1979) para 49; see also Association Ekin v. France App no 39288/98 
(17 July 2001) para 44 
49 The Sunday Times v UK App no 6538/74 (ECtHR, 26 April 1979) para 49 
50 Keun-Tae Kim v. Republic of Korea, CCPR/C/64/D/574/1994 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 1998-
11-03) para 12.2; Avon Lovell v. Australia, CCPR/C/80/D/920/2000, (Human Rights Committee, Communication 
2004-03-24) para 9.3; Leonid Sudalenko v. Belarus, CCPR/C/104/1750/2008, (Human Rights Committee, 
Communication 2012-03-14) para 7.2 see also, Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Abid Hussain, on the 
Promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression; (E/CN.4/1995/32) 14 December 1994 
para 41; Rafael Marques de Morais v. Angola, CCPR/C/83/D/1128/2002 (Human Rights Committee, 
Communication 2005-03-29) para 6.8; Kim Jong-Cheol v. the Republic of Korea, CCPR/C/84/D/968/2001, (Human 
Rights Committee, Communication 2005-07-27) para 8.2; Shchetko v. Belarus, CCPR/C/87/D/1009/2001 (Human 
Rights Committee, Communication 2006-7-8) para 7.3; Viktor Korneenko v. Belarus,   CCPR/C/95/D/1553/2007 
(Human Rights Committee, Communication 2009-03-20) para 8.3; Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and 
Derogation of Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Annex, UN Doc E/CN.4/1984/4 
(1984) at 5 
51 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, Mr. Frank La Rue (A/HRC/14/23) 20 April 2000 at 79 
52 Ibid at 79 
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facie violates article 19.53 Additionally, in order to prevent misuse or legal discretion, the law 
must specify the scope of any discretion conferred on the authorities with sufficient clarity, 
having regard for the legitimate aim of the interference in question, to provide adequate 
protection for the individual against arbitrary interference.54 
 
The European Court and the Committee have found, in the majority of cases, that most national 
laws related to sedition and ‘terroristic speech’ offences fulfil compliance with the requirement 
of foreseeability, certainty and accessibility, and restrictions are thus prescribed by law. The 
European Court has avoided opening discussion on cases which are said to be not 'prescribed 
by law', even though some applicants claimed that the law failed, to define with sufficient 
clarity, the constituent elements of the relevant offence.55 It can be claimed that the 
Committee is more in favour of applying a necessity test as to whether a restriction serves one 
of the legitimate aims.56 The Committee often observes that requirements for publications set 
out under national law, press law etc., are generally in compliance with the Covenant and are 
'provided by law'.57 Yet the individual opinion of Committee member Lallah highlights that 
systematic violation of freedom of expression should be addressed in the views, to encourage 
the state party to adopt legislation in pursuance of the Covenant.58 Lallah stated that faulty 
legislation has become the main source of certain violations.59 As a result, the Committee 
suggested the state party should review the legislation, that was the source of the restriction, 
for compliance with article 19.60 This would be considered as an alternative way of examining 
the legislation. For instance, the Committee noted in its concluding observation of Belarus that 
the Belarusian authorities have broad executive discretion without judicial control,61  a matter 
was not as yet really open in discussion by the Committee in its jurisprudence, even though 
state parties are under a legal obligation to respect the Covenant rights and to ensure them to 
all individuals in their jurisdiction.62  
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The European Court gives limited judicial or administrative discretion to national authorities 
when considering whether or not the legal basis fails to be ‘accessible’ and ‘foreseeable’.63 It 
would be contrary to the rule of law for the legal discretion granted to the executive in areas 
affecting fundamental rights to be expressed in terms of an unfettered power.64 The European 
Court is rather more comfortable with disapproving ministerial/administrative orders on 
broadcasting/publication by checking whether an applicant's conviction is 'prescribed by law'. 
In a number of cases, the Court found that orders by Turkish ministerial or administrative 
bodies, such as a ban on the circulation and distribution of a newspaper were drafted in very 
broad terms and gave wide discretion to these bodies.65 This is because the executive order 
was made without judicial scrutiny and without any justification.66 In the case of Association 
Ekin v. France, the Court found that the applicant was not able to foresee the consequence of 
his publication because the domestic court revised its case law in this case and widened its 
assessment on the basis of ministerial decisions entitled to the law.67 At the same time, the 
section of law contained very wide terms and provided a broad range of discretion for 
administrative authority to impose administrative bans on foreign publications and publications 
written in a foreign language.68 As a result, it was suggested that the ban should have been 
subjected to judicial scrutiny with detailed reasoning otherwise the decision would be open to 
various interpretations and attributed to a unilateral discretionary act.69 Nevertheless, 
European case law is not entirely consistent. The Commission was convinced that the 
ministerial directions given by British and Irish authorities in 1988-1989 on direct appearances 
of representatives or supporters of para-military organisations and their political wings on TV 
and Radio, was approved as 'prescribed by law' due to the foreseeability of the executive 
decision.70 This indicates that some administrative decisions might meet the requirements of 
'prescribed by law', if they are formulated with sufficient precision to enable persons to foresee, 
to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action 
may entail.71 The order here to refrain from broadcasting certain matters, was given solely on 
the basis of the applicant's "opinion that the broadcasting of a particular matter or any matter 
of a particular class would be likely to promote, or to incite crime or would tend to undermine 
the authority of the State".72 While restrictions in British-Irish cases met sufficient precision of 
the administrative order, restrictions in French and Turkish cases above did not fulfil the 
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requirement of foreseeability.73 Such administrative prior restraints might not be compatible 
with the Convention but it is more important to have strict control over the scope of bans and 
enhance effective judicial review to avoid any misuse of power.74 
 
3.3.2) Legitimate Aims 
Turning now to the second stage of the analytical framework, when a state body interferes with 
expression, it must justify this by reference to one of the legitimate purposes set out under 
article 19(3) of ICCPR, article 10(2) of ECHR or article 26(2) of the Turkish Constitution, showing 
that the restriction was necessary.75 Permissible limitations and restrictions on the exercise of 
freedom of expression must be an exception and kept to the minimum necessary to pursue the 
legitimate aim of protecting other rights set forth under the Covenant.76 In cases where a state 
party fails to justify requirements and measures taken with a legitimate aim, the Committee 
deems such interference as a violation of freedom of expression.77 In the case of Laptsevich v. 
Belarus, the author was charged with failing to register his publication with the administrative 
authorities to obtain index and registration number.78 Yet, the Committee noted that State 
party did not explain why this registration was necessary for one of the legitimate purposes.79 
Another instance is that the state party failed to justify prosecution and conviction of the author 
on charges of criminal insult, something said to be necessary for protection of the rights and 
reputation of domain political figure.80 The state party convicted the author for encouraging 
voters to boycott elections, without explaining how the interference could support or sustain 
any legitimate aim.81 The Committee highlighted specifically that intimidation and coercion 
imposed by the author to call voters to boycott elections would be a justifiable explanation for 
the interference.82 Yet here, the boycott was called without intimidation and coercion and thus 
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it fell under the protection of article 19.83 In a different communication, the Committee noted 
that lawful measures taken against a call for a hunger strike could be considered as trying to 
secure the health and safety of prisoners including young children, one of the legitimate aims 
listed under article 19(3).84 The measures taken against the applicants must be justified with 
reference to one or more aims specified by public authorities. Yet the Committee noted that 
invoking these laws to censure or to limit the public information of legitimate public interest, 
or to prosecute journalists, activists or human rights defenders who disseminate information, 
are not at all compatible with restriction clauses.85 In this regard, state parties must apply the 
strict requirement test of the legitimate aims for article 19 in national security provisions, 
(including treason and sedition laws).86 This, as we shall see, has led to a limiting of the ‘bite’ of 
such laws, only for them to be replaced by even broader and less precise measures relating to 
‘terroristic speech’. 
 
In some cases, the European Court did not consider ‘particular aim', which was presumed by 
the government to be a legitimate aim, as one of the legitimate aims set forth under the 
Convention. An example is the Erdoğdu and İnce case in which the government legitimized the 
interference with expression citing of 'national unity'.87 But the European Court did not count 
it as one of the legitimate aims. Rather, the national authorities claimed to interfere with 
applicant’s expression aiming furtherance of certain of the legitimate aims (protection of 
national security, territorial integrity and the prevention of disorder and crime).88 For that 
reason, the national authorities may justify restrictions on freedom of expression with only a 
legitimate aim set forth under these human rights conventions. 
 
3.3.3) Democratic Necessity  
An effective political democracy as a fundamental purpose of the European Convention is a 
critical element of the European Court’s judicial reasoning. A 'democratic society' is one that 
relies on the rule of law and permits the expression of political ideas which question the existing 
order where their realisation is advocated only by peaceful means.89 There must be proper 
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channels and opportunities for people to exercise the right to freedom of expression through 
the use of the right to freedom of association. It also requires internalizing pluralism, tolerance 
and social cohesion.90 Accordingly, for a state to succeed in its claim that restrictions are based 
on their necessity in a democratic society, it must be shown that the restrictions are more than 
simply “useful”, “reasonable” or “desirable”.91 It is essential for the state to show that the 
interference fulfils a “pressing social need” and that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim 
being pursued in all the circumstances.92   
 
In contrast, to the ECtHR, the Committee has rarely stated that an interference is required to 
be a necessary measure in a democratic society in its jurisprudence.93 In the case law of article 
19, it must be shown of any restriction cumulatively that 1) it must be provided by law, and 2) 
it must address one of the legitimate aims and 3) it must be necessary to achieve one of these 
legitimate purposes.94 The Committee did not note in any of its cases regarding article 19 that 
restrictions must be necessary, in a democratic society, as one of the conditions for restricting 
the right to freedom of expression.95 The Committee emphasised the importance of democratic 
society without taking it as a conditional element of a restriction to the right to freedom of 
expression.96 Thus, individuals must be free to receive information about alternatives to 
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political systems/parties in power,97 as well as to hold public debates concerning political 
figures. 98 Furthermore, they must be free publicly and openly to criticize or to evaluate their 
governments without fear of interference or punishment.99 The former Special Rapporteur 
Martin Scheinin argues that democracy by its very nature allows organisations or persons to 
express their different opinions even if these are criticisms of the State or of the Government 
in power.100 In this regard, the Committee noted that legitimate aims set forth under para 3 of 
article 19 cannot be used by state parties to interfere with promotion of multi-party democracy, 
democratic values or human rights.101 Furthermore, any restrictions (e.g. arbitrary arrest, 
torture and threat to life and killing) imposed on a person for his exercise of freedom of 
expression cannot be in compliance with article 19.102 The Committee members' concurring 
opinion in Coleman v Australia suggested that sanctions such as fine, imprisonment or arrest 
on the author, which are a considerable infringement of the authors' right to freedom of 
expression, must be justified by the requirements of article 19.103 In 2011, the Committee paid 
more attention to democratic society in General Comment 34, which considers democratic 
society as a crucial principle.104 For instance, the Committee highlights the role of the 
importance of freedom of expression in a free and democratic society in the communications 
brought from Belarus,105 where the Committee drew attention to numerous and serious 
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interferences with the right to freedom of expression.106 Nonetheless, the Committee still does 
not take democratic society as a conditional element for restriction on the right to freedom of 
expression.   
 
3.3.4) Proportionality  
Proportionality is the primary device in the judicial decision making process in most 
constitutional courts. This process consists of three main tests: ` (1) suitability (the limiting 
measure must be capable of achieving the (legitimate) aim pursued); (2) necessity (the limiting 
measure must be the least restrictive means to achieve the relevant purpose); and (3) 
proportionality in the narrow or strict sense (there must be a reasonable balance between the 
limiting measure and the aim pursued)`.107 The European Court of Human Rights has not 
formulated or applied it as a strict principle. The European Court's proportionality analysis relies 
on the phrase, "necessary in a democratic society". Representing the word ‘necessity’ as a 
balancing test implies an open-ended interpretation and consideration of the needs of the 
particular time. 108 As in the case of Handyside v. United Kingdom, the Court noted "the principle 
of proportionality inherent in the adjective ‘necessary’”.109 The Court has equated the term 
`necessity` with a `pressing social need`. These two terms are vital to the proportionality 
principle. Similarly, the Committee notes that the requirement of necessity implies an element 
of proportionality,110 and the scope of restrictions on freedom of expression must be 
proportional to the value that the restriction aims to protect.111 
 
Both the Committee and the European Court examine the proportionality of restrictions. There 
must be a reasonable connection for proportionality between the means employed in any 
interference and the aim it seeks to achieve.112 The proportionality test implies similar meaning 
under both human rights instruments that the nature and severity of the penalties imposed 
should be taken into consideration when assessing the proportionality of any interference.113 
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The Committee has noted that restrictions have to be narrow and specific so as to comply with 
the principles of proportionality.114 The administrative and judicial bodies must take the 
principle of proportionality into account when they apply domestic law.115 In this regard, the 
European Court only allows proportionate state interference. In examining the proportionality 
of a particular measure, the European Court seeks to answer the question of whether there is 
an alternative means of protecting the relevant public interest with minimum or no, or indeed 
lesser, interference.116 The relationship between the public interest and any individual rights 
which are the subject of the restriction must be proportionate and this proportionality is closely 
connected to a democratic society.117 The length of the criminal procedure or the length of 
sentence or the amount of any fine all play a crucial role in determining whether the limitation 
is proportionate with the legitimate aim. Accordingly, where restrictions are imposed by a state 
party on the freedom of expression, the state party must demonstrate: I) the threat; precisely, 
and in specific and individualized nature, ii) the necessity and proportionality of specific 
measure taken, and iii) a direct and immediate link between the expression and the threat.118  
 
Furthermore, the European Court case law, we can see how the contracting states have failed 
to employ proportionate measures, in the sense used above, when imposing restrictions on 
‘terroristic speech’. In many cases, the nature and severity of the penalties imposed on the 
applicants were disproportionate to the aims pursued and therefore not 'necessary in a 
democratic society'.119 The European Court has also pointed out that the nature and severity 
of the convictions imposed upon applicants may also cause the loss of a number of political and 
civil rights, such as being banned from a membership of a political party or union.120 The 
sentence and conviction must be proportionate and carry legitimate aims in order to consider 
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the interference with ‘terroristic speech’ as legitimate.121 The Committee recalled, in 
accordance with Committee’s general comment 34, that any restriction on freedom of 
expression must not be broad in nature, in order to achieve the interest whose protection is 
sought in the proportionate meaning.122 Any pertinent information to justify the state party's 
restriction is crucial for the Committee to decide whether the restriction meets the criteria set 
forth in article 19(3) or not.123 For instance, the author was charged with crimes characteristic 
of defamation and slander against the President of Angola and the Attorney General of the 
Republic and he was both fined and sentenced to six months imprisonment.124 The severity of 
such sanctions imposed on an author cannot be considered a measure proportionate with 
protecting public order or the honour and the reputation of the President, a public figure who 
was only subjected to criticism.125 His arrest, detention and the restrictions on his travel all 
together did not achieve any legitimate aim.126 Disproportionate interference with press is not 
acceptable for a free press. A free and uncensored press and media plays a fundamental role 
in maintaining in a democratic society as part of freedom of expression.127  
 
The vague definition of offences, such as 'encouragement of terrorism', 'extremist activity', 
'praising', 'glorifying', or 'justifying' terrorism, all of which are to be found in the counter-
terrorism measures of domestic laws, are very likely to pose the risk of being an unlawful 
interference with the right to freedom of expression, either (or both) because the offence fails 
to meet the ‘prescribed by law’ test or for overbreadth making them unnecessary and 
disproportionate.128 State parties should ensure compatibility of these restrictions with articles 
19 and 10.129 We will return to this in much greater depth in the remaining chapters when we 
consider how vague and overly-broad provisions such as sedition fell into disuse, only to be 
replaced – as part of the state’s machinery to combat ‘terrorism’ – by offences of equal or 
arguably greater vagueness and breadth. For now, though we need to reflect upon other ways 
in which the exercise of freedom of expression might be limited or diminished. 
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3.4) The Concepts Diminishing the Protection of Freedom of Expression  
 
Much of this chapter, and indeed parts of the second chapter, has dwelt on the reasons why 
freedom of expression should be given expansive protection. Largely, though by no means 
exclusively, this relates to its role in supporting and sustaining a viable and effective 
participatory democracy. This assumes however that the democracy in question is sufficiently 
robust to fend off or absorb existential threats. It is here we need to investigate the concept of 
a militant democracy, the idea that a democracy might seek to defend itself by restricting the 
very rights that give it its meaning. This is a way in which freedom of expression might 
(legitimately) be diminished, and the militant democracy doctrine has been applied under these 
three jurisdictions. Before we turn to that, let us consider any way in which freedom of 
expression might be given a less expansive canvas through the principle of the margin of 
appreciation. 
 
3.4.1) The Doctrine of Margin of Appreciation  
The margin of appreciation was developed by the European Court, and it means "the latitude 
of deference or error which the Strasbourg organs will allow to national legislative, executive, 
administrative and judicial bodies" when restricting any rights under the Convention.130 It works 
on two levels: when the Court is assessing the state’s assessment that a restriction was in fact 
needed (i.e. what threat is posed) and then again when the Court assesses the quality or extent 
of whatever restriction the state decides to impose. Under this doctrine, the contracting states 
will have a degree of discretion as to legislative, administrative or judicial action in the area of 
a Convention rights. 131 Yet the final decision will be given by the Court as to whether such 
action is reconcilable with the guarantee in question.132 Each contracting state might have 
various considerations due to their societal, individual, historical and philosophical persuasions. 
The Convention is a reaction to and progressive comprising of changing European social and 
legal developments. It seeks out the questing for existence of practices and policies among the 
Contracting States that will enhance human rights.133 This indicates that the Convention is the 
product of consensus as; “the Governments of European countries which are like-minded and 
have a common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law…”134 
Whatever European consensus exists between the Member States of the Council plays a crucial 
role in the interpretation of the Convention and delineating the degree of deference given to 
                                                          
130 Howard C. Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights 
Jurisprudence (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1996) 13 
131 Helen Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, (Cavendish Publishing Limited, London, 4th Ed. 2007) 36 
132 Ibid 
133 Laurence R. Helfer, Consensus, Coherence, and the European Convention on Human Rights, (1993) 26 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 133, 134; "The Court must also recall that the Convention is a living instrument which, as the Commission 
rightly stressed, must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions." Tyrer v. UK App no 5856/72 (ECtHR, 
25 April 1978) para 31 
134 The ECHR Preamble  
72 
 
Contracting States. The Convention is given a "living interpretation"135 and the rights protected 
therein will be read "in light of present-day conditions".136 The Court is willing to defer to a 
relativist position where consensus between the Contracting states is absent.137  
 
The margin of appreciation allows the Court to set "norms which one might call 
'heterogeneous'" due to harmonizing these different practices and policies.138 The 
Conventional unification can be established by harmonisation, or perhaps synthesis, of the 
identity of national and European norms together through a degree of similarity and proximity 
between these norms so as to achieve compatibility between both European and national 
norms.139 For instance, in the case of Handyside, it was not possible to find a uniform European 
concept of morality in domestic laws . This is because the requirements of morality differ over 
time and between locations, especially in modern times due to a rapid and public re-evaluation 
of opinions on manners. Furthermore because of their direct and continuous connection with 
their respective countries, "State authorities are, in principle, in a better position than the 
international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these requirements as well as on 
the ‘necessity’ of a ‘restriction’ or ‘penalty’ intended to meet them."140   
 
However, contracting states have a limited power of appreciation.141 The meaning of 
`necessary` under the article 10 implies the existence of 'pressing social need'. State parties 
have a certain margin of appreciation in both assessing whether such a need exists or not, and 
in deciding how to respond but this remains under the European Court's supervision.142 The 
Court determines whether the reason given by the State authorities justifying the restriction is 
'relevant and sufficient'.143 The interference applied by the State authorities will have to be 
both in compliance with the principles embodied under Article 10 and, based on an acceptable 
assessment of the relevant facts.144 In this regard, the Court is prepared to leave a wider margin 
of appreciation to state authorities when expression incites violence against an individual or a 
public official or against a part of the population.145 The Commission notes that the margin of 
appreciation allows governments to interfere with the right to freedom of expression by its 
measures against terrorism, involving the difficulties of a fair balance between protection of 
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freedom of information and the requirement of protecting state and the public against armed 
collusion that aims to overthrow a democratic system.146 
 
3.4.2) The Principle of Militant Democracy 
Political and legal philosophy constitute an important framework for legal institutions in terms 
of their responses to issues regarding fundamental rights. Legal institutions make judgments in 
accordance with their legal philosophy, which in turn is likely to be affected by political 
philosophy. As a result of this, it can be assumed political and legal philosophy are loosely 
interlinked. The history of most modern democratic states has been shaped by the experience 
of totalitarianism and the inter-war period. Militant democracy provides an excuse for 
democratic states to restrict the rights of anti-democratic actors so as to protect the 
substantive, predetermined values of democracy before “the Trojan Horse by which the enemy 
enters the city”.147 Under the concept of militant democracy, the state might seek to preserve 
the foundations of the political order by banning certain types of expression/association 
including political parties that aim to undermine social order.148 In order to protect democratic 
principles, militant democracy relies on the rationale that state authorities are able to restrict 
the freedom of expression and the association of groups and individuals who might pose a 
threat to the very democracy which allows them to flourish.149 Militant democracy makes 
reference to a type of constitutional democracy which is authorized to protect political and civil 
freedoms by pre-emptively limiting the exercise of such freedoms.150 This approach interferes 
with freedom of expression by using the legislation of anti-terrorism, hate-speech legislation, 
the banning of political parties, restricting mass demonstrations, and the criminalization of 
certain political organizations.151 There has been a very long record of action adopted under 
the concept of 'militant democracy' against 'terroristic speech' and it did not only commence 
after the 9/11 attacks.152 Chronologically, the most venerable offences to penalise expression 
against the state were sedition and treason.153     
   
The European Court has been in a position to defend democracy, (the essential system for 
rights and liberties to flourish), from abuses and deterioration caused by ‘hate speech’, 
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‘incitement to terrorism and violence’ and ‘non-democratic discourse’.154 Since the end of the 
Second World War, the Convention has been an instrument to provide an early warning of 
authoritarianism in weak democracies, in order to prevent authoritarian regimes.155 European 
Court case law has very much been closely focused on the idea of defining the `democratic 
spirit`.156 The Council of Europe has sought to guarantee respect for human rights and to ensure 
that its members adhere to the standards of ‘an effective political democracy’ and the rule of 
law affirmed in the Preamble of the Convention.157 Consequently, the concept of militant 
democracy has been adopted by the European Court to protect democracy by utilising article 
17 against political expression or association which is incompliant with the Convention. The 
European Convention’s concept of militant democracy is activated when a political party seeks 
to apply a programme or activity that runs counter to democracy and to the Convention 
values.158 In this context, the state has a positive obligation to protect the rights and freedoms 
of the people before such a party seizes power and begins to implement its policies.159 In the 
case of the German Communist Party, the decision was admissible with the application of 
Article 17 and was completely consistent with this construction of Article 17. This is because it 
aimed to establish a totalitarian regime and it advocated anti-democratic values. Consequently, 
the Court was required to go into detail in connection with the rights set forth in Articles 9, 10 
and 11 of the Convention and Article 17 because anti-democratic actors claim that the state`s 
interference violates the Convention rights, usually Articles 10 and 11. States defend their 
actions either with reference to Article 17 or to the restriction clauses, in order to protect the 
interests of national security, territorial integrity and public safety set forth under the Articles 
10(2) and 11(2). The Court identified such political activities and statements in the Refah Partisi 
(Welfare Party) case, which is a contemporary case for examining the notion of militant 
democracy.160 The Court held that it is possible that a totalitarian movement, structured in the 
form of a democratic party, could destroy democracy, and there has indeed been an example 
of such a party in modern European history.161 States have a responsibility to protect their 
democratic regimes from totalitarian political parties` activities.162 In consequence of this, the 
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In the case of Communist Party of Germany (KPD Case), the Commission approved of the prohibiting of the 
Communist Party in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
155 Steven Greer, The European Convention of Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects (CUP, 2006) 
56 
156 Handyside v the United Kingdom App no 5493/72 (ECtHR, 7 December 1976) para 49 "the demands of that 
pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no 'democratic society'." 
157 The ECHR Preamble 
158 Macklem (n.151) 507 
159 the ECtHR, Communist Party (KPD) v. the Federal Republic of Germany at 101-103 
160 Christian Moe, `Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey` (2003) 6 The International Journal of 
Not-for-Profit Law 1-14 
161 Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey App no 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98 
(ECtHR, 13 February 2003) para 99 
162 Ibid para 96 
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dissolution of the Welfare Party was justified by the convention under freedom of association, 
because it pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society. There is no 
doubt that the European Court of Human Rights has a positive effect on Turkey’s political and 
social life,163  and contributes to Turkey’s advancement towards a democratic constitutional 
state. Yet there are also counter examples; the decision on the Welfare Party case has been 
criticised by Turkish liberals because it caused the authoritarian bureaucratic elites to increase 
in self-confidence.164  
 
Similarly, international human rights law under the UN system has attempted to create legal 
protection for human rights. The UDHR, ICCPR and ICERD serve the aim determined under the 
charter of the United Nation; 
 
"to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has 
brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, 
in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women 
and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and 
respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law 
can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger 
freedom."165 
 
Slightly different from the ECHR, at the UN level, the international human rights law system 
persuades and encourages not only democratic societies but also societies governed by 
oppressive and authoritarian governances that ratified the Conventions. Compared to the unity 
seen in the members of the Council of Europe, there are huge political differences between the 
countries that signed the ICCPR and ICERD, some of which had very limited proximity to legal 
or philosophical norms. As a result of this, the jurisprudence of the human rights bodies 
provides comprehensive information on the challenges that faced by the right to freedom of 
expression in these diversified political realms. Expression that was considered by a state party 
as advocating violence, even if it fell under the scope of freedom of expression, might be 
restricted by national authorities so as to silence or to oppress political opposition, dissenting 
speech, media professionals, human rights activists, academics or artists.  
 
In the case of M.A. v. Italy, the Human Rights Committee noted that the author was sentenced 
upon conviction for involvement in ‘reorganizing the dissolved fascist party’ which has as its 
object to eliminate democratic freedoms and to establish a totalitarian regime with its fascist 
                                                          
163 H. A. Özhan, `Application of Decisions of European Court of Human Rights in Contracting Parties`, (2001) 6 
Journal of Liberal Thought, p.51 See also, Ensar Yılmaz, `Sociology of Political Parties’ Closure Regime` (2009) 3 
African Journal of Business Management, 831, 832 
164 Mustafa Erdogan, `Thoughts Arising from ECHR Decision on the Welfare Party`, (2001) 6 Journal of Liberal 
Thought p.50 See also, Yılmaz (n. 163) 832 
165 Charter of United Nations, Preamble  
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leanings.166 The Committee concluded that the communication was inadmissible because such 
kinds of political activities were not covered by article 5167 (the equivalent to article 17 in the 
ECHR) of the Covenant but it was a justifiable restriction under article 19(3) of the Covenant.168 
The Committee implemented the 'militant democracy' concept when it applied article 5 of the 
ICCPR against totalitarian and fascist political movements. It prevented an interpretation of the 
treaty’s provisions as permitting people to engage in activities aimed at the destruction of the 
rights of others. Yet, as Nowak argued, article 5 of ICCPR is far from playing a role in a militant 
democracy by preventing anti-democratic activities.169 In these communications, the 
Committee did not mention preventing anti-democratic activities or preventing violent political 
tendencies. The concept of militant democracy has not been given a strong position in 
international human rights’ case law. It seems that the main reason for this is that the 
signatories to the ICCPR and CERD include not only democratic states but also countries ruled 
by totalitarian and one-party systems. The Committee tends not to work with a militant 
democracy doctrine due to the variety of political systems, instead encouraging contracting 
states to respect human rights through considering complaints about other political rights 
including the right to freedom of expression.   
 
The next chapter offers an evaluation of the regulation of ‘terroristic speech’ in Turkey, and the 
interplay between the right of freedom of expression and state security. Turkey's political and 
legal philosophy has considered the state itself as a goal, with its security and interests being 
prioritized over its people.170 It has certainly not been understood as a civil appliance in the 
service of people. Militant democracy is one of the main concerns of Turkish political life 
especially given the military coups in 1960 and 1980 and the military interventions in 1971 and 
1997.171 In particular, the military coup in 1980 secured the authoritarian nature of the regime, 
which in turn influenced the degree to which liberties were protected. The legal system has 
been defensive of, and protectionist towards, the ` unalterable core` of the constitution through 
the constitutional and criminal doctrine (Turkish Criminal Code or anti-terror law) due to the 
militant nature of Turkey’s political and legal philosophy.172 The judiciary in Turkey is motivated 
to preserve the constitutional system more than to respect human rights, working in 
accordance with state power and state elites so as to protect official ideology.173 These factors 
                                                          
166 M.A. v. Italy, 117/1981 10 April (Human Rights Committee, Communication 1984-4-10) para 7.2 
167 "Article 5: "(1) Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person 
any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms 
recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the present Covenant. (2). There 
shall be no restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental human rights recognized or existing in any 
State Party to the present Covenant pursuant to law, conventions, regulations or custom on the pretext that the 
present Covenant does not recognize such rights or that it recognizes them to a lesser extent." 
168 M.A. v. Italy, 117/1981 10 April (Human Rights Committee, Communication 1984-4-10) para 13.3 
169 Manfred Nowak, the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Engel, Germany, 2005) 116–117. 
170 Vahap Coşkun, `Turkey`s Illiberal Judiciary: Cases and Decisions` (2010) 12 Insight Turkey 43, 48 
171 Markus Thiel, `The `Militant Democracy` Principle in Modern Democracies` (Ashgate, 2009) 263 
172 Ibid 264 
173 Ergun Özbudun, `Türk Anayasa Mahkemesinin Yargısal Aktivizmi ve Siyasal Elitlerin Tepkisi` (2007) 63 Ankara 
Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi, 257, 265, see also Ergun Özbudun, `State Elites and Democratic Political Culture in Turkey` 
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have resulted in unclear boundaries between, on the one hand, expression promoting 
terrorism or violence; and mere criticism of the government and its values, as voiced in 
everyday political discourse, on the other. We might recall here the critical role played by clarity 
and certainty in satisfying the ‘prescribed by law’ test. Expressing opinion about economic, 
social and religious issues in many cases was treated as a crime because it contradicted the 
official/constitutional ideology set by the military coups, and was viewed as threatening the 
state and/or its institutions.  
 
The Turkish Constitution permits limiting freedom of expression on the basis of article 14174 
and article 13175: within the ‘spirit of the Constitution’ and according to ‘the requirements of a 
democratic order for society and the secular Republic’ and according to ‘the principle of 
proportionality’. Within article 13, it is important to highlight the prohibition clause `secular 
republic` which led to the imposition of significant restrictions on freedom of expression in 
Turkey before 1990. In general, the Preamble176 together with articles 13, 14 and 26 of the 
Constitution provide vague clauses for the criminal law to sanction `an activity` contrary to the 
unitary and secular ideology of the state and its democracy. The Militant nature of the legal 
system of Turkey can be applied through these limitation clauses. Consequently, the 
Constitution focused more on protecting its own institutional characterisation, entitled with 
"an indivisible entity with its state and territory", "Turkish historical and moral values", "the 
nationalism" and "principle, reforms and modernism of Ataturk and secular republic" through 
the TMK and TPC rather than guaranteeing fundamental rights and liberties. In a democratic 
system, the constitution should give priority to the protection of the rights of individuals. In 
addition, there are provisions in the Constitution which expressly underscore militant 
constitutionalism. It is difficult within these limitation clauses to provide an adequate guarantee 
for freedom of expression and for maintaining the necessity of a democratic society. The right 
to freedom of expression has been undermined by such concepts as 'militant democracy'. All 
provisions relating to freedom of expression are in compliance with the concept of militant 
democracy set forth under the Constitution. Consequently, prosecutions on 'terroristic speech' 
can be regarded as a reflection of the concept of militant democracy in Turkey which penalises 
                                                          
in ed. Larry Diamond, `Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries` (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993) 
247-68 
174 Article 14 of the Constitution prohibits using rights and freedoms in the Constitution against “… the indivisible 
integrity of the state with its territory and nation, and endangering the existence of the democratic and secular 
order of the Turkish Republic based upon human rights.” 
175 Article 13: "(As amended on October 3, 2001; Act No. 4709) Fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted 
only by law and in conformity with the reasons mentioned in the relevant articles of the Constitution without 
infringing upon their essence. These restrictions shall not be contrary to the letter and spirit of the Constitution 
and the requirements of the democratic order of the society and the secular republic and the principle of 
proportionality." 
176 The Preamble of Turkish Constitution Para 5: "(As amended on October 3, 2001; Act No. 4709)  That no 
protection shall be accorded to an activity contrary to Turkish national interests, Turkish existence and the 
principle of its indivisibility with its State and territory, historical and moral values of Turkishness; the nationalism, 
principles, reforms and civilizationism of Atatürk and that sacred religious feelings shall absolutely not be involved 
in state affairs and politics as required by the principle of secularism;" 
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dissenting, hard-hitting critics of the state and its institutions. In Turkey, democracy has 
deteriorated by virtue of militant democracy which has posed a number of limitations and 
restrictions upon the right to freedom of expression.177  
 
However, constitutional amendment in 2001 softened the militant nature of the Preamble. The 
Preamble consisting of "That no protection shall be accorded to thoughts and opinions contrary 
to Turkish national interests..." was amended in 2001 by replacing the phrase “thoughts and 
opinions" with the word `activity`.178 This was particularly important for the right to freedom of 
expression. By this amendment the legislative body aimed to promote and to protect the right 
to freedom of thought and expression from a wide range of interferences.179 Nonetheless, the 
Preamble retains a constitutional commitment to `ideas, beliefs, and resolutions` such as 
Ataturk nationalism, the supremacy of the constitution, a unitary state and the protection of 
national sovereignty and secularism. Indeed, the ` ideas, beliefs, and resolutions’ affirmed in the 
Preamble are expressly guaranteed in Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the Constitution.180 However, the 
concept of `an activity` can be still understood as cumulative and deliberative `expression` 
against the values and principles of the Constitution.181 In this regard, the concept of militant 
democracy has been an effective factor in establishing the concept of sedition to be preserved 
and in facilitating its translation into anti-terrorism law. However, Turkish political and legal 
authorities are showing a marked departure from their perception of very strict militant 
democracy and adopting an ECHR-friendly perception. Recent case law has shown that more 
attention is being given to such democratic necessities as the principle of the freedom of 
expression. This has been achieved though politically strengthening Turkey’s civil and 
democratic institutions under the influence of ECtHR case law.  
 
 
                                                          
177 H.Ali Özhan, and B.Berat Özipek, Yargıtay Kararlarında İfade Özgürlüğü, (LDT, 2003) p.4 
178 The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, the Preamble: (As amended on October 17, 2001) “… That no 
protection shall be accorded to an activity contrary to Turkish national interests, Turkish existence and the 
principle of its indivisibility with its State and territory, historical and moral values of Turkishness; the nationalism, 
principles, reforms and civilizationism of Atatürk and that sacred religious feelings shall absolutely not be involved 
in state affairs and politics as required by the principle of secularism;…  
With these IDEAS, BELIEFS, and RESOLUTIONS to be interpreted and implemented accordingly, thus commanding 
respect for, and absolute loyalty to, its letter and spirit;  
Has been entrusted by the TURKISH NATION to the democracy-loving Turkish sons’ and daughters’ love for the 
motherland and nation.”  
179 TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Dönem 21/3, 132. Birleşim, 25.9.2001, p.70-83 
180 Turkish Constitution “Article 1: The Turkish state is a Republic. Article 2: The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, 
secular and social state governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national 
solidarity and justice; respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk, and based on the fundamental 
tenets set forth in the Preamble. Article 3: The Turkish state, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity. 
Its language is Turkish. Its flag, the form of which is prescribed by the relevant law, is composed of a white crescent 
and star on a red background. Its national anthem is the “Independence March”. Its capital is Ankara.” 
181 Thiel (n. 171) 265 
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3.5) Conclusion 
 
This chapter has analysed the importance of certain doctrinal principles for cases concerning 
‘terroristic speech’. While there are differences between the textual guarantees of freedom of 
expression under Article 26 Turkish Constitution, Article 10 ECHR, and Article 19 ICCPR, the 
underlying doctrinal principles are broadly shared between the three jurisdictions. These 
doctrinal principles determine both the scope of the scrutinized restrictions on freedom of 
speech and the extent of freedom of speech itself. These shared principles require first; a 
precise and predictable legal basis, second; pursuit of a legitimate purpose, and last all that any 
restrictions be necessary and proportionate. They function as tools through which an 
appropriate balance may be struck between the right to freedom of expression and other 
legitimate interests such as the protection of national security and the maintenance of public 
order. They also organise and give structure to legal reasoning in the national courts. In this 
regard, these doctrinal categories reflect the impact of freedom of expression on national 
authorities by giving particular attention to this right within a democratic polity. These doctrinal 
principles give not only broader scope for the right to freedom of expression, but also provide 
the legal reasoning and jurisprudential support for a contracting state to repeal or gradually 
remove the offence of sedition from the legal lexicon. In Turkey, especially the Court, giving 
such reasoning, has concluded that many restrictions on expression constituted violations of 
freedom of expression. Nonetheless, as chapter two argued, a contradictory development has 
appeared as a troubling paradox. On the one hand, human rights law disfavours these archaic 
offences, international law has simultaneously paved the way for states’ enactment of a range 
of new offences criminalizing ‘terroristic speech’ through the imposition of open-ended and 
widely-framed positive obligations, on the other. The vagueness of these offences has enabled 
States to increasingly repress political opposition and dissent. 
 
In this regard, a key concern is the lack of traction which these doctrinal principles have 
ultimately had in curtailing States’ invocation of the ‘counter-terrorism’ narrative. The 
contracting states have a degree of discretion in their legislative, administrative or judicial 
action over Convention rights under the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction as to whether such 
action is reconcilable with the guarantee in question.182 There is also concern about the extent 
to which it is legitimate for States to restrict speech that may challenge or undermine a 
particular (democratic) political order. The ‘militant democracy’, one that is capable of 
defending itself, thus comes to the fore. It operates at the national level as a tacit norm, an 
unspoken background principle, harnessed putatively in the defence of ‘an effective political 
democracy’183 in cases involving restrictions on ‘terroristic speech.’ Nonetheless, it has rarely 
been expressly acknowledged in the Strasbourg Court case law concerning the dissolution of 
political parties. ‘Militant democracy’ serves as a kind of ‘precautionary legality’ which 
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183 Preamble to the ECHR;  
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prioritizes risk aversion and self-preservation in the face of incalculable harm.184 Yet, this 
principle has caused close scrutiny of political expression in Turkey in favour of preserving the 
state itself. Thus, there remains a contradictory climate between human rights law and Turkey’s 
‘militant democracy’. Obviously, the Court’s militant democracy differs from Turkey’s in terms 
of the scope of freedom of expression given to dissenting expression, however, they rarely 
corresponded.185 It is to the Turkish position, and those various contradictions identified above, 
that we now turn. 
 
                                                          
184 Sajó (n. 7) drawing on Lowenstein’s discussion of the threat to democracy presented by emotional populism. 
185 See for examples of such correspondence; Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey App no 
41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98 (ECtHR, 13 February 2003); Zana v. Turkey App 69/1996/688/880 
(ECtHR, 25 November 1997)   
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CHAPTER 4: TURKEY’S HIGH COURTS RESPONSE TO ‘TERRORISTIC SPEECH’ 
 
4.1) Introduction 
 
Over several decades, Yargıtay1 and the Constitutional Court2 have developed a significant body 
of case law regarding restrictions on what might be regarded as ‘terroristic speech’. These have 
primarily involved offences under the Turkish Penal Code (hereinafter “TPC”) and the ‘Law on 
the Fight against Terrorism’ (hereinafter “TMK”). There have been violent clashes instigated by 
leftist groups (including Kurdish separatists) and right wings groups in the country since 1960s.3 
In their examination of restrictions on such speech, while Yargıtay and the Constitutional Court 
have demanded that a degree of imminent violence or terror must be established, there 
remains a significant evidential deficit in the courts’ approach since they still rely on a 
presumption that particular ideas present an inherent threat to the state and its institutions. A 
significant number of cases relating to public-political expressions purportedly advocating 
terrorism or political violence, have been examined by Yargıtay and the Constitutional Court. 
Individuals have often been convicted for dissenting and hard-hitting criticism of public 
authorities. Despite some positive developments in Turkish law,4 and notwithstanding the 
influence of both Strasbourg jurisprudence and the enhanced constitutional protection of 
rights (i.e. the introduction to the Constitutional Court (in 2012) of a right of individual petition), 
‘terroristic speech’ in Turkey continues to be treated in a similar fashion to speech that might, 
in the past, have been regarded as ‘seditious’. As Özek stated, any crime committed against the 
existence of the state was accepted as ‘political crime’.5 Similarly, Özhan notes that individuals 
                                                          
1 The Supreme Court; makes the unification of judgements and supervises the evidentiary of facts of the crimes 
by evaluating the decisions of first instance courts. The Court of Cassation is divided into civil law and criminal law 
chambers (hukuk ve ceza daireleri). There are 21 civil law and 21 criminal law chambers. Most of the cases 
subjected to this research were examined by the Criminal Chambers of Supreme Court of Appeal hereinafter “YCD" 
(most of the relevant cases evaluated by 9th Criminal Law Chamber (hereinafter Y (9) C.D)) and Supreme Court of 
Appeal Assembly of Criminal Chambers hereinafter “YCGK”. 
2 The Turkish Constitutional Court was established by the 1961 Constitution of Turkey. The composition, powers 
and structure of the Court were changed considerably and the right to individual application to the Constitutional 
Court was introduced by the constitutional amendments in 2010. With the actual implementation of the individual 
application started from 23 September 2012, the constitutional review has been implemented against the 
infringements of rights caused by persons or institutions exerting public authority. 
3 Kemal Karpat, `Turkish democracy at Impasse: Ideology, Party Politics and the Third Military Intervention` (1981) 
in ed. Karpat Kemal, Studies on Turkish Politics and Society: Selected Articles and Essays (Brill, 2003) 272, see also, 
Tanel Demirel, `12 Eylül`e Doğru Ordu ve Demokrasi` (2001) 56 Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi 43, 44-46 
(emphases added) 
4 For example, the phrase ‘regardless of the methods, intentions and the ideas’ was removed from Article 8 TMK  
(separatist propaganda/propaganda against the indivisible unity of the State), by Article 1 of 4126 Law, 
27/10/1995, and this offence was repealed in 2003. 
5 Çetin Özek, ‘Devletin Şahsiyeti Aleyhine Cürümlerin Genel Prensipleri’; (1966) 32/2 İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk 
Fakültesi Mecmuası 597, 621; see for example, The Constitutional Court, E.1979/31 K.1980/59, 27/11/1980 (In 
terms of Articles 141, 142 and 163 of TPC, the Legislative body was influenced by the 1930 Rocco provision 
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were often prosecuted based on their political preferences.6 Yargıtay and the Constitutional 
Court have thus interpreted relevant provisions in the same way that the concept of sedition 
has been relied upon in other jurisdictions – in order to protect the state and its ideology.7 
This chapter consists of two sections; Section 3.1 chronicles the history of speech-related 
jurisprudence in the Turkish Courts, noting that political dissent – speech critical of the State, 
its institutions or secular ideology – was commonly treated between the 1950s and late 1990s 
as ‘seditious’. Section 3.2 considers the factors upon which the courts have placed weight when 
dealing with offences relating to ‘terroristic speech’. Historically, the courts’ approach in 
determining whether an utterance of particular words fell within the parameters of a crime, 
lacked any rigorous methodology. This lack of methodological rigour will be illustrated by 
analysis of the case law relating to the expressive advocacy of `terrorism`, broadly defined. In 
the early cases, there is an obvious lack of judicial attention to the imminence of acts of violence 
or terrorism, though later cases show some signs that the judiciary have sought to address this 
deficiency. Lastly, the Constitutional Court’s and Yargıtay’s response to ‘terroristic speech’, by 
considering the separate elements of such offences (the actus reus, mens rea, and the 
evidential basis for prosecution – content and context of expression) will be analysed. The 
content and context of expression is a relatively recent development in the Turkish legal 
system. This too, can arguably be attributed to the influence of Strasbourg case law. 
 
4.2) Turkey's Legal Response to ‘Terroristic Speech’ 
 
As explained earlier in the third chapter, according to the Turkish legal system’s philosophy, the 
maintenance of the State and its institutions is viewed as an end in itself. The State is not 
primarily understood as being in the service of the people, and state security is thus prioritized 
over the protection of fundamental rights.8 The legal system in Turkey is expressly ‘charged’ 
with upholding security through resolutions in the Preamble9 to the Constitution and also 
                                                          
introduced by Italian Fascist regime in order to protect fascist state authority.) See Further, Köksal Bayraktar, 
Siyasal Suç, (İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1982) 42 
6 Hacı Ali Özhan and Bekir Berat Özipek, Yargıtay Kararlarında İfade Özgürlüğü, (LDT, 2003) 5; see for example, The 
Constitutional Court, E.1979/31 K.1980/59, 27/11/1980,  
7 The Constitutional Court, E.1979/31 K.1980/59, 27/11/1980 (In terms of Articles 141, 142 and 163 of TPC, the 
Legislative body was influenced by the 1930 Rocco provision introduced by Italian Fascist regime in order to 
protect fascist state authority.). See also, Özhan, and Berat Özipek (n.6) 5 
8 Vahap Coskun, `Turkey`s Illiberal Judiciary: Cases and Decisions` (2010) 12 Insight Turkey 43, 48 
9 The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, the Preamble: (As amended on October 17, 2001) “The recognition 
that no protection shall be accorded to an activity contrary to Turkish national interests, Turkish existence and the 
principle of its indivisibility with its State and territory, historical and moral values of Turkishness; the nationalism, 
principles, reforms and civilizationism of Atatürk and that sacred religious feelings shall absolutely not be involved 
in state affairs and politics as required by the principle of secularism;…  
With these IDEAS, BELIEFS, and RESOLUTIONS to be interpreted and implemented accordingly, thus commanding 
respect for, and absolute loyalty to, its letter and spirit;  
Has been entrusted by the TURKISH NATION to the democracy-loving Turkish sons’ and daughters’ love for the 
motherland and nation.” 
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restrictions listed in article 2610 of the Constitution. As such, criminal law has been used to 
restrict a wide range of expressions without properly distinguishing legitimate political and 
intellectual expression from speech that directly and indirectly incites a terrorist attack. This 
legal philosophy has also been furthered through anti-terrorism law. Accordingly, all 
expressions relating to communism, separatism, anti-secularism, or indeed relating even 
loosely to terrorism have been criminalised. In case law, expressions dissenting of the official 
ideology, promoting of Islamism, anti-secularism (irtica), anarchism, or communism have been 
regarded as presenting a threat to the state and its institutions, and their criminalization has 
been justified on the basis that they are ‘destructive’, ‘separatist’, ‘reactionary’, ‘dangerous’ or 
‘violent’.11 Thus any expressions in relation to these ideologies were regarded as inherently 
politically violent, such as words like ‘insurgent’ and ‘revolutionary’.12  
In previous years, the most relevant offences under the TPC (1926) were the offence of 
propaganda under Articles 14213 and 16314TPC, and the offence of indoctrination under Article 
163 of TPC. While these two Articles were repealed after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
                                                          
10 Article 26 of Turkish Constitution: "Everyone has the right to express and disseminate his/her thoughts and 
opinions by speech, in writing or in pictures or through other media, individually or collectively. This freedom 
includes the liberty of receiving or imparting information or ideas without interference by official authorities. This 
provision shall not preclude subjecting transmission by radio, television, cinema, or similar means to a system of 
licensing.  (As amended on October 3, 2001; Act No. 4709) The exercise of these freedoms may be restricted for 
the purposes of national security, public order, public safety, safeguarding the basic characteristics of the Republic 
and the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, preventing crime, punishing offenders, 
withholding information duly classified as a state secret, protecting the reputation or rights and private and family 
life of others, or protecting professional secrets as prescribed by law, or ensuring the proper functioning of the 
judiciary.  (Repealed on October 3, 2001; Act No. 4709) Regulatory provisions concerning the use of means to 
disseminate information and thoughts shall not be deemed as the restriction of freedom of expression and 
dissemination of thoughts as long as the transmission of information and thoughts is not prevented. (Paragraph 
added on October 3, 2001; Act No. 4709) The formalities, conditions and procedures to be applied in exercising 
the freedom of expression and dissemination of thought shall be prescribed by law." 
11 The Constitutional Court E.1963/173 K.1965/40, 26/09/1965; see also, Özhan, and Berat Özipek (n.6) 4; Engin 
Akın, Anayasa Mahkemesi-Yargıtay Kararları ve Uluslararası Hukuk Metinleri Çercevesinde: Terör ve Terörün 
Finansmanı Suçu, (Adalet, 2009) 45 
12 Uğur Alacakaptan, `Demokratik Anayasa ve Ceza Kanunu`nun 141 ve 142`inci Maddeleri` (1966) 1 Ankara Hukuk 
Fakultesi Dergisi 3-20, 9, see also in, Bülent Tanör, Siyasi Düşünce Hürriyeti ve 1961 Türk Anaysası, (Phd Thesis, 
Oncu Kitabevi, 1969), (Doktora Tezi, Oncu Kitabevi, 1969) 100 
13 Article 142 of TPC was repealed in 1991, “(1) Any person who unconditionally makes propaganda with the 
purpose of dominating one social class over others, or eliminating one social class, or overturning social or 
economic foundation of the country, or eliminating political or legal system of the state, is punished with 
imprisonment from five years to ten years.(2) Any person who unconditionally makes propaganda for one citizen 
or one group to govern the state as incompliance with republicanism or the principles of democracy, is punished 
with same punishment. (3) Any person who unconditionally makes propaganda for partly or completely replacing 
the constitutional rights with consideration of race, or for eliminating or weakening national feelings, is punished 
with imprisonment from five years to ten years.” 
14 Article 163 of TPC was repealed in 1991: “Any person who unconditionally makes any propaganda or 
indoctrination with the purpose of changing state’s social, economic, or political or legal system with religious 
principles and rules by using religion or religious feelings or religiously holy things, in defiance of secularism, is 
punished with imprisonment from five years to ten years”. 
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1991,15 the latter provision was effectively retained by Article 31216 of the TPC.17   Under this 
Article, the offence of ‘incitement to hatred and animosity’ and ‘praising of offence and 
offender’ are both criminalised. Furthermore, a new TPC (2004) was introduced and these 
same offences were kept under Articles 21518 and 21619.  Under these provisions, views which 
challenge the economic, social, and legal structures of the state by proposing their partial or 
complete revision, were criminalised. In addition to these provisions of the TPC since 1991, 
prosecutions have been brought under the offences of propaganda for, ‘inciting’, ‘justifying’, 
and ‘praising’ terrorism mainly under Articles of 620, 721 and 822 TMK (article 8 was repealed in 
                                                          
15 Zeynep Alemdar, ‘’Modelling’ for Democracy? Turkey’s Historical Issues with Freedom of Speech’ (2014) 50 
Middle Eastern Studies, 568, 574 
16 Article 312 of 765 TPC (revealed TPC), “(1) Any person who openly incites hatred and animosity between people 
belonging to different social class, religion, race, sect, or coming from another origin …in case that such act causes 
danger to public order.”  
17 See also; Alemdar (n. 15) 
18 Article 215 of 5237 TPC, “Any person who openly praises an offense or the person committing the offenses is 
punished with imprisonment up to two years.” Article 216 of 5237 TPC, “Any person who openly incites a group 
of people belonging to different social class, religion, race, sect, or coming from another origin, to be rancorous 
or hostile against another group, is punished with imprisonment from one year to three years in case such act 
causes a risk to public safety.” 
19 Article 216 of 5237 TPC, “Any person who openly incites a group of people belonging to different social class, 
religion, race, sect, or coming from another origin, to be rancorous or hostile against another group, is punished 
with imprisonment from one year to three years in case such act causes a risk to public safety.” 
20 Article 6 of TMK: “(1) Those who announce that the crimes of a terrorist organization are aimed at certain 
persons, whether or not such persons are named, or who disclose or publish the identity of officials on anti-
terrorist duties, or who identify such persons as targets shall be punished with one to three years imprisonment. 
(Amendment: 11/4/2013-6459/7 md.) (2) Those who print or publish leaflets and declarations of terrorist 
organizations by means of justifying or praising methods of terrorist organisation that contained violence, coercion 
or oppression, shall be punished with one to three years imprisonment. (3) Those who, in contravention of Article 
14 of this law, disclose or publish the identity of informants shall be punished with one to three years 
imprisonment. (Amendment: 29/6/2006-5532/5 md.) (4) If any of the offences defined above are committed by 
periodicals and broadcast, editors-in-chief who have not participated in the perpetration of the crime shall be 
punished with a judicial fine from one thousand to fifteen thousand days’ rates.”   
Yargıtay decided that identifying publicly known public officials in the publication were not regarded as offence 
under TMK 6. See in; Y. (9). C.D, E.1995/3693 K.1995/4525 (3/7/1995) 
21 Article 7 – (1) Those who establish, lead, or are a member of a terrorist organisation in order to commit crimes 
in furtherance of aims specified under article 1 through use of force and violence, by means of coercion, 
intimidation, suppression or threat, shall be punished according to the provisions of article 314 of the Turkish 
Penal Code. Persons who organise the activities of the organisation shall be punished as leaders of the 
organisation. (Değişik ikinci fıkra/ Amendment: 11/4/2013-6459/8 md.) (2) Any person making propaganda by 
means of justifying or praising methods of terrorist organisation that contained violence, coercion or oppression 
for a terrorist organisation shall be punished with imprisonment from one to five years. If this crime is committed 
through means of mass media, the penalty shall be aggravated by one half. In addition, editors-in-chief who have 
not participated in the perpetration of the crime shall be punished with a judicial fine from one thousand to fifteen 
thousand days’ rates. The following actions and behaviours shall also be punished according to the provisions of 
this paragraph: a) (Mülga: 27/3/2015-6638/10 md) repealed b) As to imply being a member or follower of a 
terrorist organisation, 1) carrying insignia and signs belonging to the organization, 2) shouting slogans or 3) making 
announcements using audio equipment or 4) wearing a uniform of the terrorist organization imprinted with its 
insignia (Ek fıkra/Added article: 27/3/2015-6638/10 md.) (3) In a demonstrations and marching turning as a 
propaganda for terrorism, any person who covers his face partly or completely for the purpose of hiding his 
identity, shall be punished with imprisonment from three to five years. 
22 Article 8 of TMK (repealed in 2003). “Written and oral propaganda and assemblies, meetings and 
demonstrations aimed at damaging the indivisible unity of the Turkish Republic with its territory and nation are 
forbidden, regardless of the methods, intentions and ideas behind such activities. Those conducting such activities 
85 
 
2003). Even though there is no offence expressly entitled ‘sedition’ in Turkish law, it is argued 
that sedition-like offences have effectively been reborn under the TMK (as well as under the 
different Articles of the TPC discussed above). These offences are akin to ‘sedition’ since they 
function in the same way and protect the same legal interests (namely, the state and its 
institutions). As Roger Douglas notes, ‘sedition’ is a `political crime`, used throughout history to 
`punish people for what they think (or what they are thought to think) rather than on the basis 
of the degree to which their activities actually pose a threat to public order.23 Moreover, as 
Sorial argues, laws criminalizing sedition have been modernised in the context of counter-
terrorism, which similarly targets types of expression advocating violence against the state.24 
 
In the past, perceived risks to the integrity and security of the State emerged in the form of 
discrete ideological ‘-isms’ such as ‘communism’ and ‘anti-secularism’ or anarchism. Thus, in 
the historical freedom of expression cases (those occurring before the ‘terrorism’ era), the TPC 
provided a legal basis for courts to interfere with expression advocating 
‘communism/bolshevism’, ‘socialism’, ‘anarchism’, ‘fascism’, ‘racism’, or ‘authoritarianism’. 
Speakers were also prosecuted if their speech was found to be aimed at “weakening and 
destroying feelings of being a nation”, “destroying the secular system” or “establishing a 
theocratic system”.25  Interestingly, however, while these goals were sufficient for the national 
courts to regard the speech as being tantamount to advocacy of political violence, the courts 
neither addressed nor mentioned any ‘terrorist’ organisation or motivation/ideology. Rather, 
the courts’ focus was simply on the individual’s or association’s expressive act undermining or 
contradicting official ideology. 
Today, in contrast, while the interpretation of the offences of propaganda, praising or 
incitement under the present TPC and TMK have been shaped by the case law of the previous 
TPC, these discrete ideological threats have been supplanted by more amorphous and all-
encompassing ‘-isms’ – ‘fundamentalism’, ‘radicalism’ and ‘extremism’ – under the umbrella of 
‘terrorism’. As chapter 2 explained, this thesis is premised on the argument that the reinvention 
during the modern ‘human rights era’ of archaic offences of ‘sedition’ can be traced to the 
underlying failure to narrowly define the nature of the risk posed. This, at root, mirrors the 
fundamental failure of the international community to draft a clear and precise definition of 
‘terrorism’. The legal pedigree of the speech-related offences in Turkey thus points to this 
deeper-level problem concerning the invocation of ‘terrorism’ as the basis for restricting 
freedom of speech. As this chapter will demonstrate, the Turkish courts have failed to 
distinguish and thus to prevent speech that falls far short either of intentionally inciting 
                                                          
shall be punished with a sentence of between 2 and 5 years' imprisonment and with a fine of between 50 million 
and 100 million Turkish liras.” 
23 Roger Douglas `The Ambiguity of Sedition: The Trials of William Fordon Burns` (2004) 9 Australian Journal of 
Legal History 227, 248 
24 Sarah Sorial, ‘Can Saying Something Make it so? The Nature of Sedition Harm’, Law and Philosophy, 29 (2010) 
273-305, 275 
25 Bulent Acar, “Hukuk Düzenimizde Düsüncenin Acıklanmasının Cezalandırılması ve Cezalandırmanın Sınırı”, 
(1995) 3 Ankara Barosu Dergisi 32 
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imminent ‘acts of terrorism’ that are likely to occur or of intentionally distributing a message 
with the intention to incite a ‘terrorist’ act causing a danger that such offences may be 
committed.26 Legitimate political, intellectual and academic expression has not been 
attentively distinguished from ‘terroristic speech’. Indeed, expression that seeks to offer 
constructive ways of addressing the terrorism problem, or which reveals information about the 
violation of human rights committed by national authorities, has been criminalised. 
That is not to say that there have no positive developments. Since the late 1990s, a number of 
amendments (both to the constitution and to provisions in the TMK and TPC) have moderated 
the impact of the sedition-like offences contained therein, and thus given more breathing space 
for political dissent. These revisions to the law followed from a parliamentary debate in which 
it was noted that systematic violations of freedom of expression in Turkey have painted a dark 
picture of the country.27  Clearly, the ECtHR and its case law has played a significant role in 
whatever progress has occurred. Moreover, a right of individual petition to the Constitutional 
Court was introduced in 2012, and the applications initiated under this mechanism have been 
read in light of European Convention jurisprudence, thus ensuring that greater attention has 
been paid to the value of the right to freedom of expression. Turkish law has thus begun to 
follow more closely the Strasbourg jurisprudence (this having been accepted as binding legal 
authority by the Turkish judiciary), thereby enhancing the constitutional protection of this 
fundamental right. These positive developments aside, it is argued here that uncertainty 
remains the prevalent theme in the legal consideration of ‘terroristic speech’ in Turkey. The 
offences outlined above have been applied as preventative measures which criminalise (and 
thus restrict) political, journalistic, intellectual and academic expression. 
In order to facilitate analysis of the case law relating to ‘terroristic speech’, the cases are 
categorised according to whether the courts regard the expression in question associated with 
(or more accurately, tending towards) ‘political violence’ generally, or instead, with ‘terrorism’ 
specifically. The following two sections address these two categories respectively. 
4.2.1) Expressions that Advocate Political Violence 
The scope of the right to freedom of expression was drawn up by the Constitutional Court and 
Yargıtay with the aim of disallowing expression advocating communism, National Socialism, 
anti-secularism (irtica), or immorality.28 Expressions that undermined the secular and 
democratic system, and the unity of the state and its nation, constituted one of the offences 
above which aim to protect the essence and sprit of the Constitution.29 From this point of view, 
national courts sought to counter the perceived threat posed by ideas and beliefs which might 
                                                          
26 Borrowing from the wording of the UN Special Rapporteur’s model definition. 
27 TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 90. Birlesim, 10/04/2013 p.33 
28 The Constitutional Court, E.1963/16 K.1963/83, 8/4/1963, The Constitutional Court, E.1963/17 K.1963/84, 
08/04/1963, The Constitutional Court, E.1963/25 K.1963/87, 8/4/1963   
29 For instance; The Constitutional Court, E.1963/16 K.1963/83, 8/4/1963, see also, The Constitutional Court, 
E.1963/173 K.1965/40, 26/9/1965, see also The Constitutional Court, E.1971/3 K.1971/3, 20/07/1971, (discloser 
of Turkey’s Labour Party due to being against “the unity of the state and its nation”) 
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seek to remove the established system by violence, force and insurrection/revolution.30 Since 
the Courts regarded anti-secular, communist, and leftist ideology as a clear threat to the 
existence of the political system, the Courts readily imposed criminal liability on their 
adherents. Furthermore, such expressions were considered as expressive advocacy in favour of 
political violence such as revolution or insurrection. Each military coup and intervention in 
Turkey mostly targeted religious expressions and groups, treating them as an enemy of the 
state.31  
Expression that purportedly advocates political violence is one of the oldest offences in the 
Turkish legal system. It was formulated under the offence of propaganda for, or praising of, 
communism or anti-secularism (irtica).32 Propaganda was defined as “an intention to spread an 
idea to others in order to attract supporters in any place at any time”.33  Yargıtay also stated 
that any ‘ideology’ must initially be rooted in intellectual life, after which it potentially becomes 
‘activity’; if there are no intellectual followers or supporters of an ideology, it cannot harm 
society.34  For this reason, the courts regarded particular ideologies inherently violent. 
Propaganda or indoctrination against secularism, the ‘indivisibility of the nation state’ or 
propaganda for communism were accepted as `danger crimes’ (tehlike suçu) under article 142, 
163 and 312 TPC. Expression falling under any one of these headings was regarded as being 
contrary to the constitutional principles of the state. With regards to danger crimes, the precise 
harm or danger is itself not specified in the law, and need not be caused directly, indeed there 
need not be a specific, identifiable victim.35 The new TPC (2004) also criminalizes propaganda, 
if the speaker's intention is to propose an alternative social, economic, political and legal system 
so as to establish a state system based on a religion.36 
The TPC (1926) was enacted to repress any expression and assembly advocating communist, 
anarchist, dictatorial and racist ideologies.37 The Constitutional Court noted that motivations 
such as Islamism, anti-secularism (irtica), anarchism, or communism could be regarded as a 
threat to Turkey's state system and its official ideology during the Cold War era.38 Making 
propaganda in the name of these ideologies was believed by the legal institutions in Turkey to 
                                                          
30 Acar (n. 25) 25  
31 Hamza Turkmen, `Müslümanların Adalet Arayışı ve Muhalif Kimlik` in Koçak T., Dogan T., Kutluata Z., Turkiye de 
İfade Özgürlügü (bgst Yayınları 2009) 300; There has been two military coups (27 May 1960 and 12 September 
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politics and law in Turkey.  
32 Propaganda was first introduced in the Treason Act 1920 which defined treason as any kind of activity committed 
against the legitimacy of TBMM and the interests of the nation. This act was introduced to prevent the destructive 
propaganda and sedition caused by occupying forces.   
33 The Constitutional Court, E.1979/31 K.1980/59, 27/11/1980   
34 Y. (9) C.D, E.1995/9-123 K.1995/153, 22/05/1995 p.2 
35 Öykü Didem Aydın, `Düşünce Özgürlüğü İlkesi Işığında Salt İfade Ve İletişimsel Eylem Suçları" 2006 
http://www.turkhukuksitesi.com/makale_1055.htm 1-31, 4 
36 YCGK, E.1976/9-3 K.1976/23, 26/01/1976 p.1 
37 Alacakaptan (n. 12) 3 
38 The Constitutional Court E.1963/173 K.1965/40, 26/09/1965, see also in; Akın (n. 11) 45 
88 
 
be a cause of political violence.39 As the Constitutional Court noted, these motivations were 
accepted as insurgent and in support of a dictatorial regime.40 During the Cold War period, 
expression that constituted `propaganda for communism` was targeted.41 In this regard, the 
Constitutional Court decided that `anarchy`, `fascism` and `communism` could never be 
acceptable under the rule of law in a democratic state since their ideological tenets undermine 
individual and societal welfare and peace, social justice, constitutional rights, and national 
solidarity.42  
In light of this approach, the ‘sedition’-like offences in Articles 142, 163 and 312 of the TPC have 
caused restrictions on a broad range of expression. The wording of  TPC (1926) effectively 
sought to impose liability for adhering to the central teachings of Marxist-communism (the 
dictatorship of the proletariat) by emphasizing that any attempt to pursue the domination of 
one social class over another (either through membership of an organisation, by spreading such 
propaganda, or by praising such actions) was penalized with imprisonment.43 The 
Constitutional Court noted that the TPC (1926) sought to protect Turkish democracy, to prevent 
actions against freedoms, and to stop destructive activities against the state.44  
As early case law suggests, the distribution of materials advocating communism was justified 
as an offence by Parliament, which noted that: “generating sanction against communism is the 
way to fight against undermining the established system and replacing it with a new system… 
communism desires to remove the established social and economic system. Communism has its 
own economic system which is based on collective ownership…”45 Materials such as Lenin`s 
picture, posters with leftist slogans, poems, events report and the socialist declarations,46 were 
all regarded as propaganda for communism because they sought to establish the supremacy of 
labourers over other social classes.47 Yargıtay further held that the mere display of posters 
                                                          
39 Alacakaptan (n. 12) 9, see also in, Tanör (n. 11) 100; See for instance anti-secular views were criminilised; The 
Constitutional Court, E.1971/1 K.1971/1, 20/01/1971 AMKD Vol 9, p.55, 67, 69 (Milli Nizam Party was disclosed by 
the Constitutional Court due to books written by its leader whose party again was disclosed as know Refah Party. 
The Constitutional Court decided to disclose the party because of its aim to establishing a state system based on 
Islam.), see also, The Constitutional Court, E.1980/19 K.1980/48, 3/07/1980, additional reason by Judge Yekta 
Güngör Özden 285 
40 The Constitutional Court E.1963/173 K.1965/40, 26/09/1965, see also in; Engin Akın, Anayasa Mahkemesi-
Yargıtay Kararları ve Uluslararası Hukuk Metinleri Çercevesinde: Terör ve Terörün Finansmanı Suçu, (Adalet, 2009) 
45 
41 YCGK E.1974/1-230 K.1974/412,23/09/1974, see also YCGK E1990/9-330 K.1991/18, 11/02/1991, see also Y( 
9)CD, E.1976/2878 K.1976/4105, 18/05/1976, see also YCGK, E.1974/1-230 K.1974/412, 23/09/1974 p.1 
42  The Constitutional Court, E.1963/173 K.1965/40, 26/9/1965, see also, The Constitutional Court E.1963/25 
K.1963/87, 8/4/1963   
43 Alacakaptan (n. 12) 7 
44 The Constitutional Court, E.1963/173 K.1965/40, 26/9/1965 AMKD Vol 4, p.311. This was the case as to whether 
articles 141 and 142 of TPC were incompliant to the Constitution. The Court decided that these articles were 
complaint to the Constitution.  
45 The law's preamble of 765 TCC, see also Alacakaptan (n. 12) 6 
46 For example, the declaration which stated: The “unity of labourers and villagers depends on hegemonising other 
social classes under the supremacy of these two social classes, and systematic work, gathering and educating 
socialist youth associations so as to develop the level of power of the labour class.” 
47 Y. (9), C.D. E.1976/46 K.1976/48, 05/10/1976 
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containing the image of the 'hammer and sickle' were capable of satisfying the requirements 
of the offence of praising.48 This offence was made out even where no actual attempt to change 
the political system resulted – in other words, it was not necessary to show that others had 
taken any action because of having been exposed to the ‘praise’. Indeed, Yargıtay never 
explained what danger could be caused by such expression.49   
In another instance, the law that regulated scrutiny of a movie, and the shooting a film was 
approved by the Constitutional Court so as to prevent: political propaganda of any country; 
humiliation of any nation or race; humiliation of the feelings of an ally state or society; 
advocating religion; political, economic and ideological propaganda contrary to the national 
regime, and making propaganda to weaken national loyalty or against social morality.50 The 
Constitutional Court argued that these provisions protected the public good.51 Yet, in all of 
these cases, the Constitutional Court was far from explicit about how protection of the public 
good was achieved or how such expressions might harm the public good.  
Yargıtay also criminalized political expression that criticised secularism, one of the pillars upon 
which the state is established. Again, the Courts assumed that anti-secular views were 
tantamount to advocating political violence, even though in no case did the Courts provide any 
clear reference to ‘political violence’.52 For instances, the written material being examined in 
one case simply asserted that: “secularism was written in the constitution by a minority in spite 
of people`s will. … After half a century, the secularism principle was still not accepted by the 
people and any social, economic, political and legal system which Allah does not approve has 
no chance to achieve. …”53  Yargitay noted in this case, the speaker’s expression was 
propaganda against secularism and carried the aim to replace the legal and political 
foundations of state with religious values and rules.54 For that reason, Yargitay concluded that 
expression in question met the requirements of an offence of propaganda under article 163 
TPC.55 Similarly, books which some religious movements (namely ‘Nurculuk’)56 are devoted to, 
were criminalized on the account of the fact that the `Nur` corpus aimed to weaken national 
feelings and to remove the principles of secularism, republicanism and Atatürk through the 
pursuit of religious principles and beliefs.57 Similarly, in another case, a book was translated 
into Turkish; the translation in itself was held to constitute the offence of propaganda because 
the book included ideas and beliefs which entailed that: “all branches of the social life should 
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49 Ibid 
50 The Constitutional Court, E.1963/204 K.1963/179, 08/07/1963,  
51 Ibid 
52 The Constitutional Court E.1963/173 K.1965/40, 26/09/1965, see also in; Engin Akın, Anayasa Mahkemesi-
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53 Y. (5) C.D. E.1973/2269 K.1974/379, 04/02/1974 p.1 
54 Y. (5) C.D. E.1973/2269 K.1974/379, 04/02/1974 p.2 
55 Ibid 
56 “Nurculuk”: Modern Turkish religious movement named after its founder and leader, Bediuzzaman Said al-Nursi 
(d. 1960). 
57 Y. (9). C.D. E.1976/52 K.1976/52, 13/10/1976, p.2 
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be based on Islamic rules; Islam consists of rules and principles for religion, society, mosque, 
state, the world and afterlife; Muslims are responsible for Islamic rules regarding world and 
religion…”58  
On a few occasions, the Constitutional Court has attempted to distinguish the offence of 
propaganda from political and intellectual expressions and to broaden academic freedom by 
making a judgment that academic activities should not be penalized.59 However an overview of 
Turkish case law suggests that Yargıtay - in contrast to this Constitutional Court decision - still 
classifies book translations as the offence of propaganda without any consideration of the 
imminence of acts of violence caused by these books, let alone tangible evidence of the same.60 
In these cases, counter-secular expression was criminalised by the Court without consideration 
of any link between expression and acts of political violence.  
4.2.1.1) Incitement to Hatred and Animosity, Causing Political Violence 
Another notable offence applied by the Courts to criminalise a wide range of political 
expression, is the offence of ‘incitement to hatred and animosity’ under Article 312 of TPC 
(1926) and article 216 of the new TPC (2004). Yargıtay noted that a person can be convicted of 
‘incitement to hatred and animosity’, if their expression causes a probability of danger to public 
order and public security.61 If such incitement is in relation to views on Islamism, anti-
secularism (irtica), anarchism, or communism, the Courts tend to affiliate such expression as 
‘incitement to political violence’.62 This probability threshold might suggest that the courts will 
closely consider whether there is evidence pointing to the factual likelihood of any such danger 
arising. However, the courts have simply tended to infer that ‘incitement’ means political 
violence, if the expression relates to views of Islamism, anti-secularism (irtica), anarchism, or 
communism.63 
The scope of public order and public security as protected legal interests are key factors in this 
offence. These two notions in themselves contribute to the broadness and vagueness of the 
offence. `Public order` does not focus exclusively on legal concerns but necessarily also entails 
an element of social and political judgment; this makes `public order` a subjective and 
problematic concept in the legal context.64 Public order has a dynamic and unstable content 
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in Egypt, was banned. 
59 The Constitutional Court E.1963/173 K.1965/40, 26/09/1965  
60`Nur` corpus written by Modern Turkish religious movement named after its founder and leader, Bediuzzaman 
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63 Fazil Hüsnü Erdem, `TCK nın 312 Maddesinin Koruduğu Hukuksal Değerin Kısa Bir Analizi: Türk Devlet Düzeni v. 
Demokratik Kamu Duzeni` (2003) 52 Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi 37-62, 38 
64 Ibid 
91 
 
even though it appears to have a straightforward and self-evident meaning (containing stability, 
peace, public health, public welfare and an absence of disorder in social life).65 The elements 
of public order differ from one country to another since each nation has its own social, political 
and economic conditions. This makes it understandable for courts to have an element of judicial 
discretion in determining the danger to public order.66 The Constitutional Court defined `public 
order` as “maintaining social life in peace and security, preserving the state and its system, in 
other words, all the rules related to the system of public life on every field of society”.67  As 
Erdem states; this definition implied `public order` to be understood as `state order` and `state 
security`.68 While the term ` public security` can be construed more narrowly than that of public 
order,69 it too draws no certain or clear legal boundaries for the restriction of the right to 
freedom of expression. This is clearly the case since it has been held that the offence of inciting 
people to hatred and animosity can be committed against the state or its system.70 This 
therefore implies that the `people` could be the enemy from whom the state must be guarded 
against.71  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, communism became a less imminent danger to the 
Turkish political and legal system. For that reason, Articles 142 and 163 of TPC (1926) were 
repealed, thereby potentially providing more space for religious and communist expressions.72 
Yet, the trend of prosecution under these repealed articles continued, and similar forms of 
expressions were criminalised under Article 312 TPC (‘incitement to hatred and animosity’). In 
particular, Islamist and anti-secularist views were still criminalised under this ‘incitement’ 
offence, and the rise of Islamism within and outside the country drove judges to penalise such 
expression.73 It can be argued that without clear boundaries between the different offences in 
the TPC, the courts perceived a gap left by Articles 142 and 163, and they filled it by relying on 
the offence of ‘incitement to hatred and animosity’. As Kuzu noted, the Ankara State Security 
Court concluded with the statement of “daringness and courage caused by repealed article 163 
of TPC” created a legal lacuna which was filled with Article 312 TPC.74 Here the judge believed 
that repealing Article 163 would encourage individuals to advocate anti-secular views. Article 
312 was applied by the courts in the same way as the repealed Article 163 TPC,75 and individuals 
continued to be convicted for supporting Islamism or anti-secularism. Yargıtay regarded such 
expression as incitement to hatred and animosity. ‘Public order’ is the protected legal interest 
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under TPC. As a result of this, endeavouring to apply repealed articles under new provisions 
has created a risk of causing legal uncertainty by applying the broad scope of “public order”. 
`Public order` was understood by TPC as a justification to fill the legal loophole left after the 
repeal of articles 142 and 163 of TPC, and led to excessive restrictions on political, intellectual 
and academic expressions.76  
In addition, the most crucial factor here was a threat or a probability of danger to public security 
regardless of whether any such consequences actually occurred.77 This offence convicts only 
‘incitement’ which Yargitay defined as `influencing or mobilising others to do something` and it 
does not include indirect influence over others.78 The TPC was used to draw the boundaries of 
political expression by penalizing political figures who undermine the constitutional values of 
Turkey. For instance, a person who was the mayor of Istanbul city at the time, and who read a 
controversial poem in front of a crowd of people during a public meeting scheduled for election, 
was convicted under Article 312.79 The poem included the following passage; “minarets are 
bayonets, rotundas are helmets, mosques are barracks, and Muslims are soldiers … and nothing 
else can keep myself at bay, I will never be silenced and I will not be slave to someone.”80 In this 
case, Yargıtay emphasised the impact of expression on public behaviour by noting that listeners 
became excited by his speech.81 Yargıtay interpreted the offence of incitement to hatred and 
animosity in the same way as the repealed offence under Article 163 TPC.82  
The political atmosphere of Turkey at the time was far from stable; a military intervention had 
just taken place and the governing party was dissolved by the Constitutional Court due to being 
a focal point against secularism in the country.83 It can be claimed therefore, that Yargıtay 
reflected the political climate prevailing at that time and which sought to suppress a particular 
political movement. Similarly, the TPC was also used to penalise political expression made by 
the leader of the dissolved political party (the Refah Party) in a public meeting during election 
time. The speech included the following passage:  
“When the sons of the country began their studies by ’in the name of Allah’, you removed 
it. What did you replace it with? I am a Turk, honest and hardworking.  If you say this, 
                                                          
76 Erdem (n. 63) 51-2 
77 Y (9), C.D E.1974/2 K.1974/2, 18/06/1974 p.1-2 
78 Ibid  
79 Y (9), C.D E.1998/10296 K.1998/11672, 23/09/1998, p.2 
80 Ibid   
81 Ibid 
82 Ibid 3 
83 The Refah Party was in government in 1996-7. Military intervention pushed the Refah Party to step down from 
government. After one year, the Constitutional Court dissolved the political party on the basis that the Refah Party 
became central in opposing secularism, and its leadership and some members were banned from politics. See 
also, the Constitutional Court, E.1997/1 K.1998/1, 16/1/1998 
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Muslims who are, originally Kurdish… have the right to say I am a Kurd too, more honest 
and more hardworking.”84  
In this case, the TPC was used to suppress expression critical of the state. The law penalized 
political figures for doing their job; namely, critically reflecting on the conditions of the country 
and suggesting a way forward based on their own political stand points. Again, the TPC was 
used to suppress speech in ways clearly similar to the concept of ‘sedition’. In the same period, 
in another case, Yargıtay noted that declaring jihad against the regime in Turkey constituted 
the offence of incitement to hatred and animosity based on difference of religion.85 Yargitay 
again failed in these cases to explain how such expression might cause political violence. As 
noted previously, the Constitutional Court, in earlier cases, simply inferred that anti-secularist 
speech would give rise to political violence.86 
Following an amendment on the TPC in 2002, incitement to hatred and animosity can now only 
be committed ‘between people’ and not against ‘the state`.87 Ultimately, the TPC became more 
concerned with expressions that might cause danger to the public rather than to the state itself. 
Yargıtay further limited the scope of the offence of `incitement to hatred and animosity` to 
expression that encourages or incites the use of violence.88 The aim was to limit the scope of 
restrictions on expression by considering whether expression caused a “danger to public 
security”.89 Yargıtay noted that ‘incitement’ can be committed based on difference of social 
class, race, religion, sect or region and it was not possible to incite hated and animosity against 
the state to be the entity against which hatred or animosity was incited.90 Moreover, Yargıtay 
noted that expression that harshly criticized the government’s education policy could be 
classified as incitement to hatred and animosity if it extended to calling for violence.91 Yet, in 
compliance with earlier case law, Yargıtay defined incitement to hatred and animosity as a 
danger crime which did not require a ` call for violence` to constitute the offence.92 If expression 
possibly created danger to public order, Yargıtay had adequate reasons to consider such 
expression as the offence of incitement to hatred and animosity under TPC.93 In the same case, 
                                                          
84 The Student Oath or Student Pledge (Turkish: Öğrenci Andı) was introduced on April, 1933 and was recited in 
school at the beginning of every school day. It was used until 2013 in primary schools in Turkey.   
85 Y(8)C.D, E.1997/19078 K.1997/1127, 04.02.1998; see also in, Y(8)C.D, E.1999/1140 K.1999/3117, 10.03.1999 
86 The Constitutional Court, E.1963/204 K.1963/179, 08/07/1963; The Constitutional Court E.1963/173 K.1965/40, 
26/09/1965 
87 Article 312 of TPC (765) was amended with Article 2 of 4744 Act (6.2.2002). It was not clear whether incitement 
was committed against the state, or between people. See also in YCGK, 2004/8-130 K.2004/206, 23/11/2004, p.14 
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88 YCGK, K.2007/8-244 K.2008/92, 29/04/2008 p.9 
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92 Y (8), C.D, E.2003/357 K.2004/2457, 19/03/2004 p.2 
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Yargıtay noted that such danger is inevitably imminent where there is a climate of violence in 
societies and a clear level of intolerance to different beliefs and thoughts.94  
In 2003, the TPC introduced a `clear and present danger test` into the law so as to determine 
whether expression causes a danger such as to render it culpable. Yargıtay stated that this test 
expands the scope of the right to freedom of expression and complies with ECtHR standards.95 
Judges are required to find a tangible basis to prove that expression causes a clear and present 
danger to public order.96 Yargıtay noted that criminal law deals not only with the consequences 
of acts but also with the possible future effects of these acts.97 In this respect, the legal interest 
is protected from danger, which refers to a likelihood of causing damage or harm.98 Hence 
Yargıtay adopted the `clear and present danger` test as a method to measure the imminence 
or likelihood of the danger to public order. This approach is open to criticism on the basis that 
the test focuses the courts’ gaze again on questions of ‘public order’ and ‘public security’. As 
noted above, these concepts are politically and socially contingent. As a result, uncertainty has 
become the prevalent theme in the legal regulation of speech relating to ‘political violence’ 
4.2.2) Expression that Advocates Terrorism 
Yargıtay has considered a significant number of cases involving speakers accused of advocating 
‘terrorism’. Various legal provisions have been applied to curtail expressive support for 
terrorism, but these have also resulted in restrictions being imposed on public political and 
intellectual expression. The TMK and both old and new TPC have provided the legal basis for 
the courts to interfere with expression that constitutes propaganda for terrorism, disclosure 
and publication of terrorist related materials, or praise of offence or offenders over acts of 
terrorism. The response to ‘terroristic speech’ has evolved in light of the early jurisprudence of 
Yargitay and the Constitutional Court regarding the sedition-like offences under the TPC.  
The offence of propaganda against ` the indivisible unity of the Turkish Republic with its territory 
and nation` (under repealed Article 142 TPC) was retained as an offence under the TMK.99 The 
retention of this offence perpetuated a structural problem in the law relating to the right to 
freedom of expression (see also the offences under Articles 7 and 8 TMK, discussed at 4.2.2.2 
below with more details). In general, the responses to ‘terroristic speech’ have followed a 
similar pattern to the approach taken to expression relating to political violence (as discussed 
above). However, the definition of ‘terrorism’ plays a crucial role in determining whether 
expression can be regarded as ‘propaganda for terrorism’ or not.100 Indeed, if the executive 
body decides that an organisation is a ‘terrorist organisation’,101 expression related to that 
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95 YGCK, K.2007/8-244 K.2008/92,29.04.2008 p.27 
96 Ibid 
97 Ibid 2 
98 Ibid 
99 Separatism crime derived from Article 8 of TMK and it was repealed in 2003. 
100 YCGK, E.2003 / 9-39 K.2003 / 32, 11/03/2003; Y(9)CD, E.1994 / 2980 K.1994 / 3839, 27.06.1994 
101 Turgut Kazan, İfade Özgürlüğü ve Terörle Mücadele Yasası, http://www.tchd.org.tr/MenuContent.aspx?id=140 
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organisation will most likely be assumed by Yargitay to be 'terroristic speech' regardless of 
whether the specific expression incites, or presents a threat of, immediate and probable 
violence.102 It is noteworthy that Yargitay has penalised some ‘terroristic speech’ not only under 
the TMK but also under the offence of ‘incitement to hatred and animosity’ in the TPC (Article 
312 of the previous TPC, and Article 216 of the new TPC). It is suggested here that the courts 
have deliberately penalised ‘terroristic speech’ under a wide range of provisions, thereby 
maintaining as a broad basis for prosecution as possible. Furthermore, this indicates that the 
courts are intentionally vague regarding which provisions penalised ‘terroristic speech’. In this 
way, the courts have at their disposal grounds on which to criminalise a wide range of 
expressions.  
For instance, Yargıtay penalised a weekly newspaper for publishing an article which connected 
a link between inhabitants of the city of Nusaybin closing down the shops (regarded as a civil 
disobedience), and a funeral ceremony of a member of PKK.103 Yargitay ruled that this article 
incited others into hatred and animosity on the basis of race and regional differences.104 In 
another case, Yargıtay penalised written material due to its main theme (“the state attack 
against oppressed and discriminated people in a region”) and concluded that this written 
material presented the state and the public as enemy and opponents.105 Hence the article 
planted the seed for the idea that public might be the enemy of the state and, in very broad 
terms, could be said to create hatred and hostility aimed at aggravating the situation.106 
Yargıtay decided that such expression cannot be regarded as journalism or press work.107 In 
another case, Yargıtay criminalised the expression claiming that different races exist in different 
regions, and that some of these races had been destroyed.108 Yargitay deemed this expression 
to be against 'the indivisible unity of the Turkish Republic and its territory'.109 Furthermore, 
Yargıtay criminalised expression claiming that the state had waged a counter-terrorism 
campaign against the Kurdish people in which members of a ‘terrorist organisation’ were 
referred to as ‘guerrillas’.110 The counter-terrorism campaign was presented as a campaign 
against the people in the conflict region and as a dirty and unjust war.111 In each of these cases, 
these expression was considered to constitute the offence of incitement hatred and animosity. 
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Before 2003, Yargitay defined ‘terrorist propaganda’ as “using any kind of moral or material 
tools to encourage, inculcate and influence people so as to spread, or cause to take root, 
specific views, ideas and opinions”.112 Yargıtay has also noted that the offence of propaganda 
is an activity which facilities terrorist activities and enables the existence of terrorist 
organisations.113 Propaganda was thus considered to be equivalent to providing ‘material 
support’ to terrorist organisations.114 However, this construction of ‘propaganda’ resulted in 
the imposition of highly onerous legal sanctions on the right to freedom of expression. For 
example, there have been convictions for providing material support to an illegal armed 
organisation under Article 169115 due to the phrase: “whatever way facilitate their (ie. terrorist 
organisations) activities”.116 This has provided the Courts with the legal ground to penalise 
persons for circulating propaganda on behalf of groups deemed to be ‘terrorist’.117 This phrase 
was removed from TPC by an amendment introduced in 2003, and the offence of propaganda 
for terrorism separated from the offence of aiding and abetting to a terrorist organisation.118 
After the amendment Yargıtay noted that expression was not to be considered as an activity 
providing material support.119 This issue is also clearly identified under the new TPC and 
Yargıtay reached the conclusion that material aid to a terrorist organisation is criminalised 
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under article 220/7120 of TPC but non-material support falls under the offence of propaganda 
for terrorism.121  
 
Dissenting expression has also been targeted by the administrative and legal authorities on the 
basis that it is capable of inciting ‘terrorism’. However, merely offering alternative (non-official) 
perspectives on political matters was to be considered such speech. In the same vein as speech 
pertaining to political violence (see above), the authorities’ approach accords primacy to the 
state and its official ideology. As Derya has argued, these provisions have been used by judges 
as a tool to regenerate the legal discourse of constitutional ideology.122 The TPCs and the TMK 
have been used to draw the boundaries of political, academic and intellectual expression. Of-
course, particular groups may actually seek to advocate ‘terrorism’ (strictly defined), but the 
parameters of such speech must also be narrowly drawn. Watts, for example, has argued, as a 
matter of fact, that there are important organisational differences between the PKK and pro-
Kurdish political parties, even though most of their members have close personal relationships 
with the PKK and support it ideologically.123 Indeed, they might support the PKK’s goals and 
offer enthusiastic criticism of the state in favour of PKK’s will – but this does not mean that their 
speech constitutes advocacy of ‘terrorism’.124 Thus, the courts must fine-tune the balance 
between the right to freedom of expression and national security-public order matters, and 
also the courts must explain how such expression pose danger to the state.   
Having said that, the introduction of individual petition to the Constitutional Court in 2012 has 
brought a new approach to infringements of the Constitutional right to freedom of expression. 
The Constitutional Court has adopted similar principles to those relied upon by the European 
Court of Human Rights into its constitutional doctrine.  This approach is liberal in nature and 
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provides more protection for political expression. In this regard, the Constitutional Court has 
emphasized that expression may legitimately offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector 
of the population, and such expression may not be restricted, if they do not incite and 
encourage violence and hatred.125 The Constitutional Court has thus held that some convictions 
for 'terroristic speech’ were in violation of the right to freedom of expression.126 For instance, 
after taking the whole content of a particular book into consideration, the Constitutional Court 
noted that while the book consisted of hard-hitting criticism of Turkey’s Kurdish policy and 
activities in the South East of the country, it advocated using only peaceful rather than violent 
methods to expose the “Kurdish reality”.127 In another case, books of poetry expressed sadness 
for both those who had died in the armed conflict and the jailed leader of the PKK.128 The 
Constitutional Court held that these books neither incited violence or armed insurrection nor 
embraced a terrorist organisation. The Constitutional Court also considered the way in which 
expression was delivered. In these cases, the expression in question was in books with a limited 
readership, rather than social media or other tools of mass communication.129 In such cases, 
the Constitutional Court has generated a slightly different approach, one more in favour of 
compliance with human rights standards than its approach during the previous era of sedition-
like prosecutions. As Chapter 4 demonstrates, the European Court and its case law have played 
a significant role in this progress. Now in turn, the following sub-sections address the individual 
offences related to ‘terroristic speech’ under TMK and TPC.  
 
4.2.2.1) Disclosure and Publication of ‘Terrorist’ - related Materials 
The offence of ‘disclosure and publication’ of terroristic materials derives from Article 6 of TMK. 
This provision penalises those who announce the crimes of a terrorist organization, or who 
disclose or publish the identity of officials in charge of anti-terror units,130 or who print or 
publish leaflets and declarations of terrorist organizations which justify or praise the violent, 
coercive or oppressive methods of terrorist organisations, or encourage others to use these 
methods, or who disclose or publish the identity of informants or offenders.131 If any of these 
offences are committed through periodicals their publishers (or editors in chief) shall be 
punished. By these offences, the legislative body aims to restrict expression which justifies, 
praises or encourages the methods which amount to violence, coercion or oppression; not on 
the basis of punishing every disclosure and publication of terrorist-related materials.132 These 
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offences create criminal liability for individuals as well as publishers in the media. In fact, 
Özgenç states that the offence of disclosure and publication of terrorist related materials would 
also be interpreted as an offence under Article 7 TMK which criminalises expressions in which 
‘justifying’, ‘praising’ or ‘encouraging’ of terrorism occurs.133 This possibility creates a very 
broad discretion, enabling for the courts to interfere with a wide range of expression.  
Initially, the TMK also afforded broad discretionary powers to judges and public prosecutors to 
suspend the activity of particular publications as a precaution in order to prevent these 
offences from being committed.134 The Constitutional Court approved such judicial discretion 
on the basis that the media dissemination of terrorist propaganda can cause a much greater 
harm (namely, acts of terrorism).135 Nonetheless, if Yargıtay can be convinced that publication 
was for the purpose of news and had newsworthy content, then it should not be regarded as 
‘terroristic speech’.136 Furthermore, a subsequent amendment of the TMK repealed the 
relevant paragraph, and the power to suspend a periodical’s activities has now been somewhat 
diminished.137 This amendment sought to ensure the TMK’s compliance with Article 10 of the 
European Convention,138 and has to some degree provided protection for newsworthy 
content.139 
 
In addition, as Akbulut highlighted, the offence set forth under Article 6 TMK provides 
protection from public critique for public officers engaged in the fight against terrorism.140 
Since this provision mostly targets the media, Tanör emphasized that it disrupts the press and 
inhibits public discussion of violations of law perpetrated by public officials.141  Press media and 
periodicals particularly are subjected to this offence. The editor-in-chief and owner of one 
publication were heavily penalized (with a fine) under Article 6 TMK for disclosing and 
publishing terrorist related materials in periodicals.142 The very existence of such an offence 
serves to silence public dissemination of information through media outlets. When public 
officers involved in the fight against terrorism commit torture, murder or engage in corrupt 
behaviour, the TMK provides a level of legal protection for them by criminalising those who 
criticize their actions. The Constitutional Court, however, has made a crucial distinction 
between a publication’s executive/editor in chief’s criminal liability and that of its owner. In an 
early decision (in 1991), the Constitutional Court noted that the owner of publication could only 
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be counted as liable for the offence of disclosure and publication of terrorist-related materials, 
if he did not show adequate prudence so as to prevent this offence.143 The owner of a 
publication could therefore only be held liable if there was a clear causal link between his 
conduct (or reasonable failure to take appropriate action) and the disclosure.144 Indeed, in 
2009, the Constitutional Court decided that media owner’s criminal liability should be totally 
excluded.145 Furthermore, the criminal liability of executives and editors-in-chief arises because 
of their specific responsibilities (such as being in charge of the publications` policy, appointing 
persons to the executive board, and overall supervision of the publications).146 On one level, 
the Constitutional Court’s limitation of potential criminal liability for executives or editors-in-
chief can be regarded as a positive development for the exercise of freedom of expression and 
press. Liability only arise in the event of proven ‘negligence’ which shows a lack of adequate 
care and attention to prevent forbidden disclosures.147 However, the liability of owners in 
negligence still persists, and this in itself serves as a control mechanism over the media,148 
creating a background threat of prosecution by judicial and executive authorities.149 It can be 
argued that this is a form of indirect censorship. 
Article 6 TMK criminalises a wide range of expression (books, news items, articles,150 reportage 
in a periodical,151 social media etc.) containing speeches, declarations or other utterances of a 
leader or a member of a terrorist organisation. In such cases, Yargıtay did not require that the 
author agree with the terroristic sentiments – merely that it was published.152 For instance, the 
owner and editor-in-chief of a newspaper were penalised for disclosing and publishing a threat 
to a newspaper announced by the leader of a proscribed terrorist organisation.153 The offence 
was committed only by publishing this threat.154 The national courts have thus struggled to 
distinguish news, critique or political debate from the advocacy of ‘terrorism’. Overly-broad 
judicial discretion has led to the imposition of preventive measures on legitimate political, 
intellectual, and journalistic expression. Indeed, even academic research and journalistic work 
that could have informed or contributed to a solution to the on-going terror problem in Turkey 
were subjected to restrictions under the TMK.155 As with previous cases, here too Yargitay failed 
to examine or explain how such publications may increase the likelihood of an act of terrorism 
being committed. The very existence of this form of strict liability offence absolves Yargitay 
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from giving any consideration to the causal link between expression and terrorism – since the 
legislature already assumes that such a link indeed exists, the courts are reduced merely to 
enforcing the law.  
 
4.2.2.2) Propaganda for Terrorism 
‘Propaganda’ offences under Article 7 and 8 TMK and (previously under Article 142 and 163 
TPC, discussed above) have frequently been relied upon to interfere with political expression. 
Yargıtay defined ‘propaganda’ in its early case law as “using any kind of moral or material tools 
to encourage, inculcate and influence people so as to spread, or cause to take root specific 
views, ideas and opinions”;156 or “to convince, to indoctrinate, to spread a certain idea among 
people and to cause ideas and beliefs to take root by using any kind of moral and material tools 
in order to achieve a particular end”.157 The offence of propaganda can be committed by means 
of praising or justifying the methods of terrorist organisations (such as coercion, violence or the 
threat of violence), or by encouraging these methods.158 The inclusion of these multiple terms 
- `encouraging`, `praising`, or `justifying` - make the boundaries of the propaganda offence 
broad and over-inclusive. In one debate during the revision of the TMK, held by the legislative 
body, members drew attention to the way in which the addition of multiple verbs served to 
expand judicial discretion.159 Indeed, in any case, the courts generally consider particular 
subjects (such as the Kurdish question, praising the leader of the PKK, debates questioning the 
State’s counter-terrorism policy etc.) as propaganda for terrorism, regarding these subjects as 
inherently predisposed to violent resistance, incompatible with the constitution, and therefore, 
fundamentally against the State.160 Consequently, the Courts are very far from undertaking a 
nuanced analysis of the balance between State interests and the right to freedom of expression. 
Instead, they seek to protect the established political, economic and social system in a way that 
resembles the prosecution of sedition-like offences in previous years. 
Consideration must also be given in this regard, to the offence of ‘propaganda against the 
indivisible unity of the State’, sometimes referred to as ‘separatism (bölücülük)’, under Article 
8 TMK.161 Protecting `the indivisible unity of the Turkish Republic and its territory and nation` 
meant securing each of these aspects of Turkish statehood – the ` nation`, the ` Turkish Republic` 
and `Territory`.162 Hence, advocating the establishment of another nation or a separate state 
from the Turkish state was not acceptable.163 Regarding the conflict based on ethno-
nationalism since 1980s, Yargıtay decided that describing the Kurds or other ethnic minorities 
as a separate entity from the `Turkish Nation` should also be criminalised under the offence of 
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'propaganda for separatism'.164 Yargitay noted that ‘Kurdism’ was founded on  separatism and 
attempted to weaken national feelings – while the use of the word “Kurds” was not forbidden, 
any description of Turkish citizens who are ethnically Kurdish as a separate nation was 
outlawed.165 By adopting this approach, as with the ‘disclosure and publication’ offence under 
Article 6 TMK, Yargıtay wholly fails to examine whether the particular impugned expression 
posed an imminent and likely threat to the nation, the Turkish Republic or its territorial 
integrity. Yargıtay’s approach has also led to the criminalisation of political or intellectual 
expression that raised issues regarding the problems or demands of ethnic minorities in 
Turkey.166 
This offence under article 8 of TMK was repealed in 2003,167 and Yargitay lifted the 
restrictions/corresponding sanctions under Article 8 that had previously been put in place.168 
This amendment was introduced in light of ECHR standards on freedom of expression.169 
Prosecutions for the offence of propaganda had resulted in a significant number of findings of 
violations against Turkey by the European Court of Human Rights.170  The ECtHR held that even 
separatist expression or propaganda which does not incite or encourage violence sought to fall 
within the protective scope of the right to of freedom of expression.171 These findings of 
violations did not go unnoticed by parliamentarians,172 and it is clear that ECtHR case law played 
a key role in incentivizing the legislative amendment of the TMK. That said, another (entirely 
domestic) reason that could explain the amendment is that in the early 2000s, the intensity of 
‘terrorist’ activities in Turkey decreased,173 and the legislative body may therefore provide 
more space for the right to freedom of expression.174 Whatever the primary reason for the 
amendment, the repeal of the Article 8 offence has expanded the protection of the right 
freedom of expression in Turkey, especially in terms of political expression which engages with 
ethnic and security problems.175 
Notwithstanding the repeal of Article 8 TMK, Yargitay continues to approve sanctions under 
Article 7 TMK ‘terroristic’ propaganda.  For example, slogans (such as “long live the leader Apo; 
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we are with you Öcalan; tooth for tooth, blood for blood”)176 or petitions (such as “I accept 
Abdullah Öcalan as my political will”)177 were regarded as satisfying the requirements of the 
offence of propaganda after taking into account the character of the particular organisation 
concerned.178 Similarly, a political figure was prosecuted for delivering a speech at the 
graveside of a ‘terrorist’ where people also chanted slogans praising the members of a 
proscribed ‘terrorist’ organisation.179 Yargitay decided that this speech should be understood 
as praising ‘terrorism’, justifying the fight against the security forces and encouraging use of 
‘terrorist’ methods.180 As noted previously, the inclusion of the verb ‘praising’ as an element of 
propaganda has greatly extended the breadth of the offence, and its outer parameters thus 
remain unclear. Furthermore, these sorts of expression were regarded as incitement to acts of 
terrorism due simply to the fact that they publicly spread the PKK leader’s ideas and thus 
(inevitably in the Court’s eyes) encouraged and influenced people to take up arms.181 It is 
argued, however, that such assumptions fail to recognize the value of freedom of expression 
(even, as chapter 2 outlined, in bringing to public attention the fact that a number of people 
hold such views). These assumptions also deny both the importance of counter-speech (the 
argument that the best corrective to extreme speech may be counter-speech rather than legal 
sanction), and indeed the capacity of listeners to respond rationally (having heard and 
considered alternative views, those of the authorities included). 
Despite some partially successful endeavours (such as the repeal of Article 8 TMK) to escape 
from the restrictive spirit of the sedition-like offences under previous versions of the TPC and 
TMK, the TMK has constituted a legal obstacle to democracy and freedom of expression in the 
name of the fight against terrorism. In case law, the offence of propaganda is not clearly 
differentiated from the offence of praising. And Yargitay fails to consistently consider the actual 
link between expression and their capacity or potential to incite acts of ‘terrorism’. Without 
close and careful consideration of such matters, the Courts will most probably continue to 
interpret the law in the same way as sedition-like offences, and thus to suppress even mildly 
dissenting expression.   
4.2.2.3) Praising of ‘Terrorism’ 
Praising ‘terrorists’ or offences committed by ‘terrorist organisations’ is an offence under 
Articles 312 of the old TPC and 215 of the new TPC.182 The offence of ‘praising’ was defined as 
expression that contains affirmation or approval of specific crimes. This is different from 
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‘incitement’ which, in addition, requires a specific direction to commit a prohibited act.183 Özek 
stated that the offence of ‘praising’ can be regarded as indirect propaganda.184 In fact, these 
two offences seem very similar but Yargitay defines them differently,185 ‘praising’ consists of 
expressions which do not fit into the definition of ‘propaganda’.186 ‘Praising’ also means to 
present something in a better way; to embrace, to approve, to support, and to raise the value 
of a particular idea.187 In contrast, propaganda consists of operationalising activities such as 
express persuasion or giving instructions or directions.188 As a result, the offence of ‘praising’ 
can be used to cover expressions that did not meet the requirements for an offence of 
‘propaganda’. However, when the offence of ‘propaganda’ is committed, by extension, the 
offence of ‘praising’ is also committed.189 Speakers are regularly penalised for the offence of 
‘propaganda’ rather than that of praising because its punishment is heavier.190  
 
The offence of praising provided a means for the courts to interfere with a wide range of 
expression including indirect advocacy of ‘terrorism’. Akın stated that a legal lacuna appeared 
after the repeal of the offence of ‘separatism (bölücülük)’ under Article 8 TMK, and that this 
gap was filled with the offences of praising and incitement under the TPC.191 In several cases, 
Yargıtay penalised expression that praised the founder of the PKK.192 For instance, a speaker 
was penalised for applauding slogans favouring the leader of the PKK at a public meeting which 
was organised to memorialize the anniversary of a suicide bomber`s death.193 Even more 
strikingly, Yargıtay confirmed the charge based solely on references to “Öcalan”, and “war and 
conflict atmosphere still continues in our country … Kurdish nation upon Mr Öcalan …” because 
using the prefix 'Mr' itself showed respect, and thus praised the leader of the PKK.194 In another 
case, Yargıtay approved the sanction on a speaker who made a speech in public, stating: “… the 
EU added KONGRA-GEL195 into the list of terrorist organisations. This decision is unfortunate 
and … we worry that the conflict will start again. …”. This statement was interpreted to suggest 
the speaker’s approval and support for the activities of a proscribed terrorist organisation and 
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was held to incite the public to use violence and commit a crime.196 This expression was publicly 
delivered by political figures who were members of pro-Kurdish political parties, frequently 
praising or valorising the past offences of proscribed organisations.197 
 
Yargıtay has slightly changed its approach regarding this matter due to ECtHR case law,198 and 
the scope of the offence of ‘praising’ has been somewhat narrowed. Yargıtay emphasised the 
place of ECHR in the Turkish legal system, as well as its standards on freedom of expression 
which should be regarded as a fundamental principle of democratic society and a prerequisite 
for the development of society and individuals.199 In this regard, Yargitay pays particular 
attention to, i) the content of expression to determine whether it incites violence or not, ii) the 
context in which the expression was made, and iii) whether the expression could be properly 
construed as incitement to violence.200 As a result, Yargitay has noted in a series of cases that 
the expression in question falls under the protection of freedom of expression because such 
expression did not incite armed insurgency, insurrection or did not praise an offence or 
offender.201 Following this approach, Yargıtay held that using the prefix `Mr` to refer to `Mr 
Öcalan` should be protected since the right to freedom of expression protects not only 
“"information" or "ideas" that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter 
of indifference, but also those that offend shock or disturb the State or any sector of the 
population.”202 This approach upholds the values of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness 
as prerequisites of a democratic society.203 It must be noted, that although Yargıtay has used 
ECHR standards to interpret the TPC, the law itself still provides very broad judicial discretion 
to draw boundaries to freedom of speech. There is always the possibility for `praising` to be 
misused to suppress political critics as well as academic and intellectual work. The resulting 
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uncertainty, and the unclear boundary between the offences of praising and propaganda thus 
continues to create a restrictive effect on the exercise of the right to freedom of expression.  
 
4.3) Elements to Determine whether Expression is 'Terroristic Speech'  
 
The elements of offences both under the TPC and the TMK, are crucial to determine whether 
a given expression constitutes one of the offences in relation to ‘terroristic speech’. It must, 
however, be noted that, the jurisprudence in Turkey has suffered from an absence of 
systematic method for determining what constitutes ‘terroristic speech’. Analysis of the case 
law relating to ‘terroristic speech’ exposes this lack of methodological rigour, which in turn 
causes legal uncertainty. The criminal provisions confer too wide a discretion on the authorities 
to criminalize politically oriented speech, even without tangible evidence of imminent and/or 
probable harm. Indeed, the early cases display an obvious lack of judicial attention to the 
imminence of acts of violence or ‘terrorism’. They also show a tendency to interpret terrorism 
cases in a similar manner to those of ‘sedition’. That said, later cases do show some signs that 
the judiciary have sought to address this deficiency.  
There has been a considerable number of amendments to the statutory provisions, and these 
have led to some methodological reforms. Recently, for example, the Constitutional Court 
undertook close evaluation of the content and context of expression to determine whether or 
not the authorities’ interference violated the right to freedom of expression. As such, it might 
be said that the Constitutional Court and Yargıtay have shown greater concern for the right to 
freedom of expression in their case law. However, now that ‘terrorism’ is again very active in 
Turkey, ‘terroristic speech’ is likely to meet with significant restrictions. Such restrictions remain 
possible because the elements of the offences (men s rea and actus reus, the audience - 
publicity), the evidential basis for prosecution of expression, and the courts’ evaluation of 
content and context of expression (as discussed below) have not been clearly or precisely 
defined. 
4.3.1) Mens Rea 
The speaker`s intent is one of the constituent elements of the offences related to ‘terroristic 
speech’ under TPC and TMK. Yet its consideration is not required by each offence. Özek 
differentiated the offence of praising from the offence of the propaganda on the basis of 
absence of speaker`s intention.204 ‘Intention’, the offence of propaganda, is systematically 
sought in all propaganda cases so as to detect this crime. In other words, Yargıtay defined 
propaganda as: “an intention to spread an idea to others in order to attract supporters in any 
place at any time”. 205 The element of intention is the pivotal factor for the offence of 
propaganda. Yet, the offence of praising does not require consideration of the speaker’s 
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intention. This can be counted as one of the key reasons why the offence of praising is so vague 
thus, carries such restrictive ground over expressions.  
 
In order to determine the existence of intention for the offence of propaganda, Yargıtay 
examines not only the content of speech but also its medium and context along with the 
relationship of the speaker to his/her audience. In one Yargıtay case, for example, the 
defendant said: “I am the commander, I am the head of commands, I support `Başbuğ`. We will 
demolish the Republic of Turkey and replace it with sharia government; we are determined and 
no one will stop us.”206 The local court did not sentence the speaker because the necessary 
intention was not proven. Instead, the speaker`s words were deemed to have been impulsive 
and uttered in the context of a heated debate.207 The requisite intention constitutes an 
intangible element of the offence.208 Intention of the speaker means here that speech was 
made knowingly, intentionally and for the purpose of attracting supporters.209 In another case, 
Yargitay attempted to draw the boundary for the offence of propaganda by requiring proof of 
an `intention` to compel others to follow religious principles and/or a religious system in spite 
of the regime of the state.210 If the speaker did not have intention for propaganda to create 
compulsory religious principles for the public, his speech did not constitute an offence of 
propaganda.211 However, if the speaker had the intention of changing the state system through 
such religious advocacy then it constituted an offence of propaganda due to making a religious 
rule binding.212 In early cases involving the offence of propaganda, the local court sought to 
establish the speaker’s intention to deliver ideas to the public. If intention of the speaker did 
not exist then that speech was instead counted as a praising crime.213 In contrast, Yargıtay did 
not insist on examining the intention of the speaker when determining propaganda.214 If ideas 
were disseminated to other people, whether with or without intention, Yargıtay regarded the 
activity as a propaganda crime.215  Praising did not amount to propaganda crime. It can 
therefore be argued that Yargıtay does not draw a clear distinction between the offences of 
propaganda and praising but does require the element of intention for the offence of 
propaganda.  
 
Consequently, it is evident that Yargıtay has no clear and explicit approach of the element of 
intention for the offence of praising. In few cases, Yargitay sought the element of intention to 
determine whether expression was ‘praising of offence or offender’ by evaluating the entire 
content of a book, not just a few pages, statements or sections, to detect the speaker’s 
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intention.216 In other words, Yargıtay noted that the lack of consideration of the whole content 
lead the intention of speaker not to be considered in the offence of praising.217 In another case, 
the element of intention was detected by considering the timing of the publication which was 
published right before the labour strike.218 The publisher’s timing was considered as an 
intention to praise the offence of politically motivated strike and lockout which posed a danger 
to public order.219 Likewise, Yargitay did not consistently seek the element of intention for the 
offence of incitement to hatred and animosity. For instance, in one case, Yargitay detected the 
element of intention after consideration of the whole expression ruling that the speaker 
intentionally incited hatred and animosity against the state based on ethnic and regional 
discrimination.220  
For the offence of propaganda under TMK, generally indefinite or indirect intention was 
required, rather than specific intention.221 Yargıtay noted that the element of the speaker’s 
intention cannot be an element in the offence of propaganda due to the phrase in the article 8 
of TMK; “regardless of the methods, intentions and the ideas” which contradicts criminal theory 
and the method of legislation.222 However, this phrase was removed from article 8 of TMK in 
1995.223 By this amendment, the legislative body aimed to promote the right to freedom of 
expression and to accommodate standards set by the ECtHR into TMK so as to prevent 
excessive restriction of freedom of expression.224 Ultimately, Yargitay took whole content of 
expression into consideration so as to avoid sanctions upon a speaker who did not carry the 
intention to commit the offence of propaganda.225 
 
In the case of an offence of publishing a declaration and announcement of a terrorist 
organisation under TMK, Yargıtay did not specifically seek to establish criminal intent. Yargıtay 
accepted such publications as an offence with or without intention. The only condition for such 
a crime is to publish such an announcement or declaration; Yargitay does not consider whether 
the applicant believes, agrees or supports the ideas uttered in the announcement or 
declaration of terrorist organisation.226 In this case, Local Court put emphasis on and found the 
‘intention’ behind the public disclosure, deciding that the speaker’s ‘intention’ was not to 
publish the terrorist announcement; but Yargıtay reversed this verdict and decided that 
‘intention’ was not required for the offence of publishing an announcement or declaration of a 
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terrorist organisation.227 There remains in Yargıtay’s case laws evidence of methodological 
rigour concerning the detection of ‘mens rea’. The intention of speaker is required as an 
element for the offence of propaganda but the term ‘general intent’ has allowed a broad and 
vague interpretation. For this reason, ‘intention’ is far from bringing any measure of precision 
into the offences related to ‘terroristic speech’. Thus, it can be argued that such an element 
might lead the Courts to interpret TMK as the same concept as sedition.    
4.3.2) Actus Reus 
Offences relating to 'terroristic speech' under the TPC and TMK can be considered as inchoate 
offences. These impose liability on a person who takes steps towards the commission of an 
offence without it yet having been committed.228 Such offences are classified as ` danger crimes’ 
(‘tehlike suçu’) under the TPC. For instance, criminalisation of propaganda against the ‘unity of 
state and nation’ is designed to prevent the escalation of danger before its future effects 
arise.229 As noted earlier in this chapter, danger crimes do not specify the immediate harm or 
danger, and any ultimate danger need not be caused directly. Indeed, there need not even be 
a specific, identifiable victim.230 Where a person has been charged with a ‘danger crime’, 
Yargitay has noted that there is no need to check whether their expression (or indeed, 
association) has achieved the ultimate offence or not – the mere act of expression (or 
association) is itself regarded as punishable for giving rise to a danger.231  
 
As argued in the second chapter, the criminalisation of ‘terroristic speech’ should not be 
permitted without there being a demonstrable probability that imminent harm will result.232 
Moreover, it is vital to establish both a threshold of likelihood and levels of dangerousness in 
order to determine when speech is “harmful enough” to be legitimately criminalised.233 
However, the breadth of culpable 'terroristic speech' under the TPC and TMK is augmented by 
the sheer number of different verbs used: e.g. making propaganda;234 indoctrinating;235 
inciting;236 praising;237 or justifying.238 Furthermore, most of the national security or public 
order offences in Turkish law merely require the possibility (not probability) that a terrorist act 
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may be committed at some (unidentified) future time.239 In its early case law, Yargıtay failed to 
establish definite harm or probability thresholds, and thus to narrow this remote (and inevitably 
speculative) link between expression and the possibility of harm.  
More recently, there have been some legal endeavours to bring methodological rigour to the 
offences relating to ‘terroristic speech’. Efforts to do so, concern the offence of ‘propaganda’ 
under repealed Article 8 TMK. This was previously committed “regardless of the methods, 
intentions and the ideas”, but this phrase was removed from the provision in 1995.240 Yargıtay 
stated that this amendment is important and proposes a more concrete definition of the 
elements of the propaganda crime,241 enabling the methods, intentions and ideas of the 
speaker to be considered by the court. After this amendment, the requirements for this 
sedition-like offence also stipulated that it posed a “clear and present danger” to the public, 
the state, and the regime or public order.242 Yargıtay also adopted ECtHR case law as the basis 
for its own approach to legal interpretation,243 thereby limiting judicial discretion. 
 
A further example of these efforts has sought to provide a basis for the Courts to explain the 
link between expression and the possibility of harm. First, the new TPC was introduced in 2004 
and Article 216 (‘incitement to hatred and animosity’, previously Article 312 TPC) adopted a 
`clear and present danger` test. The ` clear and present danger` to public safety has thus become 
a key element of the crime of incitement.244 This test originates in US Supreme Court case 
law,245 and amounts to “a question of proximity and degree”246 as to the tendency of a speech 
act to cause unlawful action. The evidential basis under the `clear and present danger` test 
includes consideration of the content of speech, and the position of the speaker. It also 
considers whether the expression in question has a violent nature by means of constituting a 
danger against public order or public security.247 Yargıtay explained ‘clear and present danger’ 
by interpreting ‘clear’ as meaning `the conspicuity of danger without doubt` and ‘present’ as 
meaning `tangible danger caused by speech`, or the `high likelihood to cause harm`.248 By 
adding the phrase `clear and present danger` to the Article, the legislature aimed to limit the 
previously broad judicial discretion. One judge had previously claimed, “the judge is 95% 
effective, the law is 5% effective in the case of Article 312”.249 Thus, the ‘clear and present 
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danger’ test was introduced to avoid the restrictive and oppressive nature of Article 312 which 
had become a symbol of the politicization of justice and of disregard for the rule of law.250 It 
means, in order for the courts to detect ‘danger’ by expression, it must be imminent.251 Yargıtay 
also narrowed the meaning of `hatred and animosity` by limiting its scope only to incitement 
which expressly `advises violence or contains violence`.252 Yargitay stated that the seriousness 
and the extent of the danger (of causing hatred and animosity between people) should 
determine the nature of precautionary measures which should be taken. This sliding scale 
evaluation imports a level of proportionality, and enables to be considered the relative 
importance to freedom of speech, and public security, of the factors of time and place. 
 
Conversely, new amendments to the TMK have retained the offence of ‘praising’, which 
provides a legal basis for the national authorities to restrict ‘indirect incitement’253 and thus to 
interfere with a wide range of expression, purportedly related to ‘terrorism’. Moreover, as this 
thesis has emphasized, this is particularly so given that the political nature of the term 
‘terrorism’ and its variable and unstable definition.  Now we will now look at a number of other 
elements of these offences in turn.  
 
4.3.2.1) The Audience (Publicity)  
The level of publicity which an expression attracts (in other words, the extent of its audience) 
is an element of some of the offences under the TMK and TPC. This element, however, is not 
required for all the offences related to ‘terroristic speech’. For example, it is possible that 
speech might be regarded as the offence of ‘praising’ without delivering that speech to anyone. 
On the other hand, classifying expression as the offence of ‘propaganda’ requires the likelihood 
that the speech is accessible to more than one person.254 Yargıtay extended the offence under 
Article 163 of previous TPC by deciding that while ‘propaganda’ means to convince a large 
number of people of a certain belief or opinion; indoctrination is merely to convince one or two 
persons of a particular idea.255 Thus, if expression doesn’t meet the requirements of the offence 
of ‘propaganda’, then it may meet with the offence of ‘indoctrination’ which requires only a 
very low level of publicity. In any case, Yargıtay has sentenced many individuals for the offence 
of `propaganda against secularism` without mentioning at all the number of people who were 
actually exposed to, affected or convinced by the words uttered. The degree of publicity has 
often simply not been of concern to the courts.256 
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In seeming contrast, publicity is a core element of the offences of ‘praising’ and ‘incitement to 
hatred and animosity’ (under article 312 previous TPC and Article 215 and 216 new TPC), and 
this notion was defined in the early in Yargıtay’s case law. These offences require expression to 
occur in a place where anyone is capable of seeing and hearing it.257 However, it is not required 
that anyone does actually see or hear the expression. ‘Place’ is the core focus of the element 
of publicity, rather than the number of people. As a result, the offence of ‘praising’ can be 
committed even if only one person is spoken to. This broad understanding of publicity – where 
what matters is the mere possibility of others seeing or hearing the expression258 – has led to 
a vast number of sanctions on speakers and the criminalisation of a very wide range of 
expression. This runs contrary to the central aim of criminal doctrine which is to provide 
certainty. Indeed, the spirit of Yargıtay’s case law also contradicts and undermines the stated 
purpose behind the statutory amendments (of ensuring compatibility with the standards of the 
ECtHR and the promotion of freedom of expression). As such, it is argued here that Yargıtay 
must amend the definition of ‘publicity’ so as to avoid the law being over-inclusive.    
 
4.3.2.2) The Evidential Basis for Prosecution of Expression, and the Courts’ Evaluation of the 
Content and Context of Expression   
Despite the critique developed thus far in this chapter, the Courts do require some evidential 
basis for prosecuting offences of ‘terroristic speech’ under the TMK and TPC. The nature of the 
evidential basis relied upon is critically important to determine whether the TPC and TMK are 
applied in a manner similar to the concept of sedition, or rather in a manner that affords 
appropriate weight to the value of freedom of expression. For instance, it can be argued that 
convictions under Articles 142, 163 and 312 of the previous TPC were essentially treated as 
‘thought crimes’, criminalising unwanted political views with no solid evidential basis. The 
significance of the last revision of Article 142 in 1951 was that propaganda became an offence 
which could be committed “unconditionally”.259 This amendment eliminated any need for the 
Courts to measure the potential consequences (or dangers) of the impugned expression. For 
instance, evaluating only specific pages of a book as part of the evidence (without also 
considering the context of the book as a whole) has unduly exposed authors to criminal 
sanction.260 This was routinely Yargitay’s approach before the 1990s. Indeed, this approach was 
sometimes repeated in later cases where Yargitay only examined the relevant part of 
expression (rather than whole of it) and penalized the speaker accordingly.261 Unfortunately, in 
its early case law, Yargıtay has had a long-lasting influence on the interpretation of the TPC. As 
a result, prosecutions continue to resemble the archaic understanding of the concept of 
‘sedition’ even today.  
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That said, in contrast to this earlier case law, in the early 1990s Yargitay began to demand more 
tangible evidence in relation to prosecutions relating to ‘terroristic speech’. Yargıtay asserted 
that expression has to be evaluated as a whole, with consideration of its main theme, the 
reason behind its creation, the environment in which it was created, and the intention of the 
speaker when the propaganda crime was detected.262 For instance, in one case, a writer 
mentioned the Kurdish question in his article; he stated that: “the Kurdish question is in fact a 
Turkish question, and both nations share pain and trouble in the same way as brothers do...”263 
Yargıtay asserted that this passage did not qualify as the offence of propaganda.264 This can be 
contrasted with the approach of the local court which had penalised the author based on 
evidence relating only to pages 28 and 29 of the book without consideration of the whole book 
– specifically, a passage that read “Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Armenians, Laz, Cherkes, Gerorgians 
and Turkish Alawites are different nations on the basis of ethnicity and those nations will breathe 
when the state of Republic of Turkey has collapsed.”265 The local court held that this expression 
amounted to propaganda against the ‘indivisible unity of the State with its territory and nation’. 
However, Yargıtay decided that the whole book, not only particular pages had to be 
evaluated.266 The author in this book referred to ideas which might have constituted an 
element of the offence of propaganda crime, but the writer also disagreed with these ideas.267 
Yargıtay decided that the author`s aim in writing the book, as well as the main theme of the 
book, did not indicate an intention to commit the crime of propaganda.268 In this case, Yargıtay 
evaluated the author`s intention in writing the book, his vision of the world, as well as the main 
theme of the book in order to reach a determination of whether or not the passages constituted 
a propaganda crime.269 Yargitay considered speech as a whole as well as its context and the 
place where it was made, in addition to the group of people the speech was made for.270  
 
Likewise, other evidence such as the content of speech, the position of the speaker, the aim of 
the publication or broadcast, the addressees of the speech and the addressees’ perceptions 
need to be taken into consideration.271 Yargıtay checks these elements to evaluate whether a 
defendant aims to convince society of a terrorist organisation’s ideas  or to spread these ideas 
so as to entrench them in society.272 When Yargıtay criminalised this propaganda for armed 
terrorist organisation it sought to protect a democratic society, national security and territorial 
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integrity.273 Especially in terms of offence of propaganda, these evidential basis is crucial to 
identify the intent of speaker.  
 
In addition, the Constitutional Court has adopted an assessment of the ‘content and context of 
expression’ originating from the European Court. It examines whether the interference with 
‘terroristic speech’ is in compliance with the right to freedom of expression. The ECtHR has 
often engaged in examinations of the content of speech, the states of the speaker, and the 
intended recipient of the message, as well as the context in which the words were uttered.274 
This assessment method differs from early case law of the Constitutional Court and Yargıtay as 
it brings new methodological rigour. However, there are only a limited number of cases from 
the Constitutional Court that show how this method has been interpreted. This method might 
overcome the previous lack of methodological rigor as well as seek probability and temporal 
proximity of harm in the Courts’ case law. The spirit of sedition is a hangover from early case 
law and this method shows promise in terms of eliminating.   
 
Consequently, the Constitutional Court now adjudicates by referring to ECtHR cases. For 
instance, Özgür Gündem v. Türkiye and Sürek v. Türkiye shows that the content of the 
expression (considered in its entirety)275  and the context of the expression (including the 
identity of speaker, the time when the expression was made, the purpose of expression and 
possible consequences of the expression) should be considered in order to determine whether 
the expression advocates violence.276 For instance, the office of the chief public prosecutor 
brought a prosecution against the editorial team of the book written by the founder of terrorist 
organisation PKK for the offence of publishing terrorist material and terrorist propaganda.277 
The Constitutional Court considered the whole book, and noted that it was a social, economic 
and political analysis of the Kurdish question in Turkey and its possible effect on Turkey’s 
politics. As such, the book was regarded as offering a different perspective on historical 
events.278 Besides this, the Court also considered the question of the book’s audience, and 
whether it was mass media or written material which would possibly be accessed by a much 
smaller audience.279 After considering these factors, the Constitutional Court decided that the 
ban on this book was a violation of freedom of expression, and the lifted prosecution on the 
book’s editorial team.280 The public authorities now have a much more limited scope to 
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penalize expression that does not, when viewed in context, incite violence, glorify terrorism, or 
support hatred.281 
 
4.4) Conclusion 
 
As discussed earlier in the third chapter, the Constitutional doctrine has been used, through 
criminal jurisdiction, to preserve the `unalterable core` of the Constitution and it has protected 
the state and its system from dissenting views. TPCs and TMK are applied to preserve the state`s 
institutional characteristics such as `an indivisible entity with its state and territory, and `state 
security-public security`, and the Secular Republic’s interests have been prioritised over 
fundamental rights and liberties. This is why the Courts have interpreted these laws just like 
sedition law. TMK and TPCs have criminalised expressions which once provided public debate 
and political discussion on social, economic and legal concerns, and have been used to silence 
political oppositions so as to protect established systems of the state. This has promoted the 
disabling of the right to freedom of expression through a broad range of restrictions. The 
offences of 'propaganda', `praising offence and offender` and 'incitement to hatred and 
animosity' have been interpreted broadly and vaguely and this has caused the criminalisation 
of wide range of expression including legitimate political and intellectual speech. One of the 
main reasons for this is that the Courts have penalised expressions related to secularism, 
communism, separatism, and, more recently the 'Kurdish issue', without consideration of the 
any actual link between expression and political violence or terrorism. Such views have been 
treated as a threat to the state and its institutions and inherently violent. 
This is also due to a measure of judicial bigotry in the Courts, who still upheld the previous case 
law, even though those particular offences had been amended or repealed.  For instance, 142 
and 163 articles of previous TPC played a significant role of in criminalising a broad range of 
political expression. When these articles were repealed, the Courts interpreted article 312 of 
TPC in a way that filled the ‘gap’ left by these articles.282 Kuzu stated in the case law that the 
Ankara State Security Court concluded with a statement about the “daringness and courage 
caused by repealed article 163 of TPC” creating a legal loophole which was then filled with 
article 312 of TPC.283 There have been some legal amendments, however, preserving the state 
and its institutions over and above the right to freedom of expression remains the priority 
concern. The flood of prosecutions under TPC and TMK indicates that the authorities actually 
use these provisions to restrict dissenting and critical expression to the state. This highlights 
that these provisions have a disproportionate restrictive effect on democratic debate. This has 
happened because the Courts failed to consider the actual link between expression of opinion 
and acts of terrorism or political violence until recently; in the last amendment on TMK. 
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Without said consideration, these vague provisions have become a restrictive tool against 
political discourse, academic and intellectual debates. Nonetheless, during the last two decades 
this approach has been slightly softened by amendments to these laws which adopted 
standards from ECtHR case law. This has slightly influenced the Courts to expand the scope of 
freedom of speech. 
In addition, the individual elements of the offences under these provisions are key factors in 
drawing the boundaries for the right to freedom of expression. Yargıtay has failed to bring any 
methodological rigour to its approach to detecting the imminence of acts of terrorism and 
politically motivated violence. The speaker’s intent, the audience, the evidential basis for 
prosecution and content - context evaluation play a major role in this type of charge. In terms 
of the mens rea requirement, this is the main element of the offence of propaganda, while it is 
not required for the offence of praising. For instance, ‘publicity’/’openness’ is the only element 
required for the offence of incitement to hatred and animosity. The law was drawn up with 
vague and broad terms, referencing that the place has to be such that people could see or hear 
speech, regardless the numbers of people who actually saw or heard. In this sense, this 
measure does not provide a method to differentiate between terrorism, political violence-
related expressions from legitimate political expression. The `clear and present danger` test 
might substitute for the absence of this methodological rigour but its use is only suggested for 
the offence of incitement to hatred and animosity. Furthermore, this method is not well-
developed in the Turkish legal system. The intention of the speaker remains as an element that 
is required for the offence of propaganda but it can be broadly interpreted because of the 
vagueness of the term, ‘general intent’. This element, therefore, is far from providing any 
increase in precision for the offences related to ‘terroristic speech’. Thus, it can be argued that 
such an element might lead the Courts to interpret TMK in the same way it does for the concept 
of sedition. In terms of these elements, offences related to 'terroristic speech' under TMK and 
TPC share elements very similar to those define in the seditious expression.    
However, Turkey's human rights commitments have resulted in progressive developments in 
its domestic free speech jurisprudence. There have been not only a number of progressive 
Constitutional amendments passed conferring greater protection on freedom of speech, but 
the doctrinal principles that structure Strasbourg court’s reasoning have also been imported, 
to some degree, into the reasoning of the domestic courts. This has, at a minimum, served to 
enhance the rigour with which restrictions on speech are scrutinized at the national level. 
Indeed, in the last two decades, and in light of the State’s obligations under the ECHR, the 
Turkish legislature has passed a number of amendments to the Constitution, enacted a new 
Turkish Penal Code (TPC), and introduced several amendments to the speech-related 
provisions in the ‘Law on the Fight Against Terrorism’ (TMK). Furthermore, it is now possible 
for an individual to lodge a complaint concerning a violation of Convention rights with the 
Constitutional Court following a milestone Constitutional amendment in 2010 (which came into 
force in 2012). Since 20012, following the introduction of the right of individual application to 
the Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court has started using the content-context based 
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evaluation method in its case law. Consideration of the actual link between expression and 
conduct, to evaluate whether expression incites political violence and terrorism or not, might 
provide new methodological rigour to the constitutional and monistic approach. These 
progressive developments have contributed to dismantling the resemblance between modern-
day offences relating to ‘terroristic speech’ and outdated offences of ‘sedition’. There are some 
signs that the Courts may be steering their case law away from the sedition concept through 
adopting the 'clear and present danger' test and a more ECtHR-friendly approach into their 
jurisprudence. In contrast with these progressive developments, TMK and TPC still contain the 
offences of indirect incitement to terrorism (justifying and praising of terrorism) and criminal 
liability on media professionals. These offences provide an open-ended legal basis for national 
authorities to silence political dissent. Hereafter case law established by the Constitutional 
Court should play a key role in defining the scope of these offences as well as that of the 
freedom of expression.
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CHAPTER 5:  THE STRASBOURG COURT’S RESPONSE TO ‘TERRORISTIC SPEECH’ 
 
5.1) Introduction 
 
The second chapter set out the doctrinal framework that lies at the heart of the right to 
freedom of expression, determining scope of the right as well as the lawfulness of any 
restrictions under the scope of the offences related 'terroristic speech'. Since the end of the 
Second World War, the Council of Europe has sought to guarantee respect for human rights 
and to ensure that its members adhere to the standards of 'effective political democracy' and 
the rule of law. The European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention) and the European 
Court of Human Rights (henceforth, the Court or the Strasbourg court) have been the most 
important tools for the Council to review restrictions on expression to determine whether they 
are compatible with the Convention or not. The right to freedom of expression is protected 
under article 10 of the Convention and its scope has been detailed by the European Court case 
law. As well as this, the Council of Europe is a forum to facilitate the co-ordination of the 
international fight against terrorism and prevent totalitarian views from undermining the 
convention rights and values on the European continent. Consensus among the Member States 
of the Council plays a crucial role in interpretation the Convention and the degree of deference 
given to Contracting States. The Court is willing to defer to a relativist position where consensus 
between the Contracting states is absent.1 The European Court’s case law sets free speech 
standards for the contracting states to confer greater protection on freedom of speech. The 
doctrinal principles that structure the Strasbourg court’s reasoning (discussed in chapter 3) has 
also been imported, to some degree, into the reasoning of the domestic courts.2 This has, at a 
minimum, served to enhance the rigour with which restrictions on speech are scrutinized at a 
national level.3 Herein lies the tension alongside this liberalisation of free speech, the last two 
decades have seen contracting states required to pass a number of amendments to provisions 
related to ‘terroristic speech’, in light of the State’s obligations under the Convention and as 
members of the Council of Europe more widely. The need to deal with terrorism in post-2001 
has led to an expansion in state power through an expansion of the reasons why, and 
circumstance when, interferences might be permitted. 
These doctrinal categories in Chapter 3 have influenced the laws as well as the case law, so as 
to eliminate or render redundant offences based on or structured around seditious expression. 
Chronologically, national courts have treated politically dissentient expression as sedition 
                                                          
1 Daniel Regan, '"European Consensus": A Worthy Endeavour for the European Court of Human Rights?' (2011) 14 
Trinity College Law Review 51, 69 
2 See further, Helen Keller and Alec Stone Sweet, A Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal 
Systems (OUP: 2008) 
3 H. A., Özhan, ‘Application of Decisions of European Court of Human Rights in Contracting Parties’, (2001) 6 Liberal 
Thought, p.51.  
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through using public order/national security provisions. Thus, they are treated as political 
crime, dissenting, aggressive, and hard-hitting speech against the state, its system, or its official 
ideology. In addition to this, as Sorial argued, more recently, sedition laws have been 
modernised under the pretext of counter-terrorism, which extends to criminalising expression 
that advocates violence against the state.4 This has been criticised for being too broad and for 
imposing unjustifiable limits on the right to freedom of expression.5 Consequently, in 
overarching terms, therefore, a contradiction emerges in which the European Convention 
norms appear to pull in opposite directions. States can, apparently without contradiction, ratify 
human rights treaties protecting speech, whilst at the same time relying on ‘anti-terror’ laws to 
impose far-reaching restrictions upon it, and targeting dissenting and hard-hitting criticism of 
public authorities.    
This chapter consists of two sections; Section 4.1 will provide an historical evaluation of how 
the Court responded to ‘terroristic speech’. The Strasbourg court has examined an augmented 
number of cases relating to certain public-political expression where the speaker was convicted 
by the national authorities for ‘terroristic speech’. Over time, the European Court has dealt with 
freedom of expression issues under the Council`s remit where speakers have been convicted 
due to their purported connection with terrorism or political violence offences under ‘sedition 
law’ or ‘anti-terrorism’ law. In cases where the national authorities have outlawed particular 
forms of expression, the level of the Court`s deference to those authorities is identified. As the 
purpose of the Convention is to maintain effective political democracy, in the Court’s early case 
law, there are cases related to totalitarianism concerning communism, National 
Socialism/Nazism or Fundamentalism (Pro-Sharia). In these cases, the Court examined whether 
the restrictions were compatible with the Convention or not. These three different ideological 
backdrops have been affiliated with political violence in order to achieve them and to replace 
the existing democratic system. Another issue that has brought a challenge to the Convention 
is terrorism, which appeared as an entity in the early 1970s. Expression that advocates 
terrorism including such as ethno-national “terrorist” organisations such as PKK, IRA and ETA 
and their political wings, and fundamentalist religious “terrorist” organisations such as Al-
Qaida, have been regarded as a threat by contracting states as well as by the European Court. 
The incident of the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States became a milestone for 
terrorism being seen as a threat to the Convention era, and setting a new form of conflict 
between the right to freedom of expression and national security laws. In this regard, the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe after 11 September 2001 agreed to take steps 
to rapidly increase “the effectiveness of the existing international instruments within the Council 
                                                          
4 Sarah Sorial, ‘Can Saying Something Make it so? The Nature of Sedition Harm’, (2010) 29 Law and Philosophy 
273, 275 
5 Sarah Sorial, Sedition and the Advocacy of Violence: Free Speech and Counter-Terrorism (Routledge, 2013) 2; 
Geoffrey Palmer, 'Political Speech and Sedition’ (2008-2009) 11-12 Yearbook of New Zealand Jurisprudence, 36, 
49-51 
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of Europe on the fight against terrorism…”6 Several international legal instruments encourage 
or even obligate contracting states to adopt criminalisation of particular types of expressions 
related to terrorism, including 'indirect incitement’. There remains a contradiction between the 
Court's article 10 case law, which has generally been highly protective of freedom of expression, 
and recent regional development regarding criminalisation of indirect incitement. These 
instruments push the national legislative and judicial bodies in terms of protecting freedom of 
expression in the opposite direction to that indicated by the European Convention.   
Section 5.2 shows that, in the Court's case law, there remains a well-facilitated evidential 
doctrine as the Court still relies on a presumption that particular types or forms of expression 
present an inherent threat to the state and its system. In tracing the historical evolution of 
sedition/treason offences, those relating to ‘terroristic speech’ in fact mirror sedition-type 
offences due to sharing or requiring very alike elements at the national level. We will see that 
the Strasbourg Court has found many violations of the right to freedom of expression with 
these modern day offences relating to ‘terroristic speech’ which resemble ‘sedition’/’treason’ 
offences. In this regard, it is important to analyse the elements such as the probability of harm, 
mens rea of the speaker, and ‘content of expression and context of expression' each of which 
plays a significant role in determining the protection of freedom of expression afforded by the 
Court. This analysis might provide a perspective from which to understand which elements of 
offences under national laws contradict with the elements that the Court requires. The level of 
deference given to domestic authorities in terms of interfering with ‘terroristic expression’ is 
based on these elements as to whether restriction satisfied a ‘pressing social need’ or not. 
 
5.2) The European Court`s Response to ‘Terroristic Speech’ 
 
As explained earlier in the third chapter, we might view the European Convention as providing 
an early warning of authoritarianism in weak democracies.7 The European Court, as set out in 
its Preamble, aims to guarantee respect for human rights and to ensure that its members 
adhere to the standards of “an effective political democracy” and the rule of law. Since then, 
the Court has had to confront expression/associations that undermine Conventional values and 
rights. The European Court's response to ‘terroristic speech’ has been guided by these doctrinal 
categories discussed in the third chapter. It is important to analyse the case law in light of those 
doctrinal categories at a time when there is an increase in the criminalisation of expression 
among contracting states,8 and at a time when threats of terrorism or political violence have 
escalated at both national and international levels. The European Court's case law is a 
framework which elaborates what the response of contracting states should be, as it is for the 
                                                          
6 The Committee of Ministers at the Multidisciplinary Group on International Action against Terrorism (GMT) its 
109th Session on 8 November 2001 
7 Steven Greer, The European Convention of Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects (CUP, 2006) 
56 
8 David Banisar, Speaking of Terror (Council of Europe, 2008) 20  
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Court itself.  In this regard, it is important to take the Court’s response to expression advocating 
political violence into account in order to be able to undertake analysis of the Court’s response 
to modern day offences of ‘terroristic speech’. This approach will also provide a chronological 
perspective of the Court’s response to violent expression. Firstly, expression was disapproved 
of by domestic authorities due to its authoritarian or anti-democratic nature which was 
deemed inherently violent. Such expression was mainly in relation to communism, Nazism or 
National Socialist views and authoritarianism, and caused political violence. Secondly, since the 
1970s the Court has had to confront expression/associations that advocate terrorism. Such 
expression supports national independence struggles such as the long-running actions in the 
UK about Northern Ireland, and those in Spain and France about the Basque issue and in Turkey 
about the Kurdish separatism. Thirdly, the Court has also had to deal with new challenges 
concerning the states’ response to terrorism, especially after the 9/11 attacks in the US.9 
Recently contracting states have become more aware of internationally plotted terrorist 
threats in general and the command structure of Al-Qaeda in particular since the 9/11 attacks.10 
It can be noted that terrorism is a new challenge which has become especially pressing since 
those attacks. 11 For that reason, the Council of Europe agreed to take immediate action on the 
fight against terrorism by making the instruments more effective. As a product of such actions, 
the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism has been used 
effectively to criminalise 'incitement to terrorism', including indirect incitement to terrorism. 
This has led to more restrictive measures, including criminalisation of indirect incitement, 
prioritising security and public order concerns over freedom of expression. Criminalising 
'indirect incitement' is regarded as a crucial part of these instruments’ effectiveness. We can 
also see that ‘apology for terrorism’, closely linked to indirect incitement (or perhaps a sub-
type), has been approved by the European Court as ‘terroristic speech’, and thus as a lawful 
restriction on freedom of expression.12 It appears they are not alone in indicating that indirect 
‘terroristic speech’ is a new concept in European Court case law, but it sends a signal of approval 
for the offence of indirect incitement in the human rights era. The expansion of the scope of 
legitimate restrictions evidenced by indirect incitement and apology for terrorism potentially 
constitutes a grave contradiction given the fact that sedition has either fallen into disuse or 
been specifically disapproved. 
 
There might be a risk that the exercise of freedom of expression, i.e. the public dissemination 
of opinion and information, may contribute to terrorist or politically motivated violent acts. The 
OSCE has noted that there can be an intrinsic value in proscribing certain expression; this 
proscription carries a clear message to the general public that the expression in question 
                                                          
9 Colin Warbrick, ` The European Response to Terrorism in an Age of Human Rights` (2004) 15 The European Journal 
of International Law 989, 995 
10 Saravia v. Germany, Application no. 54934/00 (ECtHR Inadmissibility Decision, 10 January 2000) para Weber and 
109 
11 the Committee of Ministers at the Multidisciplinary Group on International Action against Terrorism (GMT), 
http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/gmt_more_en.asp  
12 See for instance, Leroy c. France App no 36109/03 (ECtHR, 2 October 2008) (Turkish Translation) 
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amounts to, or causes, crime, acts of violence and terrorism.13 For that reason, the contracting 
states of the Council of Europe with their national laws have tended to criminalise indirect 
incitement (praising, apology or glorifying) in accordance with the 2005 Council of Europe 
Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, and the 2008 Council of the European Union 
Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism.14 By these measures, states aimed to fulfil their 
obligation to take adequate measures to protect the fundamental rights of everyone within 
their own jurisdiction.15 In this regard, such public expression would be deemed as being 
outside the protection of Article 10 and incompatible with the fundamental role of the 
Convention.16 However, criminalisation of expression (especially indirect incitement or 
apologie/glorification of terrorism) entails a clear and predictable risk of abuse due to the 
general criminalisation of the expression of ideas or opinions (unwanted views) unless there 
are safeguards in place for examining whether or not such expression is likely to lead to the 
commission of a terrorist act.17 Sedition laws could be counted as a decent illustration for such 
abuse. Intrinsically, criminalizing expression carries a risk that individuals cannot speak, print or 
distribute material to support an organization or ideological cause, without the threat of 
prosecution.18 And this may pose restrictive ground and suppressive effect on the exercise of 
right to freedom of expression. Political criticism and debate on matters of public interest might 
be considered as supporting terrorism or be equated to discrimination against certain ethnic 
or political groups by suppressing newspapers, blocking websites and limiting their public 
dissemination.19 Even worse, expression might be targeted and opposed by the majority 
without seeking any actual or possible link with terrorism or political violence.20  
 
Having said that, the European Court principally expects national public authorities to interfere 
with expression only under exceptional circumstance. The contracting states will have a degree 
of deference as to legislative, administrative or judicial action in the area of a Convention right 
                                                          
13 Countering Terrorism, Protecting Human Rights: A. Manual (OSCE/ODIHR 2007) 216 
14 “Apologie du terrorisme” and “incitement to terrorism” (Council of Europe Publishing, 2004) p. 15, 23, 48. Six 
of the forty-five states define “apologie du terrorisme” and/or “incitement to terrorism” in their national 
legislation as a specific criminal offence: Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Hungary, Spain and the United Kingdom. But 
not all states have legislation that deals specifically with terrorism. These states can nevertheless deal with 
terrorist acts and terrorists on the basis of general criminal law. 
15 Guidelines on Human Rights and the Fight Against Terrorism adopted by the Committee of Ministers at its 804th 
meeting (11 July 2002) 14 
16 Security Council Meeting of World Leaders Calls for Legal Prohibition of Terrorism Incitement, Enhanced Steps 
to Prevent Armed Conflict, UN Resolutions 1624 (2005); CoE Article 5 of Council of Europe Convention on the 
Prevention of Terrorism (2005); Article 4 of EU Council Framework Decision on Combating the Terrorism (2008) 
17 OSCE/CoE Expert Workshop Preventing Terrorism: Fighting Incitement and Related Terrorist Activities, 
Background Paper on Human Rights Considerations in Combating Incitement to Terrorism and Related Offences 
(Vienna, 19-20 October 2006) p.9 
18 Countering Terrorism, Protecting Human Rights: A. Manual, (OSCE/ODIHR 2007) 216 
19 David Banisar, `Speaking of Terror: A Survey of the Effects of Counter-Terrorism Legislation on Freedom of the 
Media in Europe` (2009) 7 International Journal of Civil Society Law p.50 
20 OSCE/CoE Expert Workshop Preventing Terrorism: Fighting Incitement and Related Terrorist Activities, 
Background Paper on Human Rights Considerations in Combating Incitement to Terrorism and Related Offences 
(Vienna, 19-20 October 2006) p.9 
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given by the European Court, as we seen in chapter 3.21 Indeed, in the last two decades, and in 
light of the State’s obligations under the European Convention, Turkey (especially for this 
thesis) and other contracting states have passed a number of amendments on the relevant 
provisions which have a positive influence over the protection of the right to freedom of 
expression. States’ human rights commitments have resulted in progressive developments in 
domestic free speech jurisprudence. 
 
The pathological period of the 'war on terror' has led to anti-terror laws bearing a striking 
resemblance to sedition laws, formerly used in other pathological periods such as the World 
Wars and the Cold War against communism or Nazism.22 This close resemblance to historical 
offences of ‘sedition’ points to a deeper-level problem concerning the invocation of ‘terrorism’ 
as the basis for restricting freedom of speech. However, the Convention as a human rights 
document has not given such a wide degree of deference to contracting states to apply the 
modern-day offences relating to ‘terroristic speech’ as was given to the older (and in some 
jurisdictions, now archaic) offences of ‘sedition’ and ‘treason’ they resemble.23 No matter what 
is the mode of expression, the Court gives narrow deference to contracting states to restrict 
political expression, unless it incites terrorism or political violence.24 Otherwise, the scope of 
conviction on ‘terroristic speech’ is broadened to cover criminal liability to persons who publicly 
advocate terrorism by whatever means,25 and the European Court may defer contracting states 
widely in terms of criminalisation of a wide range of expression.  
 
In order to facilitate analysis of the case law relating to ‘terroristic speech’, the cases are 
categorised according to whether the courts regard the expression as relating to (or more 
accurately, tending towards) ‘political violence’ generally, or instead, to ‘terrorism’ specifically. 
The following two sections address these two categories respectively. 
 
 
 
                                                          
21 Helen Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, (Cavendish Publishing Limited, London, 4th Ed. 2007) 36 
22 Michael Head, ` `Counter-Terrorism` Laws: A Threat to Political Freedom, Civil Liberties and Constitutional Rights, 
(2002) 26 Melbourne University Law Review, 666, 671 (emphasis added) 
23 See for example; The Australian Law Reform Commission, Fighting Words: A Review of Sedition Laws in Australia 
(Report 104, 2006), para 2.6 
24 Daragh Murray, `Freedom of Expression, Counter Terrorism and the Internet in Light of the UK terrorist Act 2006 
and the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights` (2009) 27 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 
331, 358; see also, Committee of Experts on Terrorism, Collection of Relevant Case-Law of the European Court of 
Human Rights Related to Apologie du Terrorisme' and 'Incitement to Terrorism', Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 4 
June 2004, p. 6 
25 The Committee of Experts on Terrorism (CODEXTER) or the Council of Europe “Apologie du terrorisme” and 
“incitement to terrorism” (Council of Europe Publishing, 2004) 11 
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 5.2.1) Expressions that Advocate Political Violence 
European Court case law tightly focused on the idea of defining the `democratic spirit`.26 Since 
members of political organisations enjoy the protection of the Convention, they can propose 
political, legal or constitutional changes to the structure of the state by duly considering their 
legality and fundamental democratic principles.27 However, there might be the possibility that 
a political party, other types of associations or even simply forms of expression might attempt 
to develop practices or activities intended to destroy the rights and freedoms set forth in the 
Convention and entrenched in democracy.28 For that reason, the Court relies on article 17 of 
the Convention which aims to protect the principles of the Convention from individuals and 
groups whose aim is to foster totalitarian systems.29 The Court applies article 17 only in cases 
where statements of members of an organisation, its programme or personal views indicate 
the destruction of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention.30 In order to maintain 
this aim, it is not necessary to stop every-one's right to freedom of expression as guaranteed 
by article 10 of the Convention.31 In order to protect democratic principles, militant democracy 
relies on the rationale that state authorities are able to restrict the freedom of expression and 
association of groups and individuals who might pose a threat to democracy.32 Especially, 
Germany's "bitter period that followed the collapse of" the Weimar Republic, and "the 
nightmare of Nazism ...” led the German constitution and the European Court to adopt the 
principle of ` a democracy capable of defending itself`.33 Organisations and individuals with such 
a tendency might be considered as having sufficient ground to propagate their totalitarian ideas 
and activities. As a result, a leader of a political organisation who advocates violence or fails to 
show respect in their policy to democracy and the rights and freedoms guaranteed in a 
democratic society, cannot enjoy protection under the Convention.34 Such political expressions 
and organisations are prevented from enjoying protection under the Convention (due to Article 
17) because (if) their statements call for political violence or seek to undermine the 
fundamental principles of democracy.  
                                                          
26 Handyside v the United Kingdom App no 5493/72 (ECtHR, 7 December 1976) para 49 "the demands of that 
pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no 'democratic society'." 
27 Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia App no 26261/05 and 26377/06 (ECtHR, 14 March 2013) para 105 
28 Ibid para 104; see also Kühen v Germany App no. 12194/86 (EComHR Decision, 11 April 1986) p.4-5 
29 Norwood v UK App no 23131/03 (ECtHR, 16 July 2003); Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia App no 
26261/05 and 26377/06 (ECtHR, 14 March 2013) para 103 
30 Socialist Party and Others v. Turkey App no 20/1997/804/1007 (ECtHR, 25 May 1998) para 28; see also United 
Communist Part of Turkey and Others v. Turkey App no 133/1996/752/951 (ECtHR, 30 January 1998) para 60; F.P 
v Germany App No. 19459/92 (EComHR Decision, 30 January 1992) p.4 
31 Reimann and Fisch v. Germany App no 250/57 (EComHR Decision, 17 August 1956) (German Communist Party) 
p.5; Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey App no 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98 
(ECtHR, 13 February 2003) para 99; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia App no 26261/05 and 26377/06 
(ECtHR, 14 March 2013) para 103 
32 Kasım Karagöz, "The Dissolution of Political Parties Under the Jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights 
and Examining the Case of Welfare Party According to the Venice Commission Reports" (2006) 1 Gazi Üniversitesi 
Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi 311, 322 
33 Vogt v. Germany App no. 17851/91 (ECtHR, 26 September 1995) paras 50, 59 
34 Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia App no 26261/05 and 26377/06 (ECtHR, 14 March 2013) para 105 
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The European Court has responded to such expressions through the ideas of militant 
democracy implied by article 17 and by the restricting clauses set forth under article 10(2) of 
the Convention. In this respect, the European Court has examined views related to Nazism and 
communism after the Second World War and during the Cold War, and regarded most of them 
as potential threats to the Convention rights. As well as this in the past post-Cold War era, pro-
Sharia political motivations which might advocate political violence have been considered a 
source of threat to Convention rights and values.35  
Totalitarian tendencies subjected to this section might actually or (only) potentially invoke 
political violence, which for our purposes we might consider as referring to all collective attacks 
occurring among a political community against political authorities or actors with the violent 
activities aimed at challenging their policies.36 In this regard, in the case law, the Commission 
made a noteworthy conclusion in the case of the German Communist Party, where the Court 
declared the case inadmissible because the party's aim of attaining a "socialist-communist 
system by means of proletarian revolution and dictatorship of proletariat" were contrary to the 
Convention's democratic values. 37 Communism especially before the collapse of the Soviet 
Union was considered as an imminent threat by European countries. In addition, National 
Socialist views were also considered as threat and source of political violence in the region of 
the European Convention. For example, in Germany, the applicant was dismissed from his 
position as a civil servant (he held a university lectureship) due to his political activities relating 
to the National Democratic Party of Germany (NDP) and of the content of his two books.38 He 
identified himself with the NDP and with its many militant activities; the government identified 
the NDP as an organisation rejecting human rights and the existing democratic order and 
preaching extreme nationalism and a racist ideology.39 He expressed his views in his books 
casting his disloyalty to the Constitution and praising Nazi Germany without any criticism and 
reservation.40 In addition, the German authorities were under a special responsibility in the 
fight against all forms of extremism, whether right-wing or left-wing due to the experience of 
the Weimar Republic.41 This responsibility was achieved through considering the civil service as 
the keystone of a "democracy capable of defending itself".42 In this regard, the Court took this 
past experience into consideration and decided that interferences such as ‘termination of 
                                                          
35 See both, Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey App no 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 
41344/98 (ECtHR, 13 February 2003), and Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia App no 26261/05 and 26377/06 
(ECtHR, 14 March 2013) 
36 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton University Press (New Jersey, 1971) 4 
37 Reimann and Fisch v. Germany App no 250/57 (EComHR Decision, 17 August 1956) p.4 
38 Kosiek v. Germany App no. 9704/82 (ECtHR, 28 August 1986) para 33 
39 Ibid para 17, 23 
40 Ibid para 23 
41 Vogt v. Germany App no. 17851/91 (ECtHR, 26 September 1995) para 54 
42 Ibid para 54; Kern v. Germany App no 26870/04 (EComHR Decision, 29 May 2007) p.7; Otto v Germany App no 
27574/02 (ECtHR, 11 July 2002) p.7; Erdel v Germany App no. 30067/04 (ECtHR, 12 August 2004) p.7 
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employment contract’43, ‘not being promoted’44 and ‘revok[ing] the applicant’s call-up order’45 
were imposed on the applicants as a result of their activities and their membership of 
organisations aiming at unconstitutional goals. The Court noted that these interferences were 
necessary to prevent any further criminal offences from someone with a right-wing extremist 
background, and past experience of the Third Reich caused the national authorities to consider 
these views as threat.46 The Court declared these applicants inadmissible.47 Yet, in the case 
Vogt v Germany the applicant was dismissed from the civil service because she was engaged in 
various political activities on behalf of the German Communist Party (DKP) which aimed to 
overthrow the social structure and the constitutional order, and replace it with a political 
system of the Third Reich.48 Here in this case the European Court noted there was a violation 
of the right to freedom of expression because she did not use the advantage of her position (as 
a teacher in a State secondary school with a permanent position as a civil servant) to 
indoctrinate her pupils during lessons.49 For that reason, the European Court noted that 
restriction was disproportionate and her membership to DKP was lawful (because DKP was a 
lawful political party).50 Even the Court found the restriction on her expression as a violation of 
article 10, the Court highlighted and examined her expression whether undermined democracy 
or not under the principle of a "democracy capable of defending itself" was clearly approved.51 
 
In addition, there have been inadmissible decisions regarding individuals involved in activities 
inspired by National Socialist ideas.52 These activities included preparation and promotion of 
certain publications such as racist pamphlets, the principle of elitarianism and proposals to 
introduce typical Nazi songs.53 The Court case law, it was noted that the prohibition against 
activities involving expression of National Socialist ideas can be justified as being necessary in a 
democratic society. This is in the interests of national security and territorial integrity due to 
the historical experience of Austria during the National Socialist era.54 The Commission noted 
that National Socialism is a totalitarian doctrine aiming at the destruction or limitation of the 
Convention rights.55 Another applicant was convicted by the national court for advocating the 
                                                          
43 Kern v. Germany App no 26870/04 (EComHR Decision, 29 May 2007) 
44 Otto v Germany App no 27574/02 (ECtHR, 11 July 2002) 
45Erdel v Germany App no. 30067/04 (ECtHR, 12 August 2004) 
46 Ibid; Otto v Germany App no 27574/02 (ECtHR, 11 July 2002); Kern v. Germany App no 26870/04 (EComHR 
Decision, 29 May 2007) 
47 Erdel v Germany App no. 30067/04 (ECtHR, 12 August 2004); Otto v Germany App no 27574/02 (ECtHR, 11 July 
2002); Kern v. Germany App no 26870/04 (EComHR Decision, 29 May 2007) 
48 Vogt v. Germany App no. 17851/91 (ECtHR, 26 September 1995) para 58 
49 Ibid para 60 
50 Ibid para 60-1 
51 Ibid para 54, 59 
52 Kühen v Germany App No. 12194/86 (EComHR, 28 May 1986); B.H., M.W., H.P. and G.K. v. Austria App No. 
12774/87 (EComHR, 12 October 1989); Herwig Nachtmann v. Austria App no. 36773/97 (EComHR, 2 July 1997); 
Schimanek v Austria App no. 32307/96 (ECtHR, 1 February 2000) 
53 B.H., M.W., H.P. and G.K. v. Austria App No. 12774/87 (EComHR, 12 October 1989) p.2 
54 Ibid p.4; see also Herwig Nachtmann v. Austria App no. 36773/97 (EComHR, 2 July 1997) p.5; Schimanek v Austria 
App no. 32307/96 (ECtHR, 1 February 2000) p.7 
55 Ibid 
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reinstitution of what was an unconstitutional organisation of the National Socialist Party 
(NSDAP); which had been prohibited in Germany due to its National Socialist ideology and the 
state violence and illegality that had formerly existed in Nazi Germany.56 The Commission noted 
that national socialism undermines freedom and democracy, and the applicant`s publications 
included pride of race and elements of racial and religious discrimination.57 The Court provided 
wider deference for national authorities to interfere with such expression where it constituted 
a threat to national security or territorial integrity. Horrific experience (the mass destruction 
and crime of genocide) during the Second World War has provided a justification regarding the 
restrictions on expression advocating communism and National Socialism. In these cases, the 
Court took such historical experiences as a basis to establish an actual link between these 
expressions and harmful conduct.  
 
In addition, in the Refah Partisi case, the Court identified ‘fundamentalist’ and ‘pro-sharia’ 
political activities and views, and considered it as subject to militant democracy.58 The Court 
held that it is possible that a totalitarian movement, structured in the form of a democratic 
party, may destroy democracy, and there had been such an example in modern European 
history.59 States have a responsibility to protect their democratic regime from the activities and 
incursion of totalitarian political parties.60 The Court noted that the legal and constitutional 
changes proposed by the political party in question (Refah (Welfare) Party) were rooted in 
Islamic thought, something that would be untenable because neither an Islamic state nor Sharia 
as a system was compatible with the Convention.61 Furthermore, in the Kasymakunow case, 
the Court was not convinced by the fact that statements made by members of the organisation 
rejected the possibility of resorting to violence.62 Indeed, the terminology used by the 
fundamentalist organisation gives reference to the methods adopted to gain power and to the 
propensity of the organisation to resort to violence.63 Here, the organisation, which intended 
to overthrow the government and to replace it with an Islamic state, distributed leaflets and 
brochures that contained statements calling for violence.64 The organisation's literature 
advocated and glorified struggle in the form of a jihad, used here in the meaning of ‘holy war' 
to establish the domination of Islam.65 For the purpose of this domination, legal and 
constitutional changes proposed by the organisation were found to be incompatible with 
fundamental democratic principles that undermine the Convention.66 These cases imply 
                                                          
56 Kühen v Germany App No. 12194/86 (EComHR, 28 May 1986) p.2-3 
57 Ibid p.5 
58 Christian Moe, `Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey` (2003) 6 The International Journal of 
Not-for-Profit Law 1-14 
59 Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey App no 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98 
(ECtHR, 13 February 2003) para 99 
60 Ibid para 96 
61 Ibid para 119 
62 Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia App no 26261/05 and 26377/06 (ECtHR, 14 March 2013) para 107 
63 Ibid para 108 
64 Ibid 
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‘militant democracy’ as a kind of ‘precautionary legality’ to criminalise views which cause 
incalculable harms to the Convention rights and values.  
 
However, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Court has not shown itself willing 
to show wide deference to national authorities when they convict expression supporting 
communism. For instance, convictions by the Hungarian authorities for publicly displaying 
symbols of communism were found by the Court to be a breach of article 10 of the Convention. 
The Hungarian criminal code outlawed the display of symbols equated to communism and 
Nazism “a swastika, an SS-badge, an arrow-cross, a symbol of the sickle-and-hammer or a five-
pointed red star, or a symbol depicting any of them”67 and regarded them as propaganda for 
totalitarian ideology.68 However, the Court concluded that potential propaganda for a 
communist ideology could not be regarded as a sole reason to ban the display of symbols of 
communism.69 Meanwhile, displaying ` a red star` does not mean one is propagating totalitarian 
ideology,70 and wearing a red star in public must be taken into account as a means of lawful 
political expression.71 The Court held that for such a ban, the government was required to prove 
the existence of a real and present danger of a known political movement or party that was 
seeking to re-establish a dictatorship.72 Likewise, in another case this time against Turkey, the 
applicants were convicted by the domestic court for disseminating a Bolshevik organisation’s 
(TIKB’s) propaganda which aimed at establishing a political regime based on Marxist-Leninist 
ideology by means of disseminating propaganda messages through the publication and 
distribution of a book.73 The Court noted that some of the ideas from the book might be 
regarded in a hostile tone, and glorifying the struggles of ‘revolutionaries’ against slavery, 
genocide, fascism and national and class exploitation.74 The national authorities even claimed 
that dissemination of such views might intensify serious disturbances in the prisons or in the 
country generally.75 Yet, the Court noted that although some passages of the book were in a 
hostile tone, it was in fact a critique of the Turkish penitentiary system and conveyed personal 
anecdotes that were affiliated with the organisation, and narrated general conditions and 
personal experiences in prisons such as ill-treatment or pressure put on detainees.76 The Court 
concluded that the domestic courts did not adduce in their argument any specific passages 
showing incitement of hatred and violence.77 Furthermore, the book, written by private 
individuals, would reach a relatively narrow readership.78 In those cases, domestic courts failed 
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to convince the Court that the expressions in question advocated communism which was 
regarded as inherently violent. The European Court now requires more evidential basis for such 
expression to be restricted, especially since the end of the Cold War. This means a narrow 
deference would be given to national authorities while restricting communism-related 
expression.  
 
We can see how the Court has provided wider deference to domestic authorities when 
expressions or organisations pose a danger to the rights embodied in the Convention. As an 
overview of these cases above, the Court and the Commission were convinced that expression 
in relation to communism, National Socialism and to the Sharia system, as well as their 
advocation of political violence, constituted a real and potential danger to the principles of the 
Convention. Yet, these cases span what was referred to in chapter 2 as the pathology of the 
Cold War, and the new pathology regarding fundamentalist religious motivations has only 
marginal differences in judicial approach. It can be argued that the Court acts based on the 
political atmosphere of the time when particular views or ideologies might constitute a threat 
to the Convention system. This allows the Court to keep up-to-date in preparation for, and 
guarding against, threats that could undermine the principles of the Convention and 
democracy, whatever their source of motivation. This protectionist reaction is the code at the 
centre of the Court’s response to expression that advocate political violence.  
 
5.2.2) Expressions that Advocate Terrorism  
Political violence that seeks to stir up fear and intimidate populations is not something new. 
However, terrorism in law and politics is a new phenomenon which has appeared only in recent 
decades.79 Today, views that are contrary to democracy and the Convention have been 
supplanted by more amorphous and all-encompassing ‘-isms’ – ‘fundamentalism’, ‘radicalism’ 
and ‘extremism’. This, at root, mirrors the fundamental inability of the international community 
to agree upon a definition of ‘terrorism’. This thesis is premised on the argument that the 
reinvention (during the modern ‘human rights era’) of archaic offences of sedition can be traced 
to the underlying failure to narrowly define the nature of the risk posed.  Starting from the 
1970s, terrorism has arisen as the main source of threat to states and to national security. 
Terrorism remains as a new source of threat and it indicates a pathology towards expressions 
advocating it especially after the incidents of 9/11 attacks which led US, the UN and the Council 
of Europe to declare “war on terrorism”. These attacks triggered the US, the Council of Europe, 
the EU and the UN to develop both a regional and worldwide response against terrorism,80 
including criminalisation of incitement to terrorism.81 Some of the contracting states of the 
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Convention have been confronted with “terrorism” emanating from national separatist 
movements and fundamentalist organisations. There will be some contextual comparison with 
cases emanating from various countries with a similar political backdrop. These include Kurdish 
separatists in Turkey, Basques separatists in Spain and Irish republicans in Northern Ireland,82 
as well as religious fundamentalists acting without borders in order to address the Court’s 
response to such expression. The older sedition offences, (broad and vague as they were), have 
disappeared/fallen into disuse primarily as a result of the influence of the European Convention 
as a human rights instrument but they have also served as the basis for modern day “terroristic 
speech” offences, that are also broad and vague. For that reason, the European Convention is 
a crucial human rights instrument tends to constrain “terroristic speech” offences from the 
vague and broad meaning that has its basis in ‘sedition’. Thus, States’ human rights 
commitments have resulted in progressive developments in domestic free speech 
jurisprudence in accordance with the case law of the Court where there is considerable amount 
of violation of freedom of expression, especially in the cases from Turkey.  There are, though, 
also cases where the Court has expanded the scope of ‘terroristic speech’, in cases where the 
state has convicted with wider deference given by the Court.  
 
Initially, there were cases where the European Court gave wider deference to contracting 
states: where people who disseminated ‘terroristic speech' had been convicted. We might take 
Zana v. Turkey as an example. The views expressed by the mayor of an important city in the 
South East Turkey were likely to escalate an already explosive situation, shortly after PKK 
militants had killed a number of civilians. His statement “I support the PKK national liberation 
movement; on the other hand, I am not in favour of massacres. Anyone can make mistakes, and 
the PKK kill women and children by mistake …”83 was published in a national daily newspaper.84 
The applicant was charged by the national court with the offence of disseminating propaganda 
for the activities of PKK as an armed organisation, whose aim was to break up Turkey’s national 
territory and public order.85 The Turkish courts observed that his statements defined terrorist 
organisation as “national liberation movement”86 and the fight against terrorism as a “dirty 
war”. 87 This is also one of the most important judgments in which the Court held by twelve 
votes to eight that there had not been a violation of freedom of expression.88 During the deadly 
attacks and extreme tension caused by the PKK in the region, the mayor who was obviously a 
leading figure in society, declared his support for an illegal armed organisation.89 The European 
Court gave particular attention to contextual evaluation such as the applicant’s statement as 
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published in the national daily newspaper, and the circumstances of the time, when murderous 
attacks carried out by the PKK on civilians in south-east Turkey, in order to establish a link 
between expression and terrorism.90  
 
Measures taken by national authorities against ‘terroristic speech’ are considered as part of the 
fight against terrorism. The European Court's response to ‘terroristic speech’ allows national 
authorities under the margin of appreciation to interfere with freedom of expression in order 
to facilitate the proper functioning of political democracy.91 If an expression is associated with 
a terrorist organisation and if it called for terrorist acts and armed conflict to achieve a political 
end, the Court confers much greater deference to national authorities to interfere with the 
right to freedom of expression.92 In cases where the Court has been persuaded that there was 
a clear connection between the applicant and a terrorist organization, the Court has either not 
regarded the interference at national level as a violation of freedom of expression or has 
declared the application inadmissible.93 For instance, the Court noted that expression including 
the following passage; “The national liberation struggle, growing like the ripples caused by a 
stone cast into a pool of water, has already gone past Botan in waves, … PKK  sources briefly 
describe the extent of the national struggle in Kurdistan as follows…”94 was capable of inciting 
further violence in south east Turkey.95 Another instance of direct incitement to terrorism 
stemmed from the large-scale campaign, started by PKK's presidential counsel, to lift the ban 
on PKK's activities in Germany. The campaign persuaded supporters of the PKK to request and 
uphold this demand.96 As part of the campaign, supporters signed a declaration as follows: “I 
further declare that I belong to the PKK” and “I support the line of the PKK's democratic 
struggle,” and submitted this declaration in large numbers to parliaments, administrative 
bodies and law courts.97 The applicant was convicted by the national court in Germany of 
contravening the ban on the PKK's activities by reason of providing security for PKK to plan its 
further unlawful activities and reinforce solidarity amongst potential supporters.98 Here, the 
European Court have found a direct and actual link between the expression in question and 
terrorism. Similarly, in the case of Jobe, the Court noted that the conviction of the person under 
the law which criminalised "the collection or possession of material likely to be useful to a person 
committing or preparing an act of terrorism", and which was found legitimate due to having no 
reasonable defence.99 The Court declared the application inadmissible due to fact that the 
applicant was carrying a large number of digital files including, “Military Training manual”, “Al 
Qa’eda Training Manual”, “How Can I Train Myself For Jihad?”, and “39 ways to Serve and 
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Participate in Jihad”.100 In another case, Swiss authorities seized materials such as books and 
magazines belonging to the PKK and concluded that this constituted advocacy for and 
glorification of violence, and aimed at convincing as many people as possible to favour armed 
struggle. 101 In all these cases, the European Court found a direct incitement to terrorism, or a 
clear connection between expression material and terrorism or terrorist organisation, such that 
the Court concluded the interference served a pressing social need.  
From a different perspective, the Commission has declared several applications relating to 
'terroristic speech' inadmissible. In particular, brought against the UK, the members of para-
military organisations and their lawful political wings (such as Sinn Fein, Republican Sinn Fein 
and the Ulster Defence Association) were prevented by the Secretary of State from having 
access to the broadcast media (radio and television programmes) for the purpose of 
commenting on economic and political issues.102 The ban was applied to restrict members from 
being interviewed further on TV and radio, to prevent them trying to justify their criminal 
activities.103 The rationale given by the government for introducing such bans was that the 
terrorists appealed for support from the public by using and having access to radio and 
television. The Government decided to restrict access to these platforms especially to those 
whose aim was to promote terrorism. Since the aim of this restriction was to prevent direct 
appearances of those who used or supported violence, it was not a restriction on reporting.104 
With respect to ministerial directions in the cases brought before the Commission, it is noted 
that restrictions were formed to "deny representatives of known terrorist organisations and 
their political supporters a possibility of using the broadcast media as a platform for advocating 
their cause, encouraging support for their organisation and conveying the impression of their 
legitimacy".105 The Commission noted that this ministerial direction did not have any impact on 
the content of words and images broadcast on TV or radio.106 The directions had very limited 
impact on the information available to the public because it only prevented journalists from 
having interviews with, and public appearances of, particular people.107 The Commission rather 
considered this ban as an element of domestic policy that was formulated to combat 
terrorism.108 Additionally, the Commission agreed with the domestic court that since the ban 
was aimed at terrorism, then it was applicable to persons who supported violence as it is part 
of an organisation's policy (in this case-Sinn Fein).109 In a similar case, the applicant who was a 
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former member of the Red Army Faction (RAF), a left-wing extremist terrorist movement in 
Germany, was refused the request for radio interviews or being filmed.110 The national courts 
dismissed these requests based on the declaration that the applicant made against him during 
the trial.111 As the Court noted, the applicant's declaration showed a critical attitude towards 
the strategy of the RAF notably the murder of the US soldier.112 However, the applicant 
considered her critical analysis of the RAF's history as a prerequisite for “the determination of 
future fights” and she continued to identify herself with the aims and the ideology of the RAF 
in general and apparently considered herself as a representative of the organisation.113 The 
European Court noted that the domestic court`s refusal to allow the applicant to be interviewed 
and filmed met a “pressing social need” due to the fact that the national court considered that 
the applicant`s access to the journalist and the filmmaker could allow the applicant to influence 
supporters of the Red Army Faction (RAF) and gain more support.114 The applicant was the one 
of the main representatives of the RAF organisation, which had waged a murderous fight 
against Germany for more than twenty years.115 The Court considered the applicant`s 
statement as promotion of the terrorist organisation and as an influence on supporters of this 
organisation.116  
 
As in all these similar cases, the Commission and the Court showed wide deference to the 
national authorities to interfere with the right to free expression. These decisions can be 
criticised on the basis that the media ban had an effective impact on restricting criticism of 
British government policy towards Northern Ireland.117 Arguably, the main difference between 
the Turkish cases and British cases mentioned above is that the British ministerial directions 
aimed to prevent particular figures` speech before it was delivered and available in the public 
domain via TV or radio whereas the Turkish courts restricted applicant’s speech after it was 
expressed in the press or documented as a written material. In this instance, the appearance 
of representatives of political parties on TV was not considered by the Court as preventing 
different perspectives on the situation in Northern Ireland. This is because the British 
ministerial ban was limited to specific persons and their appearances on TV and radio; this 
implies that a different perspective on the situation in Northern Ireland could have been placed 
in the public domain by delivering such views using various other media (excepting only 
broadcasting). This prevented a broad prior restraint on the free press. It is extremely important 
for the Court to consider the expression mode of delivery to the audiences (broadcasting or 
publishing) due to their potential impact on the audience and number of people accessed by 
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the speaker. In these cases, the Court pays particular attention to the expression in question 
being available to the audience in different formats so as to ensure a different perspective on 
the circumstances is available to the listeners.  
 
However, the anti-terror and national security laws target political and intellectual expression 
due to their purported connection to incitement to terrorism. The European Court has adopted 
the principle that, “… the limits of permissible criticism are wider with regard to the government 
than in relation to a private citizen ...118 In a democratic system, there must be a close scrutiny 
not only of the legislative and judicial authorities but also of public opinion regarding the actions 
or omissions of the government.119 The Court has found many violations of freedom of 
expression in the cases where the domestic courts mostly convicted the speakers for 
disseminating propaganda by means of supporting terrorism.  This is especially true of the views 
expressed regarding the Kurdish question or PKK. Dozens of people have been dragged to the 
Court for violating Turkish criminal code and anti-terror laws. Many cases related to the specific 
circumstances in South East Turkey are taken into consideration in assessing whether or not 
expression leads to acts of terrorism. National authorities, especially in Turkey, tend to 
interpret some statements very sensitively with focus on their content, particularly when they 
are about economic, social, academic or political aspects of situations potentially linked to 
terrorism or its relevant issues.120 This again implies here that national security laws (TMK and 
TPC in Turkey) have been interpreted just like sedition law. In contrast with national authorities, 
however, the European Court has found some expression as offering different perspectives on 
the subject,121 or as being focused on a critical assessment of government policy and thus 
disapproved of such interferences.122 The Court noted that these expressions could seem 
provocative or to be delivered in a hostile tone to the national authorities, but that did not 
mean they must be taken as provoking violence.123 There are many cases where the Turkish 
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authorities held that particular remarks such as “Kurdistan” or “demanding education in 
mother tongue” were capable of destroying the unity and integrity of Turkish Republic and its 
nation, and regarded as advocacy of terrorism. But the Court does not consider the term of 
“Kurdistan” as disseminating separatist propaganda and incitement to violence; indeed, it 
merely alleges that people of Kurdish origin live in that part of the country,124 or separate from 
the territory of Turkey, and as such exercises authority on behalf of that entity.125 The Turkish 
national courts considered such expressions as a threat to its national security, and not as 
political criticism. Yet, the European Court regarded an applicants’ expression regarding these 
issues as offering “a different perspective on the situation in south-east Turkey”.126 Additionally, 
in the case of Gerger, the European Court concluded that the applicant’s comments including 
the statement “from the seeds of liberation of the Kurdish people sown in those days the 
guerrilla campaign in the mountains of Kurdistan was born”127 constituted political criticism of 
the Turkish authorities, to which the use of words such as “revolt” and “oppression” added a 
certain virulence.128 The national courts took the view that the applicant’s expression was not 
a political criticism of the Turkish authorities; rather it was intended to incite Kurdish citizens 
to engage in armed combat against the Turkish State, supported separatist violence and 
encouraged for the activities of the PKK.129 Similarly, in the case of Başkaya and Okçuoğlu, the 
national authorities maintained that the applicant’s expression sought to justify PKK terrorism 
as well as incite violence.130 And the European Court draws attention to words or deeds which 
have the potential to exacerbate the security situation in the region, where there had been 
serious disturbances and conflict between the security forces and members of the PKK since 
early 1980s.131 Yet, the European Court noted that the statements in question were, again, tied 
up with the public's right to be informed of a different perspective on circumstances in south 
east Turkey.132 Furthermore, the expression in question was characteristic of an academic 
study, the socio-economic evaluation of Turkey`s political history and political ideology.133  
Likewise, the Court gives less deference to national authorities if it finds that a particular 
expression contains hard-hitting criticism of the national authorities.134 By doing this, the Court 
provides a wider space to voice permissible political expression regarding the government and 
its policies.135 However, the Court considered and evaluated giving reference to the 
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incriminated news commentary described as an awakening of Kurdish sentiment, mainly by 
way of romanticising the Kurdish cause and drawing on the names of legendary figures of the 
past, in the context of the overall literary and metaphorical tone of the article and not as an 
appeal to violence.136 On the whole, the content of the articles cannot be construed as being 
capable of inciting to further violence.137 Yet, the Court noted that the domestic authorities in 
this case failed to have sufficient regard for the public’s right to be informed of a different 
perspective on the situation in south-east Turkey, irrespective of how unpalatable that 
perspective may be for them.138 In another case, a union made a demand to promote the 
development of education in the mother tongue (the Kurdish language) was ruled upon by the 
national courts.139 As distinct from the national court`s argument based on an alleged risk to 
the integrity of national territory, the Court did not consider this demand as calling for use of 
violence, armed resistance or uprising, nor as inciting hatred.140 That is why the Court 
concluded that "there was no clear or imminent threat to the State’s territorial integrity"141 from 
a demand to develop an educational curriculum in the mother tongue.  
In addition, to elaborate on the principle above, in the case of Otegi Mondragon v Spain, a 
spokesperson of the Sozialista Abertzaleak parliamentary group in a press conference 
responded to the issue of the Egunkaria newspaper which was searched and subsequently 
closed by the police due to its perceived links with ETA.142  Some members of its editorial board 
were consequently arrested.143 Also, during a visit by the Spanish king to the Basque region, 
the spokesperson criticised the King in the following terms “it was pathetic”, “a genuine political 
disgrace” and “… the King is the commander-in-chief of the Spanish army, … is in charge of the 
torturers, who defends torture and imposes his monarchical regime on our people through 
torture and violence?”144 The Court agreed with the national court that the speech was 
provocative, yet the Court noted that there was room for a degree of exaggeration, or even 
provocation without being seen as advocating the use of violence.145 Thus, the Court found a 
violation of freedom of expression because the speech did not advocate terrorism and political 
violence and thus underplayed the crucial impact that political criticism has on the functioning 
and flourishing of democracy in any society.146 
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5.2.2.1) Response to ‘Terroristic Speech’ after the incidents of 9/11 (Indirect incitement)  
The Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (2005) (which carries very 
alike features with UNSC Resolution 1624 (2005) and the European Union Framework Decision 
on Combating Terrorism (2008)), is the regional instrument entailed in criminalizing indirect 
incitement to terrorism after the ‘terrorist’ attacks in the US on 11 September 2001, and other 
attacks in European capitals which emerged as a challenge to the realm of Convention. The 
Committee of Ministers defined this challenge as a direct threat to the fundamental values of 
human rights, democracy and the rule of law.147 It can be stated that the post 9/11 era relies 
on increased restrictions in order to prioritise security and public order concerns over freedom 
of expression. Even political expression that indirectly advocates ‘terrorism’ or ‘violence’ can 
be limited in this context.148 Measures adopted in order to combat terrorism covers material 
support to terrorist activities, and expert advice and assistance, as well as public support for 
terrorism by whatever means.149 The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe agreed 
to adopt these instruments more effectively in fighting against terrorism.150 The Council of 
Europe has introduced prohibitions on both direct and indirect incitement.151 In this regard, 
the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism provides restrictions on a 
much wider range of expression including "the dissemination of messages praising the 
perpetrator of an attack, the denigration of victims, calls for funding for terrorist organisations 
or other similar behaviour" and “making available of a message to the public advocating 
terrorist offences”.152 It also defines public provocation to commit a terrorist offence as "the 
distribution, or otherwise making available, of a message to the public, with the intent to incite 
the commission of a terrorist offence, where such conduct, whether or not directly advocating 
terrorist offences, causes a danger that one or more such offences may be committed."153  
 
This contrasts with the approach taken by the European Court which as it was agued above, 
gives wider deference to national authorities in cases where statements or expression have 
directly incited violence or armed struggle.154 For instance, the European Court gave wider 
deference to national authorities in cases such as, Zana v. Turkey, Sürek v. Turkey (No. 3), Aydin 
v Germany, Jobe v. UK and Kaptan v. Switzerland where there was a direct connection between 
the expression and terrorism. In cases of criminalisation of direct incitement rather than 
indirect one complies with the principle of “… the limits of permissible criticism are wider with 
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regard to the government than in relation to a private citizen ...155 For that reason, the European 
Court regards some provocative, hostile and offensive expression, where the speaker was 
convicted of indirect incitement to terrorism by the national authorities, as offering a different 
perspective, or as hard-hitting criticism to international or internal politics. Thus it can be 
argued that the Court tended to give wider deference to national authorities only for direct 
incitement to terrorism until the 9/11 incidents. We can see immediately that a tension must 
arise between, on the one hand, the Court’s historic approach – that of far greater toleration 
towards expression that ‘only’ indirectly incites terrorism – and on the other, the counter-
terrorist preventive turns epitomised by the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers’ 
approach of post-9/11.  
The Court has sought to avoid criminalisation of indirect incitement due to its broad restrictive 
effect on public political expression. For that reason, convictions for expressing views based on 
offences related to sedition, as it is argued in the second chapter, historically seen as 
incompatible with the exercise of the right in article 10. Yet, the post-9/11 era has posed a new 
pathology for the operation of the Convention. There is a national, regional and international 
trend which suggests and encourages criminalisation of indirect incitement after 9/11 
incidents.156 Adopting a broader scope of ‘terroristic speech’ including indirect incitement such 
as apology, has been adopted into national laws, and encouraged member states by 
international law.157 Thus, it can be argued that the pathology of the ‘war on terror’ prompts 
national authorities to apply anti-terror laws in a manner closely resembling sedition law. In 
other words, the concept of sedition might be reborn under the notion of criminalizing indirect 
incitement as part of anti-terror measures through the European Court.  
 
There are only two leading case that supports this argument. In Leroy v. France, the Court 
referred to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism and took it into 
account in its reasoning when examining indirect incitement (apology and glorification of 
terrorism).158 The Court noted that the conviction of the cartoonist was necessary in a 
democratic society due to the importance of the fight against terrorism and the cartoon’s 
possible impact on public order.159 In this case, in a weekly magazine, Ekaitza's editorial team 
drew a cartoon representing the attack of 11 September 2001 with the slogan of a famous 
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brand: "We have all dreamt of it... Hamas did it".160 The cartoon was published in the 
newspaper on 13 September 2001. In its following issue, the newspaper published extracts 
from letters and emails received in reaction to the drawing. The applicant emphasised that his 
aim was to represent the decline of the US through the 9/11 attacks.161 The cartoonist was 
charged with complicity in condoning terrorism. The European Court unanimously found no 
violation of freedom of speech by reason of regarding the cartoon as glorifying terrorism.162 
The Court noted that the details of the speech proved it was far more than a mere criticism of 
US imperialism and the use of the first person plural ‘we’ proved that the author identified 
himself with terrorism.163 A further example identifies that the applicant was charged for his 
press release on the internet which was, as the European Court noted, approval of the ‘terrorist 
attacks’ (events of 9/11).164 
 
However, in many cases concerning national independence struggles, the Court has instead 
found convictions for PKK-related expression and articles as violations of article 10 even where 
the reality of terrorism was much more imminent and intense.165 These cases have required 
the Court to engage in analysis of the compatibility, in Convention terms, of the criminalisation 
of indirect advocacy of terrorism (such as glorification/apology) which was adopted mainly after 
the 11 September attacks.166 As we saw above, in many cases the Court has rather found PKK-
related expression to be hard-hitting criticism of and offering a different perspective on south 
east Turkey, rather than incitement to terrorism. In case of Leroy, the Court however 
considered the cartoon was not limited to criticism of American imperialism but supported and 
glorified the destruction of the Twin Towers by 'terrorism'.167 Another distinctive point made 
by the Court in the Leroy case is that moral support for those he had presumed to be the 
perpetrators of 11 September attacks was provided by the applicant,168 by approving the 
violent death of victims whose dignity was further diminished by the submission of his cartoon 
on the anniversary of the attacks.169 Yet, the Court does not taken victims` dignity and moral 
support to perpetrators of terrorist acts into consideration in other cases.  For instance, there 
are cases against Turkey where providing moral support for the perpetrators of a terrorist 
attack or terrorist was not counted a legitimate reason, even though the government argued 
that the applicant’s expression was moral support for the terrorist organisation and separatist 
violence.170 We might well conclude that the European Convention and the Court, fully 
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approved the criminalisation of indirect incitement, and moved away from its earlier incitement 
standard.171 They indicate the Court perceives a contradiction with its actual role in ensuring 
the Conventional rights, especially here the right to freedom of expression. Criminalisation of 
indirect incitement can be regarded as a rebirth of sedition laws on a national level.   
 
Having established the different approaches, the European Court takes or has taken exception 
to speech that advocates political violence or terrorism, both before and after 9/11 with both 
direct and indirect incitement.  In each, we have noted different trends or presumptions. Let 
us turn now in more detail to the Court’s jurisprudence, where we will analyse the case-law 
under the same headings as were used for Turkey (chapter 4) and the UN (chapter 6 to come). 
This will discern any common themes or differences in approach for the various elements we 
identified: content and context of expression, specifically audience and publicity, probability of 
harm and mens rea. 
 
5.3) The Elements that Required by the European Court in Terms of ‘Terroristic Speech’ 
 
It is highly important to specify the elements taken into consideration by the Court while 
examining the interferences imposed by national authorities.  These elements reflect on the 
scope of the right to freedom of expression as well as the scope of the offences related to 
‘terroristic speech’. The European Court principally established that “in exercising its 
supervisory jurisdiction, the Court must look at the interference in the light of the case as a 
whole, including the content of the impugned statements and the context in which they were 
made.”172 This implies that the Court carefully considers the elements of content and context 
of the expression, or weighs one against another, or it applies only a context-based 
assessment.173  
It will be argued that the Court gives more protection to political expression by concentrating 
less on the inflammatory nature of the expression and more on the different elements of the 
contextual evaluation of the speech under scrutiny.174 The contextual evaluation is the only 
way to carefully to distinguish between expression protected under article 10 and expression 
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restricted for the sake of a democratic society.175 This analysis is important because there are 
many cases from Turkey where the Court approved the interference on grounds of direct 
incitement to terrorism. Yet in its various judgments, the Court has been critical of Turkey, 
identifying the crucial difference between the responses of the European Court and Turkish 
Courts as this: “Turkey attaches too much weight to the form of words used in the speech and 
focuses less on the general context in which the words were used and their possible impact”.176 
In this regard, the Court applies a highly context based evaluation in its case law. In addition, 
the explanations, persuasive evidence and justifications of the restrictions brought by 
government are crucial elements for the Court as part of the process of evaluating the content 
or/and context of expression in order to determine whether there is a violation of Article 10 or 
not.177 For instance, in the Üstün case, the Government was unable to explain why the second 
edition of a book was banned, whereas the first edition was not,178 and how the second edition 
of the same book could have caused more concern to the judicial authorities than the first 
one.179 For that reason, the European Court holds that there has been a violation of Article 10. 
Likewise, in the case of Çetin and Others v. Turkey while it was possible that the expression in 
question (here it was an article published with a newspaper) would have exacerbated an 
already tense situation, the national authorities did not identify any reasons and made no 
reference to the seizure warrants issued by the judges in the decision to seize the newspapers. 
180 Without a detailed reasoning conveyed by proper judicial scrutiny, restriction on such 
expression would be simply regarded as a response to heavy criticism of government 
policies.181 As a result, explanations and justifications submitted by the government play a 
significant role leading the Court to reach a different conclusion when taking them into 
consideration as part of content- and context- based evaluation.182 For that reason, the 
elements such as men’s rea of speaker, and the content and context based evaluation will be 
analysed in order to understand how the Court responds to ‘terroristic speech’. 
5.3.1) The Content of Expression 
The Court evaluates the words used in an entire expression to decipher its meaning; this gives 
the real meaning of the words in their content. The content evaluation alone provides the basis 
for the Court and national authorities to hold restrictions on expression but in itself it is not 
adequate to restrict expression. The aim of the European Court is to find the meaning of words 
used in an expression, something which involves considering the whole meaning of the 
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expression in order to determine whether it advocates violence. Not only is the overall message 
given to the audience by the expression considered, but also a specific part of the expression 
must be evaluated. The content of expression is an element required to decide if the expression 
in question is a mere criticism - a legitimate political expression or ‘terroristic speech’.  
Case law demonstrates many cases where the Court has concluded that the words constitutes 
harsh criticism of government policies and anti-terror measures, after taking the content of 
expression into consideration.183 For instance, the author of an article regarding the Kurdish 
problem was convicted by the national authorities based on evaluation of only one particular 
part of the expression. Yet, the Court interpreted the applicant's expression as containing 
offensive phrases in an aggressive tone but reached the view that the article as a whole did not 
glorify violence and did not incite people to armed resistance or insurrection.184 Instead, the 
article as whole was constructed as an intellectual analysis of the Kurdish question.185 In 
another case, the Court evaluated the content of two letters which mentioned two massacres 
committed intentionally by the authorities to annihilate Kurds and was critical of the attitude 
shown by the authorities to imprisonment, killings and torture of dissidents for the sake of the 
state.186 The Court held that the impugned letters contained words that aimed at defining the 
PKK as a national liberation movement.187 The words used in these letters were essential for 
deciding whether that speech was a permissible criticism or not. In these letters, the Court 
found that the applicant intentionally labelled one side of the conflict as “the fascist Turkish 
army”, “the TC murder gang” and “the hired killers of imperialism” alongside references to 
“massacres”, “brutalities” and “slaughter”.188 After evaluating the content of the statement 
here, the Court noted that the applicant overstepped the limits of permissible criticism and his 
letters were deemed to incite violence against an individual, a public official or a sector of the 
population.189 This is because, as the Court noted, the letters in question sought to provoke a 
bloody revenge by arousing emotions and to connect themselves with deadly violence.190 As 
we saw earlier in this chapter, Leroy published a cartoon which represented the attack on the 
twin towers of the World Trade Centre, with a famous brand slogan: "We have all dreamt of 
it... Hamas did it".191 The cartoonist identified himself with the attack through his use of the 
first person plural "we" and idealized this lethal project through the use of the verb "to dream" 
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by using these words in this content, the Court considered them an indirect encouragement 
for the potential reader to evaluate positively the successful commission of a criminal act.192 
Particular sections or phrases are understood in the overall content of expression. For instance, 
the Court found no violation of the right to freedom of speech with these words "We will die 
but we will not enter the cells!" However, when looking at it overall and situated within the 
whole content of the speech, they conveyed the message to the readers to resort to violence 
rather than get incarcerated.193 This was at a time of serious disturbances in several prisons 
which resulted in several deaths and injuries.194 Thus, the Court considered the content of this 
speech as incitement to political violence rather than as mere criticism of a new prison 
system.195 In addition to this, another noteworthy case regarding content evaluation is Çamyar 
and Berktaş v Turkey. Here, the national courts did not claim that any specific passages or pages 
of the speech (the book) were presumed to incite violence.196 The applicant in this case was 
convicted based on a complete analysis of the book as a whole without making reference to 
any specific passages or pages.197 As a result, the Court concluded that the domestic courts 
gave insufficient reasons to justify the interference with the right to freedom of expression.198 
The Court's review on national judgments addressed the fact that an evaluation of the content 
is required in assessing both the 'words' used in the expression and the 'expression as a whole'. 
If one is absent in the domestic courts’ judgment, the Court might consequently note that the 
domestic authorities have failed to give sufficient reasons in a matter that could possibly violate 
the right to freedom of expression. It can be noted that the Court consistently considers the 
content of expression in its case law. The same consideration is assigned as a responsibility to 
contracting states. By doing this, they can justify their interference with the right to freedom 
of speech by referring to specific words, or parts of expression and to an entire expression that 
might advocate violence. Thus, it can be argued within this analogy that Turkey has failed to 
adopt this measure into its related case law.  
Moreover, the tone of expression whether it is aggressive, provocative or hostile etc. might be 
understood differently based on the legal bodies’ perception of particular issues. There are 
some cases in which the European Court ascribes a different meaning to the expression in 
question than the domestic authorities ascribed. For instance, the Turkish national authorities 
pointed to a specific view which referred to a part of the country as “belonged to Kurdistan” 
and which advocated for the dismantling of the nation and glorified the acts of the PKK as a 
“national liberation struggle”.199 The domestic authorities regarded these words as provocative 
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in nature and an incitement to armed struggle against the State.200 The Court noted that the 
government did not submit any further arguments or facts that would indicate the expression 
encouraged violence, armed resistance or an insurrection in order to convince the Court for 
wider deference.201 Yet, the national authorities failed to prove that any specific passages, 
pages or parts of expression evaluated under the whole meaning of expression, sought to 
advocate terrorism and political violence. This implies that the Court considered that the 
national authorities failed to provide enough evidence or explanation to justify the 
restriction.202 Domestic authorities must provide persuasive and convincing evidence and 
explanation regarding the expression in question that it advocates terrorism or political 
violence through the words, passages, or parts of expression, as well as whole meaning of 
expression. However, in the case of banning the publication of an entire newspaper for a 
certain time, the Court does not examine the content of the impugned articles and news 
reports as a necessary step in the process.203 The Court noted that such prior restraints on the 
media were not per se incompatible with the Convention.204 However, the European Court was 
examining here not the content of the expression itself, but the nature of the restriction (here 
it was ban on future publication of entire periodicals) to determine whether or not it complied 
with article 10. 
5.3.2) the Context of Expression  
The Court conducts further evaluation of the expression in question, paying particular attention 
to the context in which expression was published or spoken. Contextual evaluation of 
expression might consist of ‘who the speaker is’, ‘how expression was delivered to audience’, 
‘where expression was published or made’, ‘the time when the expression was delivered’ or 
‘what the background of the case is’.205 All of these might be required by the Court to determine 
whether the restriction on expression is necessary and proportionate. In some cases, the Court 
has considered such particular views as a threat per se to Convention rights and values. For 
instance, with a National Socialist background, and past experience of the Third Reich were 
factors felt to be quite a real threat by the Court.206 They felt there was a possibility of re-
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experiencing what was experienced in the time of the Third Reich, if the National Socialist 
ideology was advocated.207 This ‘past experience’ can be evaluated as having its background in 
the context of the expression. In addition, the context of the security situation such as in South 
East Turkey where there have been serious disturbances between the PKK members and the 
security forces leading to severe loss of life since the 1980s.208 Within such contextual 
framework, the expression in question could be more capable of advocating further violence in 
the region.209 The Court considers background of the cases where the national authorities are 
aware of the dissemination of views which might exacerbate the serious disturbances occurring 
at the time.210 Another example of the criminalisation of incitement is the case of Kern v. 
Germany. 211 There, the Court declared the application inadmissible where the local chairman 
of the right-wing extremist association published a press release in the press and on the 
internet right after the terrorist attack in 9/11.  The Court noted that the applicant`s statements 
and cartoon approved the ‘terrorist’ attacks 9/11 incidents, published just right after the 9/11 
attacks.212 The Court drew attention to the timing of such publications. In this regard, time plays 
an important role in evaluating when particular views are published.213 For instance, both the 
content of the expression in the Zana and Leroy cases were contextually assessed by the Court 
under the prevailing circumstances in south east Turkey, when serious disturbances were 
raging, and the unique timing immediately after the September 11 attacks. The timing of 
expression in these cases was important in terms of their contextual evaluation to decide 
whether they incited terrorism or not. This implies that in order to commit ‘terroristic speech’, 
it must be published, spoken or broadcast at a critical time when an act of terrorism or political 
violence has recently been committed.  
5.3.2.1) Audience-Publicity 
A further point was highlighted by the Court regarding the way in which an expression was 
delivered in relation to the number of people that the expression possibly reached. The size of 
the audience or its potential size is important to justify for interfering with the expression. This 
is an important factor in the European Court, influencing whether the expression is deemed 
outside or within the protection of Article 10. As follows, broadcasting has a more immediate 
and powerful impact than the printing press.214 For instance, a ministerial order imposing 
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restrictions on broadcasting media was declared inadmissible by the European Commission.215 
Yet, the Court found a violation of the right freedom of expression in an administrative ban on 
publication and its distribution.216 The Court considered the power and influence of radio and 
television, which have a more immediate impact than the print media.217 The broadcaster is 
limited in his ability to correct, qualify, interpret or comment on any statement made on radio 
or television in comparison with those made in the press.218 Live statements carry a special risk 
which even conscientious journalists cannot control within the exercise of their professional 
judgment.219 For instance, the Court considered that the applicant had no possibility of 
reformulating, refining or retracting his speech at a press conference before making his speech 
in public.220 The publication written by private individuals would most likely reach a much 
narrower readership than expressions made by well-known persons in the mass media.221 The 
European Court considers the potential impact of written publications or the mass media on 
matters of public order and national security a substantial degree.222 As a result of this, it can 
be claimed that the Court found the ban on written materials disproportionate due their lesser 
and limited impact on society. In the case of Zana, the mayor, the most important city in south-
east Turkey, was interviewed by a major national daily newspaper and his words reported.223 
The European Court took the applicant’s position and his views’ possible impact on the 
circumstances into consideration.224 
5.3.2.2) The Probability of Harm 
European Court case law, ‘the probability of harm’ is not always required as an element. Yet, it 
has been evaluated as part of context of expression to determine whether such expression 
causes such a danger that a terrorist offence might be committed. Ronen argues that the 
European Court case law does not set a strict probability threshold, but it does require 
consideration of the significance and credible nature of the danger, the author and the 
addressee of the message, as well as the context in which the offence is committed.225  The 
Court is up to date in preparation for and guarding against threats that could undermine the 
principles of the Convention and democracy by feeling and considering particular views as a 
                                                          
215 Purcell and Others v. Ireland, (App no. 15404/89), EComHR Inadmissibility Decision 16 April 1991, p.14-5, Brind 
and Others v UK (Application No. 18714/91) EComHR Inadmissibility Decision 9 May 1994 p.11 
216 Çetin and Others v. Turkey App no 40153/98 and 40160/98 (ECtHR, 13 February 2003) para 10 
217 Purcell and others v Ireland (Application No. 15404/89) EComHR Inadmissibility Decision 16 April 1991 p.14 
218 Ibid 
219 Ibid 
220 Otegi Mondragon v. Spain App no 2034/07 (ECtHR, 15 March 2011) para 54 
221 Çamyar and Berktaş v. Turkey App no 41959/02 (ECtHR, 15 February 2011) para 42; Alınak v. Turkey, App no. 
40287/98 (ECtHR, 29 March 2005) para 45 
222 Ibid 
223 Zana v. Turkey App 69/1996/688/880 (ECtHR, 25 November 1997) para 60 
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225 Yaël Ronen, ‘Incitement to Terrorist Acts under International Law’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 
645, 668, see in Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism - Explanatory Report - [2005] 
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December 2008) para 24; Kalın v. Turkey App no 31236/96 (ECtHR, 10 November 2004) (Turkish Translation) p.2; 
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threat to the Convention era. Expression in relation to communism, Nazism, fundamentalism 
or terrorism would be treated as threat by the Court due to their possible harm to the 
Convention rights and values. Thus it can be argued that the Court responds to such expression 
with no deference if it constitutes a probability of harm (threat). 
5.3.3) Mens Rea of the Speaker 
The Court does not require the speaker's intention as an element to determine unprotected 
expression no matter whether it is direct or indirect incitement to terrorism or not. Even the 
Court did not consider the applicant’s claim about what he intended by his expression. In Leroy, 
the Court found that the content of the expression (here, a cartoon) taken as a whole supported 
the idea of destroying American Imperialism by means of violence.226 Yet, the applicant stated 
that his true intention was to express his anti-Americanism through satirical cartoon that 
showed the weakening of US imperialism.227 The Court reached the conclusion that the speaker 
supported and was in solidarity with perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks and that he glorified the 
destructions caused by the attacks of 11 September 2001. The Court did not require element 
of intention in general but there are rare cases where the Court checked it whether existed or 
not. For instance, in the case of Zana, the national authorities decided that this constituted a 
direct incitement to terrorism and the European Court gave wider deference to national 
authorities. There were strong dissenting opinions which disagreed with the majority, 
concluding that the Court did not take an indispensable element of the applicant’s intention 
into account.228  
 
5.4) Conclusion 
 
Since the end of the Second World War, the Convention as an instrument has provided an early 
warning of authoritarianism in weak democracies in order to prevent authoritarian regimes.  
The case law of the European Court strongly focuses on the idea of defining the `democratic 
spirit` through guaranteeing respect for human rights and ensuring that its members adhere to 
the standards of ‘an effective political democracy’ and the rule of law. Under the light of such 
political philosophy, the doctrinal principles have been used as primary considerations while 
reviewing whether interferences with the right to freedom of speech are a necessity of 
democratic society. In this regard, over time the Court examined the restrictions imposed on 
expressions related to communism, National Socialism and the Islamic sharia system; as well as 
‘terroristic speech’ related to PKK, IRA, ETA, and Al-Qaida. This chapter analysed the European 
Court's response to ‘terroristic speech’ and its echo of the past ‘sedition’ laws due to their close 
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resemblance. Contracting states, especially here Turkey, have applied broad restrictions on 
political dissenting expression through using these offences. This resemblance has reflected a 
deeper-level problem concerning the invocation of ‘terrorism’ as the basis for restricting 
freedom of speech. 
The European Convention as a human rights instrument has resulted in progressive 
developments in domestic free speech jurisprudence through a number of progressive 
Constitutional and criminal law amendments. The European Court allows a lower level of 
deference for national authorities when criminalising a wide range of expressions that are 
critical and dissenting to the state and its economic, security, and societal policies. The 
European Court, in its early case law, examined expressions or views related to communism 
and National Socialism as part of its role in defending democracy from ideologies and threats 
undermining it. This is because, at that time, due to horrific experience of the Second World 
War, the Court believed that it was possible that such political parties and other types of 
associations or expression, might advocate practices or activities likely to destroy the 
democratic rights and freedoms set forth under the Convention. In other respects, the 
Strasbourg Court has examined an increased number of cases related to certain public-political 
expressions where national authorities convicted the speaker due to those expressions being 
‘terroristic speech’. The European Court differed, regarding most of the offences as not related 
to ‘terroristic speech’ and thus as interfering with freedom of expression where the speech, 
properly viewed, was simply a different perspective or constituted hard-hitting criticism of 
government policy. The Court uphold the decision of the national authorities only in cases 
where expression is examined contextually as having the potential to escalate or being useful 
for an act of terrorism. In these cases, the Strasbourg Court is convinced that there is a (direct) 
connection between expressions and terrorism after taking the context and content of 
expression into consideration. While it can be argued that the Court has contributed to the 
dismantling of the offence of sedition at the national level, (since it tended to criminalise 
expression without any definite link to ‘political violence’ or ‘terrorism’). Yet there remains a 
contradictory development after the 9/11 attacks, the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe agreed to take steps using the international instruments within the Council of Europe 
to enhance the fight against terrorism including criminalising indirect incitement. This 
international trend has led to the criminalisation of a wide, indeed, even wider, range of 
expression, this time with the backing of international law.  
In addition, the elements such as the content and context of speech, mens rea, the likelihood 
of harm, and publicity are analysed under the case law of the Court. They are essential to 
determine whether restriction on expression constitutes a violation of human rights or not.  
The content and context evaluation shows the focus of the national authorities, whether they 
prioritise free speech or restrictions on freedom of speech. Indeed, the European Court has 
been imported, to some degree, into the reasoning of the domestic courts from its well-
established case law in this regard. This has, at a minimum, served to enhance the rigour with 
which restrictions on speech are scrutinized at the national level. For instance, the main 
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difference between the Court's and Turkish authorities` approaches is that Turkey attaches too 
much weight to the form of the words used in the speech and lack attention to the general 
context in which the words were used and their possible impact. The Court gives wide 
protection to political speech by focusing less attention upon the inflammatory nature of the 
speech and more on the different elements of the contextual evaluation of the speech. The 
case law analysis here indicates that national authorities must bring explanations and 
justifications regarding the restriction on expression. The link between expression and acts of 
terrorism must be clearly shown through these explanations to the Court for wider deference. 
The audience/publicity is also a key element in terms of preventing a wide range of expression. 
This has been taken seriously into consideration by the Court which I assume is what 
distinguishes modern-day offences related to ‘terroristic speech’ from sedition. Yet, the Court 
has failed to bring the same level of rigour to the question of the speaker's mens rea. This might 
be useful in terms of preventing abuse of ‘terroristic speech’ offences. Overall, the 
interpretation of these elements under the case law has provided an opportunity for 
contracting states to dismantle sedition offences under these laws as well as those found in 
case law so as to comply with human rights obligations.  
 
150 
 
CHAPTER 6: INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW’S RESPONSE TO ‘TERRORISTIC 
SPEECH’ 
 
6.1) Introduction 
 
International human rights law appeared as a reaction to the horrific experience of Nazi 
Germany during the World War II. Since the 1960s, the UN system has worked to ensure the 
enforcement of universally-recognized human rights norms, including (for the purposes of this 
Chapter) the promotion of the implementation of ‘the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights’ (ICCPR) and ‘the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination’ (ICERD). The primary purpose of human rights treaties is to protect the basic 
rights of individual human beings, regardless of their nationality, against arbitrary and 
disproportionate State interference.1 The right to freedom of expression is protected under the 
Article 19 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its scope has been detailed by the 
Human Rights Committee (henceforth ‘the Committee’). The Committee’s views on individual 
communications (through the individual complaints procedure), the Committee’s Concluding 
Observations on periodic State reports, and the General Comments drafted by the Committee 
in relation to particular rights together provide authoritative interpretations of the Covenant.2  
As the third chapter described, the doctrinal categories at the heart of human rights based 
analysis are important foundations which determine the scope of the right to freedom of 
expression. The doctrinal principles that structure the reasoning of the Committee might be 
imported into the reasoning of the domestic courts. In the UN era, international human rights 
law sets obligations not only for democratic societies but also for societies governed by 
oppressive and authoritarian governments that have ratified the Covenants. These state parties 
are not like-minded and have various political and legal traditions, ideals, and governance 
systems. Nonetheless, Human Rights Bodies' jurisprudence provides comprehensive guidance 
about how to respond to the challenges that the right to freedom of expression faces in these 
differing political atmospheres. Under oppressive and authoritarian systems, a greater range of 
expression is more likely criminalised by state parties so as to oppress any political opposition 
and to silence dissenting speech (of media professionals, human rights activists, academics, 
artists and the like).  
One role of the Human Rights Committee is to encourage national legislatures and judicial 
institutions to interpret offences relating to ‘sedition’ in a way that neither conflicts with nor 
undermines the State’s obligations arising from Article 19.3 As previous chapters have 
                                                          
1 Nihal Jayawickrama, The Judicial Application of Human Rights Law: National, Regional and International 
Jurisprudence (CUP, 2002) 24 
2 Human Rights Committee's General Comment No 33 (2008); (CCPR/C/GC/33) para 13 
3 Ibid para 30 
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demonstrated, national courts (particularly in Turkey) have all too readily treated dissenting 
expression as seditious through reliance upon public order and national security provisions. In 
addition, as Sorial argues, more recently, sedition laws have been modernised under the guise 
of counter-terrorism, to extend the criminalisation of expression that purportedly advocates 
violence against the state.4 Sorial is rightly critical of such laws for being too broad and for 
imposing unjustifiable limits on the right to freedom of expression.5 As has also been noted (see 
especially, Chapter 2) there is a clear tension between the ratification of human rights treaties 
protecting speech, and reliance on ‘anti-terror’ laws to impose far-reaching restrictions upon 
it. As Chapter 2 highlighted, this tension has been exacerbated by the absence of a definition 
of ‘terrorism’ at the international level, and corresponding expansive interpretations of 
‘terrorism’ at the national level. The result is an overly-broad legal and administrative discretion 
for authorities to misuse their power: one which constitutes, as Ronen states, a new set of 
conflicts between the fight against terrorism and freedom of expression.6   
 
The UN has sought to enhance international cooperation in countering terrorism. Until the late 
1990s, it did so primarily by means of urging the criminalisation of specific forms of conduct 
(e.g. the hijacking of planes and taking hostages) and also by encouraging States to take pre-
emptive measures such as criminalising the financing of terrorism.7 In the aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks, however, the background motivation underlying acts of ‘terrorism’ and the social 
processes that lead individuals to involve in ‘terrorist’ activity have become a central concern 
of the international community. The international consensus about the need to take concerted 
action against ‘terrorism’, and indeed, to prevent individuals from being drawn into ‘terrorism’, 
was manifested in UN Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005) which urged States to criminalise 
‘terroristic speech’.  
 
This chapter, in section 6.2, analyses International Human Rights Law’s response to ‘terroristic 
speech’, bearing in mind the close resemblance of such modern-day offences with historical 
offences of ‘sedition’. It does so by examining some relevant complaints brought to the Human 
Rights Committee and the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 
These cases involve the States’ criminalization of ideologically-driven speech, including speech 
relating to National Socialism and communism. In addition, several cases are concerned with 
the criminalization of political dissent due to its purported link with suspected insurgent 
activities (especially, for example, where the government might be likened to a totalitarian 
system or military junta). As will be demonstrated, the Committee plays a key role in 
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encouraging greater protection for the right to freedom of expression. However, while national 
counter-terrorism provisions have brought the right to freedom of expression into sharp 
conflict with national security and public order policies, the Committee has not yet satisfactorily 
drawn up legitimate parameters for what measures States may take against ‘terroristic speech’. 
Even though there are very few cases specifically involving ‘terroristic speech’, the Committee 
has monitored the systematic violation of the right to freedom of expression under military 
regimes or one-party systems where individuals were charged with the offence of sedition. It 
is fair to say that the Committee has shown some degree of effort to encourage the elimination 
of the concept of ‘sedition’ from national law. 
 
Section 6.3 further considers the jurisprudence of the Committee and its analysis of the 
elements of these crimes (including actus reus, content and context of expression, publicity 
and audience exposure, probability of specific harm, and mens rea of the speaker). The analysis 
of these elements is important to know how the Committee has sought to differentiate 
legitimate political expression from ‘seditious’ and ‘terroristic’ expression. It is argued that the 
Committee has not done well in bringing methodological rigour to its analysis of these 
elements. Unfortunately, the Committee has sometimes been prepared to accept the State’s 
reliance on a presumption that particular expression presents an inherent threat to the state 
and its system. Yet the Rabat Plan of Action proposes the six-part threshold test of: (context, 
speaker, intent, content and form- extent of the speech act, and likelihood, including 
imminence) to identify unlawful incitement. If such test is applied by the Committee, lack of 
mythological rigour might be defeated.    
 
6.2) The UN Human Rights System's Response to ‘Terroristic Speech’ 
 
This thesis takes as a basic premise that criminalising a wide range of expression is incompatible 
with the right to freedom of expression under Article 19 ICCPR. At the outset of this section, 
however, it is worth charting the core parameters of this right, as established by the Human 
Rights Committee. Article 19 comprises three main elements: “1) the right to hold opinions 
without interference; “2) the right to seek and receive information and the right of access to 
information; and 3) the right to impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, 
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of one’s 
choice.”8 For the purpose of this thesis, the right to freedom of expression entails (at a 
minimum) being able to express critical and dissenting views about government policies 
without fear of interference or punishment.9 In this regard, individuals must also be free to 
                                                          
8 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, Mr. Frank La Rue (A/HRC/14/23) 20 April 2000 at 26, see also in, Avon Lovell v. Australia, 
CCPR/C/80/D/920/2000, (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2004-03-24) para 9.2; Kim Jong-Cheol v. the 
Republic of Korea, CCPR/C/84/D/968/2001, (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2005-07-27) para 8.2 
9 Aduayom et al. v. Togo, 422/1990, 423/1990 and 424/1990, (Human Rights Committee, Communication 1996-
07-12) para 7.4; Rafael Marques de Morais v. Angola, CCPR/C/83/D/1128/2002 (Human Rights Committee, 
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receive information about alternatives to the political system and parties in power,10 as well as 
to have public debate concerning political figures and issues. 11 
In terms of limiting freedom of expression, more specifically, the Johannesburg Principles were 
adopted as an indication of how expression may be legitimately punished as a threat to national 
security, if state parties can demonstrate: if "(a) the expression is intended to incite imminent 
violence; (b) it is likely to incite such violence; and (c) there is a direct and immediate connection 
between the expression and the likelihood or occurrence of such violence."12 In this regard, 
expression that: "(i) advocates non-violent change of government policy or the government 
itself; (ii) constitutes criticism of, or insult to, public officials, or a foreign nation, state or its 
symbols, government, agencies or public officials" are protected.13 
As highlighted by Ambeyi Ligabo, the former Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, there has been a trend among 
member states to adopt or to consider adopting national security measures which interfere 
with the right to freedom of expression.14 In fact, some state parties have applied systematic 
violation of the right to freedom of expression by silencing speakers who express opposition to 
the incumbent government. These measures have targeted in particular media professionals, 
political opponents and human rights defenders.15 Such a trend indicates that a number of state 
parties have prioritized national security over the protection of freedom of expression.16 The 
adoption of such legal measures clearly restricts the free flow and exchange of information.17 
It also invariably leads to indirect forms of restriction, not least means to self-censorship by 
media professionals, human rights defenders, or political opponents.18 Speakers are most likely 
to be convicted of denigrating and defaming public officials, propagating extremist and 
disruptive ideas, gathering dissident news, disturbing public order, causing threats to the unity 
and best interest of the country, or treason.19 As the former Special Rapporteur, Ambeyi Ligabo, 
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noted (based on the cases he received) these cases involved threats, assault, harassment, 
murder or other forms of physical and psychological attacks on journalists, students, human 
rights activists and unionists due to exercising their freedom of speech.20 In addition to 
facilitating harsh censorship of all forms of communication, counter-terrorism and national 
security provisions have also been misused by states to intimidate or arbitrarily detain speakers, 
to close down media outlets, to ban specific publications, or to program and prohibit public 
gatherings or particular groups and associations.21 Worse still, some particularly egregious 
cases have involved 'censorship by killing', committed by agents of states or persons informally 
affiliated with the government.22 In light of these trends, it is perhaps unsurprising (but no less 
important) that General Comment 34 emphasizes that sedition and treason laws should be 
regarded as something that state parties must give special care to eliminate. Such laws can be 
misused to suppress or to prevent the free flow of public information and to prosecute 
journalists, researchers, environmental activists, and human rights defenders despite there 
being no (objectively) demonstrable harm to national security.23 
Nonetheless, ‘terrorism’ (especially after the events of 9/11) remains a key challenge to 
freedom of expression due to the broad discretion which counter-terrorism laws generally 
confer on national authorities.24 Anti-terrorism laws impose broad and vague restrictions on 
expression including the criminalization of indirect incitement, for example, by making it an 
offence to glorify or promote terrorism or extremism, and by strictly regulating critical speech 
or media reporting of matters relating to ‘terrorism’.25 As a result, the Committee has 
emphasized that any restrictions should be clearly and precisely defined so as to prevent 
                                                          
20 Report of the Special Rapporteur Ambeyi Ligabo on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression, (A/HRC/7/14) 28 February 2008 at 6 
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unnecessary or disproportionate interference with the right to freedom of expression.26 
Despite these broad principles, however, it will be argued that the Committee is far from 
establishing a comprehensive, consistent and well-developed free speech jurisprudence 
regarding ‘terroristic speech’. International human rights law ought to provide effective 
protection against any violation of basic democratic rights.27 The following section turns to 
analyse how the jurisprudence of the Committee has responded to ‘terroristic speech’ (and 
indeed, its past echo ‘sedition’).  
6.2.1) Expressions that Advocate Political Violence 
There have been many violations of the right to freedom of expression in the cases from 
countries that have experienced a military coup d'état, one-party system or totalitarianism. In 
such cases, State parties established only an abstract and remote link between the authors' 
speech and political violence, consequently often charged speakers with the offence of 
‘sedition’. These restrictions have broadly been rejected by the Committee. Disproportionate 
convictions and vaguely-framed restrictions on expression have been found in violation of 
Article 19. The Committee has disapproved many restrictions imposed on political expression, 
such as political activities relating to communism-socialism or dissenting expression against a 
military junta or the governing party. State parties did not seek to establish a concrete causal 
link between expression and acts of political violence while restricting such expression.  
 
In this regard, it is crucial to ask whether the Committee itself has sought to establish such a 
link when reviewing these restrictions. There are a number of significant cases (discussed 
below) where the Committee has clearly highlighted its rejection of sedition laws which 
silenced and repressed dissenting and unwanted expression by means of linking them with 
political violence. It can be argued that while the Committee does seek evidence of a link, its 
jurisprudence has not yet established a clear and generally applicable threshold test for the 
relationship between speech and purported violence. Inevitably, the Committee relies heavily 
on the information, explanation and justifications provided by the parties. Yet, insufficient 
information provided by applicants has been one of the main challenges for the Committee in 
its examination of individual communications. In several cases (also discussed below) 
insufficient information submitted by the applicant has prevented the Committee from finding 
a violation of freedom of expression. I would argue that declaring these complaints inadmissible 
only serves to encourage these state parties to undermine the protection and promotion of the 
right to freedom of expression. While this argument is one that highlights the procedural 
constraints operating on the work of the Committee, it highlights a particular (and recurring) 
problem in the scrutiny afforded by the Committee to sedition-based restrictions on speech. 
On the one hand, the Committee rejects restrictions based on sedition, but on the other hand, 
                                                          
26 Human The Human Rights Committee’s general comment No. 34 (2011) on Freedoms of Opinion and Expression 
(CCPR/C/GC/34) para 46 
27 Michael Head, Crimes against the State from Treason to Terrorism (Ashgate, 2011) 278 
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sedition continues unchallenged due to the Committees’ declaration that it has been provided 
with insufficient information.28  
 
A series of complaints were brought to the Committee for convictions under the National 
Security law of South Korea.29 This National Security Law criminalised the dissemination of 
ideas, and being a member of organisations, deemed to benefit the enemy. Based on this law, 
a number of academics, artists and members of opposition organisations who criticised the 
government, the military regime,30 their allies, foreign interventions to South Korea, and the 
support for national unification were convicted.31 In particular, the author distributed 
pamphlets criticizing the regime, dissident publications covering numerous political, historical, 
economic and social issues and made an unauthorized (criminal) visit to North Korea.32 The 
State party considered that expressing the view that the military dictatorship in South Korea is 
controlled by the US,33 as deserving of prosecution under the "crime of praising, encouraging 
or siding with anti-State organisation" which amounted to espionage.34 Yet, the State party 
failed to explain how the speech in question posed a threat to national security. On the basis 
of this failure by the State party (on whom the evidential burden rests), the Committee 
provided a ruling for the applicant giving protection for political speech. The Committee noted 
that the author had been subjected to the ‘ideological conversion system’35 which is 
discriminatory by nature and incompatible with Article 19.36 In another communication, the 
painting entitled "Rice Planting" was described (by an "expert witness" chosen by the national 
authorities) as representing the "socialist realism" and a "class struggle". According to the 
                                                          
28 Concluding observations on Hong Kong (CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/3) 29 April 2013 para 14; Concluding 
observations on Cameroon (CCPR/C/CMR/CO/4) 4 August 2010 para 25; Concluding observations South Korea 
(CCPR/C79/Add.114) 01 November 1999 para 9 and CCPR/C/KOR/CO/3 28 November 2006 para 18; Concluding 
observations on Tajikistan (CCPR/C/TJK/CO/2) para 22; Concluding observations on Uzbekistan (CCPR/CO/83/UZB) 
26 April 2005 para 21 
29 Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on Republic of Korea CCPR/C/79/Add.114, 1 
November 1999 at 9 
30 Yong Joo-Kang v. Republic of Korea, CCPR/C/78/D/878/1999 (Human Rights Committee, Communication, 2003-
07-15) para 2.1 
31 Tae Hoon Park v. Republic of Korea, CCPR/C/64/D/628/1995 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 1998-
10-20) para 2.2-2.3; Keun-Tae Kim v. Republic of Korea, CCPR/C/64/D/574/1994 (Human Rights Committee, 
Communication 1998-11-03) para 2.1; Hak-Chul Shin v. Republic of Korea, CCPR/C/80/D/926/2000 (Human Rights 
Committee, Communication 2004-03-16) para 3.1 
32 Yong Joo-Kang v. Republic of Korea, CCPR/C/78/D/878/1999 (Human Rights Committee, Communication, 2003-
07-15) para 2.2 
33 Tae Hoon Park v. Republic of Korea, CCPR/C/64/D/628/1995 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 1998-
10-20) para 4.1 
34 Yong Joo-Kang v. Republic of Korea, CCPR/C/78/D/878/1999 (Human Rights Committee, Communication, 2003-
07-15) para 2.3 
35 Korean law produced the "ideology conversion system" that was designed to change a prisoner's political 
opinion by the provision of favourable benefits and treatment in prison. If a prisoner failed in this system, then he 
is classified as communist, and commits "confident criminal" which was not clearly defined and appears from the 
context of the communication. This system was abolished in 1998. See in; Yong Joo-Kang v. Republic of Korea, 
Communication, CCPR/C/78/D/878/1999 
36 Yong Joo-Kang v. Republic of Korea, CCPR/C/78/D/878/1999 (Human Rights Committee, Communication, 2003-
07-15) para 7.2 
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expert witness, the farmers portrayed in this painting sought to incite the overthrow of the 
government of the Republic of Korea (because of its close relationship with the US and Japan) 
and to replace it with the ‘happy lives’ provided by North Korean doctrine.37 In another 
communication, the author was convicted for organizing illegal demonstrations and instigating 
acts of violence on several occasions.38 The State party claimed that the demonstration was 
illegal and during these demonstrations, participants "threw thousands of Molotov cocktails 
and rocks at police stations, and other government offices”.39 The Korean authorities explained 
that the speech and demonstration in question resulted in public disorder and presented a 
clear danger to the existence of the state and its free-democratic order, by means of 
propagating and encouraging North Korean ideology in order to make the Korean Peninsula 
communist by force.40 The state party even requested special treatment from the Committee 
due to Korea's security situation, without having officially declared a derogation from certain 
rights (such as Article 19), but the Committee was not prepared to approve such an undeclared 
derogation.41  
 
What is striking about this series of communications, is that the Committee found a violation 
of freedom of expression because the state party failed to specify the precise nature of the 
threat posed by the author's speech.42 The State parties failed to justify adequately their claim 
that the convictions were necessary for the protection of one of the legitimate purposes.43 For 
instance, the Committee noted that the state party had neither explained how the speech in 
question might benefit the enemy nor demonstrated how the speech created a threat to 
national security.44 It was unclear what was the nature and extent of any such risk.45 Moreover, 
the national courts neither addressed these issues, nor given any consideration of influence of 
the speech upon its audience (in order to determine whether there was actually a threat to 
public security).46 In light of these communications, the Committee noted in its Concluding 
Observations on the periodic report of the Republic of Korea that restrictions based on the 
                                                          
37 Hak-Chul Shin v. Republic of Korea, CCPR/C/80/D/926/2000 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2004-
03-16) para 3.3 
38 Keun-Tae Kim v. Republic of Korea, CCPR/C/64/D/574/1994 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 1998-
11-03) para 4.2 
39 Ibid para 4.2, 8.4 
40 Ibid para 8.4 
41 Tae Hoon Park v. Republic of Korea, CCPR/C/64/D/628/1995 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 1998-
10-20), para 10.4 
42 Yong Joo-Kang v. Republic of Korea, CCPR/C/78/D/878/1999 (Human Rights Committee, Communication, 2003-
07-15) para 7.2; Tae Hoon Park v. Republic of Korea, CCPR/C/64/D/628/1995 (Human Rights Committee, 
Communication 1998-10-20) para 10.3; Keun-Tae Kim v. Republic of Korea, CCPR/C/64/D/574/1994 (Human 
Rights Committee, Communication 1998-11-03) para 12.5; Hak-Chul Shin v. Republic of Korea, 
CCPR/C/80/D/926/2000 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2004-03-16) para 7.3; Jong-Kyu Sohn v. 
Republic of Korea, CCPR/C/54/D/518/1992 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 1994-7-7) para 10.4 
43 Ibid 
44 Keun-Tae Kim v. Republic of Korea, CCPR/C/64/D/574/1994 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 1998-
11-03) para 12.4 
45 Ibid 
46 Ibid 
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national security law did not meet the requirements of Article 19(3) due the absence of 
evidence demonstrating their necessity for reasons of national security.47  
 
Another series of communications, also regarding the rising trend mentioned by the Special 
Rapporteurs earlier in this chapter, concern the arbitrary detention and/or torture, even killing, 
of those who criticise administrative organs and governments in certain jurisdictions. This trend 
was most discernible amongst authoritative and repressive governments in African and Central 
Asia.48 State parties involved in such practices, when seeking to justify a limitation, commonly 
claimed a link between the expression in question and political violence. In fact, these state 
parties themselves committed violence or arbitrary detention against individuals. Such 
governments have not tolerated the expression of alternative political views, and individuals 
have been prosecuted for publishing articles denouncing corruption and reporting violence 
committed by the security forces.49 Indeed, prominent political figures have been arrested and 
imprisoned in order to prevent the expression of their political views;50 authors have been 
arrested and detained on the basis of membership of and activities for a political party opposing 
the governing party (in a one-party system);51 and books advocating a new political party and 
seeking to introduce multi-party democracy, have been banned and their circulation 
prohibited.52 In each of these cases, violations of Article 19 were found by the Committee.  
By way of another example, the Committee decided that silencing and suppressing 
encouragement of multi-political democracy, democratic principles and human rights cannot 
be a legitimate objective, even in order to protect national unity.53 Arbitrary arrest, torture and 
threats to life of authors in order to silence unwanted expression can never be a legitimate 
restriction on the exercise of freedom of expression, and such restrictions clearly do not meet 
the necessity test.54 The Committee found these limitations to be disproportionate to the value 
that the restriction aimed to protect, and strongly condemned such practices.55 It can thus be 
argued that the Committee has encouraged the promotion of freedom of expression. 
                                                          
47 Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on Republic of Korea, CCPR/C/KOR/CO/3, 28 
November 2006 at 18 
48 There are a number of complaints from Cameroon, Senegal, Guinea and Algeria, Libya and from Central Asian 
countries such as Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. These countries have a similar political atmosphere in 
terms of having a one-party system. 
49 Njaru v. Cameroon, CCPR/C/89/D/1353/2005; (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2007-03-19) para 6.4 
50 Umarov v. Uzbekistan, CCPR/C/100/D/1449/2006 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2010-10-19) para 
8.8 
51 Miha v. Equatorial Guinea, CCPR/C/51/D/414/1990 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 1994-7-10) para 
6.8  
52 Mukong v. Cameroon, CCPRC/51/D/458/1991 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2007-10-26) para 2.1  
53 Ibid para 9.7 
54 Njaru v. Cameroon, CCPR/C/89/D/1353/2005; (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2007-03-19) para 6.4; 
Mukong v. Cameroon, CCPRC/51/D/458/1991 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2007-10-26) para 9.7-
8; M.T. v. Uzbekistan CCPR/C/114/D/2234/2013 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2012-12-18) para 2.1-
3; Al-Rabassi v. Libya, CCPR/C/111/D/1860/2009 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2008-12-16) para 
2.1-3 
55 Njaru v. Cameroon, CCPR/C/89/D/1353/2005 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2007-03-19) para 6.4 
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In another case, Kone v. Senegal, the state party did attempt to explain the link between the 
impugned expression and political violence. Indeed, precisely because the espousal of violence 
was much more clearly explained by the state party, but the author failed to explain how his 
expressive political activities did not pursue violent causes. The Committee treated this case 
differently from those discussed above. In Kone v. Senegal, the state party justified the lengthy 
pre-trial detention, which restricted the author's political activities (namely, his membership of 
Marxist and Maoist revolutionary groups which the government maintained aimed to 
overthrow several governments in Western Africa including that in Senegal).56 The evidence 
showed that the author had visited neighbouring countries to meet both members of this 
‘revolutionary network’ and foreign governmental officials.57 He had also previously 
participated in an unsuccessful coup attempt in Gambia and in destabilising the government in 
Guinea.58 He was arrested and questioned about violent incidents during the general election 
in Senegal in 1988.59 The author was detained again, suspected of sympathizing with the 
Movement of Casamance's Democratic Forces, which was considered to be a separatist 
organisation and which was in violent conflict with government forces.60 The Committee noted 
that the author was detained and arrested on the basis of his expressive activities supporting 
the Movement of Casamance's Democratic Forces,61 but found no violation of his freedom of 
speech because this was tantamount to showing support for a violent separatist organisation. 
Such speech, the Committee held that such speech does not fall under the scope of protected 
speech under Article 19.  
Similarly, in a series of communications from Belarus, the Committee distinguished intimidation 
and coercion from persuading voters to boycott an election.62 Expression that encourages the 
boycott of an election without intimidation and coercion on voters falls under the protection 
of freedom of expression.63 However, speech that advocates violence or uses intimidation or 
coercion does not fall under the right to freedom of expression. The Committee did not, 
therefore, find a violation of Article 19. These examples demonstrate that if a state party 
adequately explains and justifies its restrictions on expression by establishing a clear link 
between expression and political violence, then such expression will not be protected under 
Article 19.   
However, as noted above, there have also been a number of communications where the 
Committee approved restrictions on expression (or at least, found no violation of Article 19) 
because of insufficient information provided by the authors. In a series of communications 
                                                          
56 Kone v. Senegal, CCPR/C/52/D/386/1989 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 1994-10-5) para 6.8 
57 Ibid 
58 Ibid 
59 Ibid para 7.5 
60 Ibid para 7.7 
61 Ibid para 8.5 
62 Leonid Svetik v. Belarus, CCPR/C/81/D/927/2000 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2004-07-08) para 
7.3; Shchetko v. Belarus, CCPR/C/87/D/1009/2001 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2006-7-8) para 7.4 
63 Leonid Svetik v. Belarus, CCPR/C/81/D/927/2000 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2004-07-08) para 
8; Shchetko v. Belarus, CCPR/C/87/D/1009/2001 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2006-7-8) para 7.4 
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against Algeria, for example, the authors did not provide sufficient information for the 
Committee to conclude there was a violation of Article 19.64 In these communications, the 
authors were the founders and leaders of the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut 
(FIS)). This was a legal political party, and the authors organized a protest and general strike 
with the support of all other opposition parties against a new electoral law introduced by the 
government.65 After a few days, they ended the protest and strike, and the opposition parties 
and the government agreed to revise the electoral law in the near future.66 Yet, the government 
cleared protesters from the squares by means of the Algerian army. Thereafter, the authors 
were convicted for “jeopardizing State security and the smooth operation of the national 
economy”.67 The state party claimed that the authors called for mass violence and attempted 
uprising to establish theocratic regime by violent means.68 Yet, the authors claimed that they 
were charged for purely political reasons and that their speech had been deemed subversive 
by the military, not by the civil legal authorities. They claimed that a military tribunal bringing 
charges clearly aimed to eliminate the president of the main opposition party from the Algerian 
political arena.69 Additionally, the Committee noted in its Concluding Observations that the 
Algerian authorities systematically restricted political activities of opposition groups.70 Yet, in 
the communications of Benhadj, and Abbassi, the Committee stated that there was insufficient 
information to find a violation of Article 19.71 The Committee recalled that in a democratic 
society, citizens are free to seek information concerning how to replace political system or 
governing parties and to criticise their government openly and publicly with no fear of 
retaliation and repression by their government; yet such information or criticism might be 
subject to restrictions set forth by 19(3).72 Insufficient information submitted by authors 
creates a significant challenge for the Committee and its work in scrutinizing restrictions on 
political expression.   
                                                          
64 Ali Benhadj v. Algeria, CCPR/C/90/D/1173/2003 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2007-07-20) para 
8.10; Salim Abbassi v. Algeria, CCPR/C/89/D/1172/2003 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2007-03-28) 
para 8.8 
65 Ali Benhadj v. Algeria, CCPR/C/90/D/1173/2003 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2007-07-20) para 
2.2; Salim Abbassi v. Algeria, CCPR/C/89/D/1172/2003 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2007-03-28) 
para 2.2 
66 Ibid 
67 Ibid 
68 Ali Benhadj v. Algeria, CCPR/C/90/D/1173/2003 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2007-07-20) para 
4.1; Salim Abbassi v. Algeria, CCPR/C/89/D/1172/2003 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2007-03-28) 
para 4.2 
69 Ali Benhadj v. Algeria, CCPR/C/90/D/1173/2003 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2007-07-20) para 
3.2; Salim Abbassi v. Algeria, CCPR/C/89/D/1172/2003 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2007-03-28) 
para 3.2 
70 Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observation 
of the Human Rights Committee, Algeria (CCPR/C/79/Add.95) 18 August 1998 at 17 
71 Ali Benhadj v. Algeria, CCPR/C/90/D/1173/2003 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2007-07-20) para 
8.10; Salim Abbassi v. Algeria, CCPR/C/89/D/1172/2003 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2007-03-28) 
para 8.8 
72 Salim Abbassi v. Algeria, CCPR/C/89/D/1172/2003 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2007-03-28) para 
8.8 
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Similarly, the Committee was satisfied to declare the communications of M.N; Kulov; and Al-
Rabassi inadmissible due to very general (and thus insufficient) information provided by the 
authors.73 In this case, the first president of the Socialist Party of Tajikistan (SPT) was allegedly 
murdered in a ‘terrorist attack’, and others who assumed the presidency of the party were also 
persecuted and oppressed by the regime.74 The authors claimed that their right to hold 
opinions had been violated by the state party by means of discrimination on the grounds of 
political opinion and by not providing protection against violent acts.75 The state party did not 
deny that a number of violent attacks had been committed against the members of the party, 
but the state party claimed it was not the State party who had committed the attacks.76 Yet, 
the Committee was unable to conclude that the authors had sufficiently substantiated these 
claims because the information they provided in support of their claims was very general.77  
 
Similar outcomes occurred in two further cases – in both Kulov v. Kyrgyzstan and Al-Rabassi v. 
Libya, the communications were rejected on the basis that author had provided insufficient 
evidence. In the first case, the founder of the Ar-Namis political party was subjected to 
persecution for having publicly criticized presidential policy and propounding an alternative 
policy for the country.78 The author claimed that he was arrested, charged and sentenced for 
political reasons in order to prevent him from participating in the forthcoming presidential 
election.79 In the second communication, the author was held in incommunicado detention due 
to his e-mail to a newspaper for assistance to publish a book criticising the political leadership 
of Libya.80 Al-Rabassi attached limited information to the file which did not allow the Committee 
to conclude that his arrest and subsequent conviction were linked to the message he sent to 
the newspaper.81 In the third communication, Kulov failed to provide ‘any further information’ 
to insufficient substantiate admissibility.82 
 
In the communications of M.N; Kulov; and Al-Rabassi, there was no indication by the state 
parties that the expression in question was connected to violence or advocated the use of force 
to implement their political aims. Despite the failure of the state parties to provide such 
information, the Committee declared these communications inadmissible. It can, however, be 
                                                          
73 M.N at all v. Tajikistan, CCPR/C/89/D/1500/2006 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2012-10-29) para 
6.5; Kulov v. Kyrgyzstan, CCPR/C/99/D/1369/2005 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2010-07-26) para 
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162 
 
argued that declaring these complaints inadmissible encourages these states to undermine the 
protection and promotion of the right to freedom of expression. While failing to provide 
compelling evidence of the alleged violation may sometimes justify their complaint being 
deemed inadmissible, when insufficient information is provided by State parties, the rejection 
of these communications can lead the international human rights system to neglect serious 
violations of freedom of expression. The resulting absence of any strong rejection or criticism 
in international human rights jurisprudence allows for the possibility that sedition (and similar) 
laws will remain unchallenged in many countries.  
 
6.2.2) Incitement to Hatred or Violence/Racial Violence:  
Consideration of the Committee's response to 'incitement to hatred or violence' must be kept 
in mind that there is a coherence between Articles 19 and 20.83 Article 20 does not set forth an 
individual right but rather mandates states to restrain the exercise of freedom of expression 
that advocates ‘national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, 
hostility or violence.’ McGonagle has stated that Article 20 can essentially be regarded as a 
fourth paragraph of Article 19 and the two must be understood as being closely intertwined.84 
This stance was also approved by the Committee in the communication of Ross v. Canada. Here, 
the Committee emphasized that restrictions imposed in light of Article 20 must also be 
permissible under Article 19.85 The directive aspect of Article 20 is not interpreted by States in 
ways that might fundamentally undermine the protections of Article 19. In this regard, the 
Rabat Plan of Action (2012) highlighted that national ‘legislation that prohibits incitement to 
hatred uses variable terminology and is often inconsistent with Article 20 of the ICCPR.’86 This 
document importantly cautioned that ‘the broader the definition of incitement to hatred in 
domestic legislation, the more likely it is to open the door for arbitrary application of laws.’87  
Also relevant is Article 488 of the CERD which aims to prevent racial violence, and mandates the 
penalization of "(1) dissemination of ideas based upon racial superiority or hatred; (2) 
                                                          
83 Article 20. 1. “Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law. 2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious 
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law." 
84 Karl Josef Partsch, “Freedom of Conscience and Expression, and Political Freedoms”, in Louis Henkin, 
Ed., The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1981) 227. see also, Agnes Callamard, Article 19: Expert Meeting on the Links Between article 19 
and 20 of the ICCPR: Freedom of Expression and Advocacy of Religious Hatred that Constitutes Incitement to 
Discrimination, Hostility or Violence (UN HCHR, Geneva, October 2-3, 2008) 9  
85 Ross v. Canada, Communication, CCPR/C/70/D/736/1997, 18 October 2000 at 10.6. See also Manfred Nowak, 
The UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (2005, Engel, Germany) 468; see also, Ian Cram, Terror and War on 
Dissent: Freedom of Expression in the age of Al Qaeda (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009) 37 
86 Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence: ‘Conclusions and recommendations emanating from the four 
regional expert workshops organised by OHCHR, in 2011, and adopted by experts in Rabat, Morocco on 5 October 
2012’, para 15 
87 Rabat Plan of Action, October 2012, para 15 
88 The International Convention on Elimination of All Forms Racial Discrimination Article 4: “States Parties condemn 
all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of 
persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in 
any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or 
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incitement to racial hatred; (3) acts of violence against any race or group of persons of another 
colour or ethnic origin; and (4) incitement to such acts."89 Any national, racial or religious hatred 
that constitutes incitement to violence is prohibited.90 Unlike the inter-relationship between 
Articles 19 and 20 ICCPR, however, less attention has been focused on the coherence between 
Article 4 of CERD and the ICCPR.91 
The former Special Rapporteur, Abid Hussain, has noted that physical or psychological harm 
can result from hate speech; this is particularly true where such speech involves incitement to 
violence, provoking hostility between different cultural, racial and religious groups, and 
endorsing stereotypes.92 There have been a number of communications brought to the 
Committee regarding purported discriminatory, hateful or violent speech against Jewish, 
Muslim or Roma groups.  Here, such expression was deemed to be a possible cause of political 
violence against targeted groups – contributing to and fomenting a will or desire to eliminate 
or oppress them. 
The link between discriminatory or hateful speech and possible violent acts has been more 
easily established where expression has sought to stimulate and reinvigorate (in the present) 
pre-existing ideologies which used violence against particular groups (in the past). In particular, 
the CERD Committee has considered expressive support for anti-Semitism, for figures and 
symbols of Nazism, and denial of the Holocaust to be incitement to racial hatred or violence.93 
For instance, in a communication submitted by the Jewish Community in Oslo, the author 
complained about the inability of national law to protect persons against dissemination of racial 
discrimination, hatred, and violence.94 The complaint originated after the organiser of a far-
right march made a speech stating that: his "people and country are being plundered and 
destroyed by Jews, who suck our country empty of wealth and replace it with immoral and un-
                                                          
acts of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention, inter alia: (a) Shall 
declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement 
to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons 
of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the 
financing thereof; (b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all other propaganda 
activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such organizations 
or activities as an offence punishable by law; (c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national 
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89 General Recommendation 15 on article 4 of CERD; see also in The Jewish community of Oslo v. Norway, 
CERD/C/67/D/30/2003 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2005-8-15) para 3.7; TBB-Turkish Union in 
Berlin v. Germany, CERD/C/82/D/48/2010; (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2013-2-26) para 4.4 
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92 Report of the Special Rapporteur Mr. Abid Hussain on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression, (submitted in accordance with Commission resolution 2001/47) (E/CN.4/2002/75) 30 
January 2002 para 63 
93 The Jewish community of Oslo v. Norway, CERD/C/67/D/30/2003 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 
2005-8-15); Ross v. Canada, CCPR/C/70/D/736/1997; (Human Rights Committee, Communication 2000-10-18); 
Faurisson v. France, CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 1996-11-08) 
94 The Jewish community of Oslo v. Norway, CERD/C/67/D/30/2003 (Human Rights Committee, Communication 
2005-8-15) para 3.2 
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Norwegian thoughts."95 In his speech, he referred to Rudolf Hess and Adolf Hitler and their 
principles, and emphasised that his group will follow their principles and fight for their beliefs.96 
The CERD Committee noted that showing respect to Hitler and his principles must be 
considered as incitement to racial discrimination, if not to violence.97 The speech and the march 
in question had a serious effect on those who survived the concentration camps during the war 
and they had received threats on their life.98 These statements were manifestly offensive and 
not protected by Article 19.99 The effects of – and dangers presented by – the dissemination of 
ideas of racial superiority, and of incitement to racial hatred and violence, were especially 
pronounced in Norway where violent Nazi groups exist.100 The Committee approved the 
author's claim that the march and speech in question were in the nature and roots of Nazi 
rhetoric, and that the State had failed to provide protection against such dissemination. The 
case thus disclosed a violation of Article 4 of ICERD.101 
A similar line of reasoning – where weight was placed on the existence of violent neo-Nazi 
groups, and the corresponding strength of Nazi ideology, in the country as a means of assessing 
the imminence of the threat presented – was followed by the Human Rights Committee in the 
well-known case of Faurisson v France. In this case, the author gave an interview to a monthly 
journal and was convicted and fined on the basis of having exclaimed that there were "no 
homicidal gas chambers for the extermination of Jews in Nazi concentration camps,"102 that "... 
the myth of the gas chambers is a dishonest fabrication ...",103 and for asserting that the 
Nuremberg Tribunals were fallible. The Committee took the full context of speech into 
consideration and noted that, by its very nature, it encouraged and raised anti-Semitic feelings, 
ultimately finding that France had not violated Article 19 in prosecuting Mr Faurisson under the 
1990 Gayssot Act.104  
In the previously mentioned case of Ross v Canada, the Human Rights Committee also found 
that penalizing speakers for holocaust denial did not violate Article 19 of the Covenant. The 
claimant was the author of a number of books (entitled, 'Web of Deceit', 'The Real Holocaust', 
'Spectre of Power and Christianity vs. Judeo Christianity'). He was a teacher who was placed on 
leave of absence without pay for a period of eighteen months and demoted to a non-teaching 
position due to his books.105 The state party claimed that these books clearly were not the 
presentation of scholarly research; they contained attacks on "the truthfulness, integrity, 
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dignity and motives of Jewish persons" and contributed to the creation of a "poisoned 
environment" for Jewish students in the school.106 The Human Rights Committee was satisfied 
that there was a causal link between the expression and the poisoned environment. The 
Committee concluded that the measures against the author taken by the state party were 
necessary to protect the Jewish children’s right to have a school system free from bias, 
prejudice and intolerance.107  
 
In these cases, the restrictions on speech were upheld because it was accepted, on the 
evidence, that the speech was likely to cause national, racial or religious hatred (constituting 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence). In spite of this, other examples of expression 
in similar contexts were not regarded in the same way. It can at least be argued that while the 
Treaty bodies have been willing to accept a link between anti-Semitic speech and racial violence 
after the horrific experience of Nazi Germany, treating individuals of the Jewish community as 
potential victims of such expression, a different approach has been taken in relation to anti-
Muslim expression. In two notable Danish cases (Andersen v. Denmark and A.W.P v. Denmark), 
anti-Muslim expression did not provide victim status for the authors of the complaints. The 
petitioners claimed that the State party had failed to provide an effective remedy against anti-
Muslim speech. In Andersen, a member of the Danish parliament (the leader of the Danish 
People’s Party (DPP)) compared "the Muslim headscarves with the Nazi symbol of the 
swastika".108 The author claimed that this statement, aired on National Danish Television, not 
only insulted and hurt her, but also heightened the risk of her being attacked.109 The A.W.P. 
case concerned similarly worded statements, but in this case, published them in local 
newspapers. The applicants in both cases claimed that there was evidence proving the risk of 
such attacks, and highlighted a study which showed that several minority groups (namely, 
people from Turkey, Lebanon and Somalia living in Denmark) had experienced racist attacks in 
the streets.110 However, the State party argued the authors’ claims should fail. In Andersen, the 
State argued the author had not shown that any attacks had been committed verbally or 
physically at any point during the two years following the broadcast of the statement.111 
Moreover, in the A.W.P case, since the author was a Dane (rather than a member of one of the 
groups examined in the study), the State party argued that the study was irrelevant.112 The 
Committee in each case found that the authors had failed to establish either that the impugned 
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statements had had specific consequences for them, or that the specific consequences of the 
statements were imminent and would personally affect them.113  
 
When contrasted with the cases involving holocaust denial (where it was assumed that such 
speech caused a danger of violence), it is suggested that anti-Muslim or islamophobic speech 
was not regarded in the same way resulting in a denial of victim status. In another example, 
this time involving a case before the CERD Committee, the State’s failure to prosecute the 
author of an anti-Roma leaflet was found not to be in violation of Article 4 ICERD. Here, the 
racist and xenophobic nature of leaflet was similarly held not to have directly and personally 
affected the author of the complaint because the leaflet instead narrowly targeted two named 
individuals as personal vendetta (rather than being directed against the Roma community as a 
whole).114  While the CERD Committee reminded the State party of its obligations under Articles 
4 and 6 of the Convention to prosecute all statements which attempt to justify or promote 
racial hatred and discrimination in any form, this was held not to be such a case on its facts.115  
 
In this regard, it is worth emphasizing that, in order to be a 'victim', authors must convince the 
Committee that they belong to a class or group of persons who might in the future be adversely 
affected by the conduct (expression) in question.116 The Committee has noted that anyone 
claiming to be victim of a violation according to Article 19 and 20 of the ICCPR or Article 4 of 
ICERD, must clearly demonstrate that they are a victim.117 In freedom of expression cases, this 
generally means that the specific consequences of speech must be shown to affect the author 
directly or personally as a victim.118 Yet if failing to successfully make this argument the 
Committee declares a number of communications inadmissible.119 Importantly, as the above 
discussion of the cases involving incitement to hatred reveals, it is at least possible to argue 
that there has been a degree of inconsistency in the way in which this test has been applied 
across different groups. 
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6.2.3) Expressions that Advocate Terrorism 
As Chapter 2 argued, the emergence of ‘terrorism’ discourse, and the post 9/11 ‘War on Terror’, 
have resulted in multifaceted responses at both regional and international levels.120 It is 
important for this thesis, the Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005) encourages States to 
criminalize incitement to terrorism.121 As argued in the second chapter, human rights 
instruments (primarily, the European Convention of Human Rights, but also the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) and their case law on freedom of expression, have gone 
some way to moderating the worst excesses of older offences such as ‘sedition’ and ‘treason’. 
They have also encouraged States to amend their legislative framework accordingly. 
Nonetheless, as has been shown, there remains a significant risk of retrenchment – specifically, 
that modern-day offences relating to ‘terroristic speech’ have broadly reinvented these age-
old offences, and thus have facilitated arbitrary interferences with speech on essentially 
political grounds. 
 
It is therefore important in this chapter to consider the extent to which the Human Rights 
Committee has begun to address these concerns. However, it must be noted that there has so 
far been only one individual communication that clearly involves restrictions on ‘terroristic 
speech’. As such, the Committee has not been able to establish a comprehensive response 
which establishes the parameters for speech that ought legitimately to be protected. 
Consequently, the Committee’s jurisprudence does not provide much guidance for member 
States in terms of balancing freedom of expression with national security and public order 
issues. That said, on a number of occasions the Committee has highlighted the negative 
influence of anti-terror legislation in its Concluding Observations. A number of examples are 
worth highlighting. 
 
In relation to Russia, the Committee was critical of a Federal counter-terrorism law which 
consists of provisions that provided restrictive ground for a wide range of infringements on 
fundamental rights.122 Similarly, the Committee’s Concluding Observations on both Turkey and 
the United Kingdom highlighted how anti-terrorism laws have had far-reaching effects on the 
Conventional rights.123 In particular, as a result of the implementation of the Turkish Anti-
Terrorism Law, human rights defenders, lawyers, and journalists have been convicted for 
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participating in democratic debate and exercising their right to freedom of expression.124 There 
are numerous articles in the TMK and TPC with broad and vague definitions of ‘terrorism’, 
‘organised crime’, and ‘propaganda’ which result in broad restrictions on the right to freedom 
of expression.125 The Committee highlighted how US counter-terrorism measures have 
provided broad discretionary powers for the authorities in relation to political dissent (where 
there is deemed to be some, even minimal or speculative, connection to ‘terrorism’).126 The 
Committee has emphasized that State parties should be aware of the abuse of anti-terror 
provisions to oppress political or critical expressions, which are irrelevant to ‘terrorism’.127  
 
The Committee’s General Comment 34 underscores similar concerns: 
“States parties should ensure that counter-terrorism measures are compatible with 
paragraph 3. Such offences as “encouragement of terrorism” and “extremist activity” as 
well as offences of “praising”, “glorifying”, or “justifying” terrorism, should be clearly 
defined to ensure that they do not lead to unnecessary or disproportionate interference 
with freedom of expression.”128 
 
The Committee has also noted – as was argued in Chapter 2 – that the vagueness of the 
definition of ‘terrorism’ is itself one of the most problematic factors underlying these far-
reaching restrictions on freedom of expression.129 Indeed, observing the legitimacy, necessity 
and proportionality of anti-terrorism measures is relatively difficult due to the absence of a 
universally accepted, comprehensive and authoritative definition of terrorism.130 In this sense, 
international law has failed to bring clarity and predictability to the protection of free speech, 
and governments are able to manipulate the definition of ‘terrorism’ to use for own 
interests.131 Thus, as Kent Roach argues, states can easily restrict the right to freedom of 
expression by claiming that they are acting in the interests of national security, public order 
and safety.132  
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However, on one occasion only, the Committee did consider, what might be characterized as 
‘terroristic speech’. This case consists of ‘keeping of books, magazines and leaflets’ that were 
alleged to promote a ‘terrorist organisation’ (Hizb ut-Tahrir) and to propagate religious 
fundamentalism and extremism.133 The Committee held that legal restrictions on distributing 
materials that contain Hizb ut Tahrir's ideology were compatible with Article 19 and that there 
had been no violation of freedom of expression.134 The Committee relied on the experts’ report 
(on the books, magazines, leaflets and other prohibited literature) which had been requested 
by the national courts. This report stated that the author sold these materials and used them 
for teaching to his students as anti-constitutional activities to demolish order in Uzbekistan and 
to disseminate ideas, which is counter to Uzbek law.135 The report also added that these 
materials called for the establishment of an Islamic state based on religious fundamentalism by 
using ideological struggle, and that “the entire Islamic world must become a single community; 
all Muslims must be as one body and one spirit, regardless of their ethnic group, nationality or 
race. Beyond obstacles and artificial borders, all States must join together in a single ‘Islamic 
State’.136 The report concluded that the content of the materials was characteristic of religious 
fundamentalism and extremism.137 The Committee noted that the national courts had 
convicted the author for disseminating the ideology of Hizb ut-Tahrir,138 which was deemed to 
be a threat to national security and the rights of others by using violence to overthrow the 
constitutional order.139 The Committee was persuaded that the State party had established a 
direct link between expression and ‘terrorism’.  
 
In conclusion, while the Committee has certainly tried in its Concluding Observations and 
General Comment 34 to discourage States from criminalising a wide range of expression 
through anti-terrorism laws, it is difficult to argue that the Committee has achieved much clarity 
in this regard through its jurisprudence. Undoubtedly, there will be further communications 
involving 'terroristic speech'. But until further guidance and the strong international consensus 
on ‘terrorism’ will enable States to use anti-terrorism laws to perpetuate sedition-like offences, 
and domestic courts are left with a relatively weak jurisprudential answer to such measures. A 
universally (or at least widely) accepted definition of ‘terrorism’ would be helpful in providing 
yardstick against which measures against terrorism could be monitored.140 
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6.3) The Elements Required by the Committee in Terms of ‘Terroristic Speech’ 
 
In criminal law it is crucial to define the precise elements of an offence. This is to prevent law 
enforcements bodies from using vagueness in the law to prohibit a multitude of harmless acts 
and words and thereby impose overly-broad prohibitions on freedom of expression. For that 
reason, it is important to identify the elements that the Committee takes into consideration 
while examining interferences with freedom of speech imposed by national authorities. The 
Committee examines communications in the light of all the information provided by the state 
party and the authors.141 Perhaps unsurprisingly the Committee (as a supra-national, quasi-
judicial body) is highly dependent on this information, and its conclusions often rely solely on 
the information, judgments or explanations provided by State parties142 and authors.143 Indeed, 
in some cases, the Committee has simply repeated the contracting State’s argument, and relied 
on the investigation or evaluation conducted by the national authorities.144 The Committee has 
pointed out that if a State party fails to specify the precise nature of the threat allegedly posed 
by the author’s expression, the restriction on the expression will not be regarded as compatible 
with Article 19.145 By the same token, in some communications, the Committee has noted that 
the authors have not provided sufficient concrete information about the alleged violation.146 
Consequently, the Committee declares such communications inadmissible or finds no violation 
of freedom of expression due to insufficient information. For instance, in the communication 
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of Andersen, the author failed to demonstrate that she was a victim for the purposes of the 
Covenant.147 
 
The Committee has not developed a rigorously precise methodological approach to matters of 
interferences with freedom of expression. This implies that the Committee has not been 
prescriptive about what aspects of expression must be taken into account.148 In this regard the 
Rabat Plan of Action (RPA) is a milestone for the understanding and implementation of 
international law on freedom of expression and incitement to hatred.149 This might be 
considered as a type of international soft law, even though the text is a product of 
workshops.150 As Parmar argues, the (RPA) is a ‘critical turning point’, providing the clearest 
guidance for states to criminalise expression (advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred 
that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence).151 One of the most striking 
features of the RPA is to suggest a high threshold for defining restrictions on freedom of 
expression (specifically on incitement to hatred) by proposing a six-part threshold test of: 
context, speaker, intent, content and form- extent of the speech act, and likelihood, including 
imminence.152 This six-part threshold test is a major breakthrough which is especially helpful 
for prosecutors, lawyers and, in particular for judges who make the judgment.153 This test 
would be applied on ‘terroristic speech’ to be identified by the Committee where there is a lack 
of methodological rigour on elements of the offence of ‘terroristic speech’. Again, creating such 
a test aims to allow states parties to avoid vague and broad prohibitions on incitement, and to 
provide a consistent and less restrictive interpretation of ‘incitement’.154 Here, the six-part 
threshold test is a critical proposition for the Committee itself to overcome its lack of 
methodological rigour and to be consistent in examining ‘terroristic speech’. For that reason, 
in this part, the focus firstly is given to the elements which the Committee took into 
consideration and secondly to the six-part threshold test proposed by the RPA.  
 
6.3.1) Actus Reus 
The elements of the offences often appear to be accepted by the Committee, although, it is 
not the role of the Committee to review domestic legislation ‘in abstracto’. In the case of A.S. v 
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Russia (which the Committee declared inadmissible), the national authorities noted that the 
expression in question did not have the elements of the offence of incitement to hatred or 
enmity. The actus reus of this offence involved a call to others, defined as “an active influence 
upon mind and will of people with the aim of encouraging them to commit violent acts of 
seizure of power, retention of power or change of the constitutional system, etc.”.155 Similarly, 
the Committee gave a high level of importance to the report and evidence provided by the 
national authorities as to whether restriction was a violation of article 19. For instance, Uzbek 
authorities prepared a report which identified the aim and motivation of the organisation of 
Hizb ut-Tahrir.156 This organisation is an extremist religious organisation and was banned. 
Written materials related to this organisation’s ideology were seized in the applicant’s house, 
he was convicted on account of them.157 The Committee decided based on the argument in the 
report that a perceived threat to national security (violent overthrow of the constitutional 
order) and to the rights of others had arisen.158 
6.3.1.1) Evaluation of Content & Context of Expression 
In the case of Tae Hoon Park v Republic of Korea, the Committee disapproved the contextual 
evaluation of the expression made by the State party. The author had been convicted on the 
basis of the government’s claim that Korea had a very sensitive security situation (evidenced 
also by the National Security Law which prioritised security over certain rights of individuals).159 
The Committee rejected the Government’s claim, viewing its assessment of the context as one 
that unjustly prioritised the application of its national law over its obligations under the 
Covenant.160  
The Committee pays close attention to contextual-based evaluation, which may serve instead 
to reinforce the State’s argument in favour of the restriction. This was so in the Faurisson case 
in which the Committee considered the arguments in favour of restricting the anti-Semitic 
statements in their full context. Their evaluation of this context was that the raising or 
strengthening of anti-Semitic feelings was not merely a remote, but rather a real possibility.161 
Interference with such expression thus served to ensure the right of the Jewish community to 
live free from fear and free from an atmosphere of anti-Semitism.162 Likewise, in Salim Abbassi 
v. Algeria, contextual evidence adduced by the State party was regarded as persuasive factor 
by the Committee, justifying the interference with the author’s rights. The state party claimed 
that the author had been enjoying all his rights and had been resident abroad since the relevant 
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time. In this communication, the Committee did not consider the author’s claims as refuting 
the state party’s claims. 163 In another case, the author drew attention to the timing the leaders’ 
(of an opposition group) arrests and the fact that he was arrested at around same time.164 The 
Committee considered the author’s explanation as substantive information, proving that his 
arrest and conviction directly resulted from his political views.165  
The Committee did not evaluate the content of expression in any great detail. Indeed, there 
are a very few cases where the Committee did thoroughly evaluate the content of expression, 
as in the case of Mavlonov v Uzbekistan. Here the Committee noted that author’s published 
article contained educational and other materials for Tajik students and young persons, and 
reported there were particular difficulties facing the continued provision of education to Tajik 
youth in their own language, including shortages of Tajik-language textbooks, low wages for 
teachers and the forced opening of Uzbek-language classes in some Tajik schools.166 In another 
communication, the Committee considered the state party’s evaluation of content of 
expression (a leaflet) which was specifically related to the representatives of the Roma 
community rather than its members.167 After evaluation of content of this leaflet, it is 
understood that two persons wrote it who wished to harm only specific persons. Thus the 
leaflet did not aim to stir up conflict between State and Roma community.168 
The Rabat Plan of Action proposes ‘context’ and ‘content’ of speech to be critical elements of 
incitement and focus of the court’s deliberations. Ideally, any analysis of the context of speech 
should rely on the social and political context prevalent at the time the speech was made and 
disseminated.169 Assessing the social and political spectrum means considering the relative 
peace and prosperity of the area, and having a level of indicating conflict and the potential for 
the occurrence of discrimination, hostility or violence occurring.170 This includes ‘existence of 
conflicts’, ‘existence and history of institutionalised discrimination’, ‘history of clashes and 
conflicts’, ‘the legal framework’ and ‘the media landscape’.171 The RPA evaluates the speaker 
as a separate element. However, as the ECtHR considers ‘the speaker’ as a factor under the 
element of context. Thus, the speaker test implies here the identity of the speaker or originator 
of the communication, particularly their position or status in society and their standing or 
influence. Particular matters should be considered such as “the official position of the speaker 
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– whether he/she was in a position of authority over the audience; the level of the speaker’s 
authority or influence over the audience and his/her charisma; whether the statement was 
made by a person in his/her official capacity, in particular if this person carries out particular 
functions”.172 ‘Content’ of speech might be analysed as ‘what was said’, ‘the form (such as 
artistic, academic, religious or statements of facts and value judgements), ‘the style’, ‘whether 
the expression contained direct calls for discrimination or violence’, ‘the nature of the 
arguments deployed or the balance struck between the arguments’.173 
 
6.3.1.2) Publicity 
The Committee does not prescribe its own threshold for publicity, rather using the State party’s 
evaluation of publicity, if a State party considers it. This was, for example, explained in the 
communication of A.S v. Russia where some exposure to the ‘general public’ (whether through 
speeches and presentations held in meetings, rallies and other public activities, or proclaiming 
extremist slogans during demonstrations, processions, pickets and etc.) was a requirement.174 
In this regard, the impugned expression did not meet with this ‘publicity’ threshold because 
the expression (the leaflet) which consisted of anti-Roma/racist views, was distributed in a 
place predominantly populated by the Roma.175 The leaflet was received by no other 
individuals; only by the Roma people who lived in this area.176 Here, the Committee relied on 
the national authorities claim that publicity cannot be limited to a few people who hear or see 
the expression in question, the number of people who hear or see that expression is also 
pertinent. If only Roma people saw this leaflet then, no harm could be committed. The leaflets 
in this communication had been written by a girl who wished to cause harm to two guys in 
particular.177 Thus, the application was declared inadmissible as the applicant did not qualify to 
be a victim since the content of the leaflets had not directly or personally affected him.178 
Publicity of speech under the RPA is considered as the ‘extent of the speech’ which includes 
the range of the speech, its public nature, magnitude and the size of its audience. The 
authorities may also examine the medium of communication by considering whether the 
message was disseminated through the press, audio-visual media, a piece of art or a book. The 
frequency, the amount and the extent of the communications, and size of audience are also 
crucial for analysis of ‘extent of speech’. This examines whether the speech was circulated 
within a limited circle or widely accessible to the general public.179 It is crucial to highlight here 
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that audio-visual media often have a much more immediate and powerful effect on individuals 
than print media.180  
  
6.3.1.3) The Probability of Harm 
In the Committee’s jurisprudence, the element, ‘the probability of harm’ is not consistently 
considered by the Committee in each communication as it is not always required.181 However, 
information, justifications and explanations still play a key role in determining whether there is 
a link between expression and violent act. The Committee required sufficient explanation of 
how the expression in question created a threat to national security.182 For instance, the 
Committee drew specific attention to the encouraging of a boycott of an election, yet without 
intimidation or coercion. Call for boycott here falls under the protection of freedom of 
expression, whereas if the exhortation had imposed intimidation and coercion, then it would 
not be protected.183 In another instance, disseminating violent ideology (Nazism)184 or 
propagating extremism (Hizb ut-Tahrir)185 constituted a possible threat to national security.186 
Such ideologies were regarded as a sufficiently substantial reason for the Committee to 
establish the link. However, there are communications where the authors failed to provide 
sufficient information for the Committee to be convinced that the expression in question was 
likely cause acts of violence, or alternatively, was likely to lead to violent consequences for 
applicants as victims.187 Again, the Committee relies on evaluation of the probability of harm   
which was conducted by both parties.  
The Rabat Plan of Action proposes probability of harm as an element reflects some degree of 
risk. The courts have to determine that there was a reasonable probability that the speech 
would succeed in inciting actual action, and that such causation should be direct (the possibility 
of harm should be imminent).188 This risk can be identified on a case-by-case basis with 
consideration of such questions as; “was the speech understood by its audience to be a call to 
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acts of discrimination, violence or hostility?”, “was the speaker able to influence the 
audience?”, “did the audience have the means to resort to the advocated action, and commit 
acts of discrimination, violence or hostility?” and “had the targeted victim group suffered or 
recently been the target of discrimination, violence or hostility?”.189 There should not be any 
particular time limit because the imminence must be established on a case-by-case basis.190  
6.3.2) Mens Rea 
The Committee does not require the speaker's intention as an element in determining 
unprotected expression rather considering the State party’s evaluation of the intention of 
speaker. For instance, in the communication of A.S v. Russia, here only direct intent was 
prescribed, (the Russian law required direct intent for this offence) but it did not prescribe any 
incidental emotional manifestation of discontent or pursuit of other aims.191 For that reason, 
the leaflets were seen as being distributed with the aim of informing the Roma and not the 
general public about their content because they were distributed in the area predominantly 
populated by the Roma.192 Therefore, the actions were not intended to address non-Roman 
people and  did not invoke acts of violence against the Roma.193 Thus it can be argued that 
mens rea does not play a crucial role in determining whether the restriction is in compliance 
with freedom of expression under Article 19. 
The RPA clarifies the ‘intent’ of speaker by explaining that negligence and recklessness are not 
sufficient. It requires “advocacy” and “incitement” rather than mere distribution or 
circulation.194 For that reason, this ‘intent’ test requires activator impact and a relationship 
between the object and subject of the speech as well as the audience. However, it is a complex 
matter to prove the existence of intent, unless the speaker confesses or admits to it. Even then, 
his/her intent is always difficult to prove.195  The courts have the flexibility to make their own 
judgments whether the actions indisputably indicate a speaker’s intent to incite.196 For 
instance, the European Court determines ‘intent’ by considering of the case and its 
circumstances as a whole.197 
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6.4) Conclusion 
 
International human rights treaties have been constituted to protect individual rights from 
arbitrary State interference. Basic human rights were annihilated during World War II as seen 
in the horrific experience of Nazi Germany. These treaties are thus reactionary instruments, 
premised on the idea that atrocities of such a magnitude should never be allowed to recur. The 
Human Rights Committee has examined restrictions imposed on communist, National Socialist 
and anti-Semitic, fundamentalist, and dissenting/critical expression directed against 
democratic governments, military dictatorships and one-party state systems. There have, 
however, been a very limited number of individual communications dealing directly with 
‘terroristic speech’, and in the most directly germane case, the Committee approved the 
criminalisation of direct incitement to terrorism. 
That said, in its Concluding Observations, and indeed in General Comment 34, the Committee 
has been attentive to the dangers of counter-terrorism legislation, and the potential for states 
to unduly expand the category of ‘terroristic speech’ to include those they wish to restrict. 
Through such pronouncements, it can be surmised that the ongoing work of the Committee 
plays an important role in encouraging state parties to repeal sedition laws, or at least, to 
interpret them in compliance with Article 19. It is argued, however, that there is a crucial 
tension at the heart of the international human rights system. This tension derives from the 
fact that States themselves are at once the primary threat to, and the primary guarantor, of the 
same rights. Moreover, the state-centricity of the international system in the context of the 
‘War on Terror’ has given strength to UN Security Council Resolution 1624, which expressly 
mandates State parties to criminalise 'incitement to terrorism'. As Chapter 2 emphasized 
(drawing in particular on the work of Sarah Sorial), such laws have tended to reinvent sedition-
like offences under a new guise. 
Given that it is generally not the Committee’s role to review domestic legislation ‘in abstracto’ 
(unless, perhaps, a State is failing to meet its the General obligation to protect rights under the 
Covenant), relatively little can be gleaned from the Committee’s free speech jurisprudence 
about its view on the precise framing of inchoate offences relating to ‘terroristic speech’. 
Nowhere does the Committee prescribe a model offence, or elaborate on specific thresholds 
in relation to the probability or harm, the degree of imminence required, the requisite mens 
rea, or the degree to which a particular expression must first have gained widespread audience 
exposure. What can at least be ascertained from the case law is that the Committee places 
significant weight on the evaluation of the relevant context – and this can work either in favour 
of the State’s case for restricting speech, or in favour of the individual’s argument against State 
restriction. The RPA’s six-part threshold test is a promising development in the International 
Human Rights System, proposing an accurate methodology for prosecutors, lawyers and judges 
to use these considerations to determine unlawful incitement.  
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Furthermore, due to the Committee’s position as a supra-national, quasi-judicial body, it 
evidently attaches significant weight to the sufficiency of information or justification presented 
to it. The Committee is highly dependent on the parties’ evaluation of the facts and on any 
underlying evidence cited in support. Finally, the chapter alluded to the fact that the 
Committee’s admissibility decisions regarding victim status could arguably be said to work 
against certain groups where the general level of persecution (present or historical) has not 
been well-documented or proven. At the same time, the relative paucity of evidence in such 
admissibility decisions obviously makes it difficult to reach generalizable conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
The objective of this thesis was to critically analyse the case law of Turkey's Yargıtay (Court of 
Cassation) and Constitutional Court on 'terroristic speech' in the light of regional (the European 
Court of Human Rights), and international (Human Rights Committee and CERD) standards. Its 
overarching finding was that Turkey's contemporary legal response to 'terroristic speech', by 
criminalising certain forms of freedom of expression, resembles the now outmoded offence of 
'sedition'. In the past, sedition offences were used for tight controls on political dissent. 
Ironically, as noted at the outset of the thesis, this development (from ‘sedition’ to ‘terroristic 
speech’) has occurred at the behest of international human rights law and the positive 
obligations which it imposes on States (specifically here on Turkey). 
 
This thesis has identified an undeniable tension alongside this seamless thread, with both old 
(‘sedition’) and new (‘terroristic speech’) laws operating to criminalise those who express views 
at odds with the ideology of national unity and secularism. However, we discerned in Chapter 
4, a liberalising counter-narrative. Turkey's human rights commitments, especially those in 
accordance with the European Court's case law, have resulted in progressive developments in 
domestic free speech jurisprudence. Indeed, in the last two decades, and in light of the State’s 
obligations under ICCPR, ICERD, and the ECHR, Turkish legislature has passed a number of legal 
amendments on speech-related provisions. A number of progressive Constitutional 
amendments as well as amendments on TMK and TPC have been passed conferring greater 
protection on freedom of speech. The doctrinal principles that structure the reasoning of both 
the Strasbourg court and the UN Human Rights Committee have also been imported, to some 
degree, into Turkey's Constitutional Court and Yargıtay case law reasoning.  
 
Nonetheless, this sets up a further tension that has been identified throughout the thesis. 
States can, apparently without contradiction, ratify human rights treaties protecting speech, 
whilst at the same time relying on ‘anti-terror’ laws to impose far-reaching restrictions upon it. 
The tension arises, on one hand, human rights obligations push states to provide real and 
effective protection for the human rights, including of course the right to freedom of 
expression, on the other, terrorism pulls states to give effect to the positive obligation to 
protect life (in article 2 of the ECHR and article 6 of the ICCPR) – to adopt measures against 
expression related to terrorism, as part of the ‘war on terror’. International instruments such 
as the UN Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005), Article 5 of the 2005 Council of Europe 
Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, and the Council of the European Union Framework 
Decision on Combating Terrorism of November 28, 2008 have been behind the drive to impose 
sweeping restrictions (especially through indirect incitement) on freedom of expression, 
reflecting the widely-acknowledged preventive turn in criminal law. It also reflects the problem 
of state-centricity inherent in any scheme for protecting human rights. 
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The thesis also addressed the fact that while both political violence and terrorism have provided 
a considerable challenge to the hegemony of human rights discourse over the past half century 
or so, it is the latter of the two which, it was argued, had the more significant and detrimental 
impact by criminalising, or having the potential to criminalise (and thus inhibit) a far wider range 
of expression.  While both are hard to define with precision, this leaves unstable boundaries 
and unclear contours to freedom of expression. The term ‘terrorism’, as it is used today, is 
profoundly politically loaded and contentious in Chapter 2 that it implies deeply subjective and 
moralistic characterisations of the ‘enemy’ (so as to deprive them of legitimacy) rather than 
any neutral definition of a method. The process of defining speech as ‘terroristic’ – just as 
proscribing an organisation as ‘terrorist’ – is thus a political, rather than a judicial, process. This 
presents us with a further tension. The political construction of terrorism, and thus the political 
conferring of that epithet on ‘terroristic speech’ stands in direct conflict with the right of 
freedom of expression’s legal construction of and adjudication. They are in short 
incommensurable. Terrorism is binary – best reflected perhaps in the George Bush’s 
declaration that “you're either with us or against us in the fight against terror" – presenting 
violence as self-evidently illegitimate. Political violence on the other hand can more easily, and 
better, be viewed on a spectrum. The whole notion of terrorism entering into legal discourse 
and reasoning is inherently problematic. Judicial resolution of the lawfulness of any restriction 
on freedom of expression under the ECHR and before the ICCPR and increasingly in Turkey 
revolves around questions of balance and proportionality. That necessarily involves judges 
making assessments of gradations of harm and of benefit. It would also involve consideration 
of the various free speech rationales discussed in chapter 3, since each might provide differing 
weight for any restriction. That is obviated where a counter-terrorism justification is deployed, 
something articulated more starkly as follows, with a simple contrast. The multifaceted nature 
of ‘political violence’ offers a far more nuanced consideration of the gains and losses. The 
concept of ‘terrorism’ thus serves as a rhetorical device. It not only blurs the many distinctions 
that might properly be drawn between different types of ‘political violence’, but also shrouds 
them, falsely offering an organising criterion against which to measure restrictions on freedom 
of expression (and thus to structure argument). The end result, where restrictions are imposed 
on 'terroristic speech', is a clear deficit in the level of constitutional scrutiny given, in 
comparison to that afforded to other restrictions on speech, and on rights more generally. 
 
This move from political violence to terrorism, and the lack of clarity which that brought, is 
matched by the very marked shift in ideological backdrop. We can plot a clear change in how 
states articulate risks to security and integrity, from discrete ideological ‘-isms’ of the past such 
as ‘communism’ and ‘national socialism’ or 'anti-secularism' replaced by vaguer, but more 
comprehensive ‘-isms’ – ‘fundamentalism’, ‘radicalism’ and ‘extremism,’ all closely related to 
'terrorism'. In this regard, some specific forms and modes of expressions have been treated by 
states as a source of evil and as (almost) per se advocating recourse to violence in particular 
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periods, what Blasi referred to as different pathological perspectives1 referring to political 
violence such as rebellion, revolution; and recently to terrorism. Speakers who engage in 
expressive activity in relation to these ideological backdrops are then punished for what they 
say or believe simply because their views are regarded as unorthodox increasing the likelihood 
of harm. This ideological re-siting has led the reinvention, during the modern ‘human rights 
era’, of archaic offences such as sedition in the form of 'terroristic speech', leading us to this 
observation. Just at the time sedition was on the wane, unable to withstand the incoming tide 
of human rights norms and values, similar, and greater, restrictions on freedom of expression 
were being ushered in under the guise of the need to deal with the terrorist threat, founded 
on the new ideologies. 
 
Measures taken to confront the terrorist threat lack certainty in two linked ways. The first stems 
from the politically-laden construction of terrorism, (that we adverted to above). The second, 
which can be traced to the underlying failure to narrowly define the nature of the risk posed. 
This, in fact, emerges through the inability of the international community to agree upon a 
satisfactory and workable definition of ‘terrorism’. Both create a clear tension. ‘Terrorism’ 
conspires against the successful attainment of a precise, predictable and clear criminal law 
doctrine. Constructing ‘terrorism’ as a concept of indiscernible breadth and scope offers 
lawmakers considerable latitude in criminalising oppositional and dissenting speech, something 
that in turn creates obvious problems for the rule of law, even in its more limited formalistic 
conception. The danger, or the tension, is that in seeking to defend against terrorist threats – 
and thus to preserve a state guided by rule of law principles – a state may in fact confound the 
very principles it seeks to maintain by laying claim to the nebulous uncertain concept of 
‘counter-terrorism’ and outlawing ‘terroristic speech’.   
 
The arguments throughout this thesis focus less on the development and entrenchment of 
human rights norms and emphasizing instead the critical importance of precise and narrowly-
drawn definitions in criminal law. In particular, the thesis points to the importance of 
incorporating constraining requirements as constituent elements of the various offences. The 
European Court and the Human Rights Committee have shared very similar doctrinal principles 
including the requirement that restrictions have a clear and prospective legal basis, that they 
pursue a legitimate purpose, and that they are necessary and proportionate. These doctrinal 
principles have been applied to organise and give structure to legal reasoning. As such, they 
function as tools through which an appropriate balance may be struck between the right to 
freedom of expression and any other state interest (legitimate aims). These shared principles 
reflect and give effect to the fundamental importance of freedom of expression to a democratic 
polity, and offer jurisprudential support for contracting states to repeal or gradually remove 
the offences of sedition from the legal lexicon. These doctrinal principles (set out in chapter 3) 
have led to a softening in Turkey’s legal response (as we saw in chapter 4) which historically 
                                                          
1 Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, (1985) 85/3 Columbia Law Review, 449, 
450 
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had relied on an unspoken background principle of militant democracy when confronted with 
the need to deal with ‘terroristic speech’. Turkey’s militant democracy reflects the notion of 
‘precautionary legality’ which prioritized risk aversion and self-preservation in the face of 
incalculable harms. This has led to the criminalisation of a wide range of expression regardless 
of any actual demonstrable link between expression and harm. 
 
The three bodies of case-law under consideration – Turkey, the ECtHR and the Human Rights 
Committee – have dealt with very similar views in relation to ideologies of communism, 
socialism, National Socialism (Nazism), fundamentalism, ethno-national terrorism or 
fundamentalist terrorism, all of which are regarded as backdrops or precursors to political 
violence or terrorism in various different ‘pathological’ periods. In this regard, the Turkish 
courts interpreted both the Turkish Penal Code (TPC) and the ‘Law on the Fight against 
Terrorism’ (TMK) vaguely and broadly as a restrictive tool on political dissent. This allowed them 
to convict those who espoused any purportedly 'unorthodox views', such as communism, anti-
secularism, or more recently pro-Kurdish-PKK related expression, due to their supposed link 
with political violence or terrorism. Turkey’s Constitutional Court and Yargitay did not actually 
seek any precise link between the expression and acts of terrorism or political violence in their 
case law. Consequently, these courts have not attentively distinguished legitimate political, 
intellectual and academic expressions from seditious expression and ‘terroristic speech’. 
 
This resemblance was maintained through keeping particular offences in later provisions or 
through continuing to attribute particular offences with a specific interpretation even though 
the law has been amended.  There are clear indications of a particular judicial mind-set, evident; 
steadfastly sticking to its previous case law, despite later amendment or repeal. For instance, 
articles 142 and 163 of the previous TPC – containing various offences of or relating to 
propaganda - played a significant role in criminalising a broad range of political expression but 
even when these articles were repealed, the Courts interpreted them under article 312 of TPC 
(incitement to hatred and animosity) so as to fill the purported gap left by their repeal. As Kuzu 
stated, the Ankara State Security Court spoke of the “daringness and courage caused by 
repealed article 163 of TPC”. The Court felt the gap left required filling with restrictions not 
liberties, so it did that interpreting the offence under article 312 of TPC.2 Or, ‘indirect 
incitement to terrorism’ has been kept under the offences of propaganda for, ‘inciting’, 
‘justifying’, and ‘praising’ terrorism, all prosecuted under TMK since 1991. The vague and fluid 
boundaries of these offences has led to the suppression of legitimate political, intellectual and 
academic expression. Similarly, new TPC was introduced in 2004, with offences of articles 215 
and 216 broadly retaining the former offence in article 312 of the previous TPC, with minor 
changes.3 While it is true that some legal amendments have been passed in order to open up 
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K.2004/206, 23/11/2004, p.14, Y (8)CD E.1999/12715 K.1999/14981, 03.11.1999 
3 Article 215 of 5237 TPC, “Any person who openly praises an offense or the person committing the offenses is 
punished with imprisonment up to two years.” Article 216 of 5237 TPC, “Any person who openly incites a group 
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more space for the right to freedom of expression, yet the political purpose of the 
Constitutional and criminal norms have remained static: to preserve the state and its 
institutions as priority concerns over the right to freedom of expression. For that reason, the 
flood of prosecutions under TPC and TMK show that the authorities actually use these 
provisions to supress dissenting and critical expression to the state, in turn highlighting the 
disproportionate restrictive effect on democratic debate.  
 
Chapter 4’s analysis of Turkish case law showed a significant lack of methodological rigour in 
the courts’ approach as they continued to rely on the presumption that particular ideas 
presented an inherent threat to the state and its system. In the earlier cases, there was an 
obvious lack of judicial attention to whether any acts of violence or terrorism was imminent, 
though later cases did show some signs that the judiciary had sought to address this deficiency. 
The lack of methodological rigour in the judicial reasoning process not only caused legal 
uncertainty but led to the authorities enjoying a broad discretion to criminalise politically 
oriented speech without the need for tangible evidence. For instance, Yargitay gave far too 
expansive a meaning to the element of ‘publicity’, a requirement of certain offences related to 
‘terroristic speech’. ‘Publicity’ is required for the offence of 'incitement to hatred and animosity' 
but is defined vaguely as a place where anyone is able to see and hear the expression in 
question. However, the strict interpretation given meant there was no requirement that 
anyone actually saw or heard the expression; only that they could have seen or heard it. 
Another example is that the requirement of element of mens rea for the offences related to 
'terroristic speech' remains undecided. Under TMK and TPC It is only required as an element 
for the offence of propaganda, but it was defined simply by the Constitutional Court as “an 
intention to spread an idea to others in order to attract supporters in any place at any time”.4  
Such a definition of ‘intention’ surely reflects very vague boundaries for the offence of 
propaganda. There has also been insufficient evidential basis for the prosecution of such 
expressions regarding their content and context. The elements of offences related to ‘sedition’ 
and 'terroristic speech' in Turkish law analysed in chapter 4 have shown marked similarity to 
the elements of sedition discussed in chapter 2. For these reasons, judicial bodies tend to apply 
broad restrictions on freedom of expression. We also noted how there has been insufficient 
evidential basis for the prosecution of ‘terroristic speech’ regarding its content and context. In 
short, there is little to demarcate the ‘old’ sedition offence from the ‘new’ terroristic speech 
offence in terms of the judicial construction of their elements. 
By contrast, Turkey’s human rights commitments under the ICCPR and especially the European 
Convention have pushed Turkey’s legislative bodies to repeal and amend relevant laws and its 
judicial bodies to gradually render the offence of sedition obsolete. Both the European Court 
                                                          
of people belonging to different social class, religion, race, sect, or coming from another origin, to be rancorous 
or hostile against another group, is punished with imprisonment from one year to three years in case of such act 
causes risk from the aspect of public safety.” 
4 The Constitutional Court, E.1979/31 K.1980/59, 27/11/1980   
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and the Human Rights Committee have allowed a wider space to be available for expression in 
public debate. Turkey’s legal response to ‘terroristic speech’ has been reformulated under the 
influence of the European Court’s free speech standards and doctrinal principles. Some positive 
developments began to show from the late 1990s when Turkish law began to be re-cast in 
accordance with Strasbourg jurisprudence so as to enhance constitutional protection of rights. 
An increased number of cases relating to public-political expression where the speakers were 
convicted due to their purported link with advocacy of terrorism or political violence, were re-
examined by the European Court. Most of these were viewed quite differently, as no more than 
dissenting and hard-hitting criticism of public authorities, or offering a different perspective on 
issues related to ‘terrorism' or the security situation. Turkey has engaged in a comprehensive 
reform process in the last two decades with a view to further strengthening democracy, 
consolidating the rule of law and ensuring protection for the right to freedom of expression. 
These positive legal developments have contributed in some measure to breaking the 
evolutionary link from sedition to modern-day offences relating to ‘terroristic speech’, and thus 
to preventing criminalisation of too wide a range of expression.  
 
In this regard, special attention should be paid to the introduction of the right of individual 
petition to the Constitutional Court (from 2012) as a cornerstone development. This laid the 
ground yet further for the undermining of the concept of sedition in Turkish law by giving more 
room for freedom of expression. The European Court gives very limited deference to national 
authorities who excessively criminalise expression, while the Human Rights Committee plays a 
key role in encouraging state parties to guarantee greater protection for the right to freedom 
of expression in order to ensure that dissenting and hard-hitting criticism of governmental 
policies is allowed. The Committee and the European Court found Many restrictions imposed 
by national authorities were violations of freedom of expression because state parties failed to 
explain why the expression in question was a threat to national security or justify how it could 
cause acts of political violence. Ultimately, the Court or Committee discerned that there was 
no actual link between the expression and any act of political violence or terrorism. This well-
developed case law has provided the impetus and incentive for Turkey’s judicial and legislative 
bodies to realise the offence of ‘sedition’5 is incompatible with the European Convention. 
 
If we turn back to discussing the elements of these offences in Turkish law, a considerable 
number of amendments were passed against this deficiency in order to reduce legal 
uncertainty and to prevent too much legitimate free expression being criminalised. After the 
2012 Constitutional amendment (the introduction of individual application to the 
Constitutional Court), offences related to 'terroristic speech' required slightly more tangible 
and precise objections. For example, the Constitutional Court has started to evaluate the 
content and context of expression in its case law. We do not have enough data yet to know 
                                                          
5 Again I would remind that there are no offences called ‘sedition’ in Turkish law. Sedition offences are officially 
called ‘offences against public peace’. Yet, they have functioned as ‘sedition’ offences and are included here as 
‘sedition’. 
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whether or not the Constitutional Court’s new approach has effectively overcome the former 
lack of methodological rigour, but it does promise to yield more thorough examination of cases 
by, for example, considering the actual link between expression and conduct. When Turkey’s 
courts started taking the European Court’s case law as legal reasoning, and as references for 
their decisions, it shifted the direction of their more recent case law away from sedition and 
towards adopting a more ECtHR-friendly approach into their jurisprudence. These positive 
amendments have led the Constitutional Court and Yargıtay to focus slightly more on the right 
to freedom of expression in their case law. On the other hand, UN human rights bodies’ failure 
to provide a methodological framework or jurisprudential rationales, have felt state parties, 
here especially Turkey’s courts having to determine by themselves whether an expression 
advocates terrorism or not. There is nothing in Turkey’s case law regarding any reference or 
reasoning given by the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee.   
 
However, while these legal developments relating to how Turkey responds to ‘terroristic 
speech’ are clearly progressing, there still remains broad legal opportunity for Turkey's 
Constitutional Court and Yargıtay to criminalise a great deal expression due to vague provisions 
under the TPC and TMK. This is because these laws still criminalise indirect incitement to 
terrorism (praising, encouraging and justifying of terrorism). The broad and vague definition of 
terrorism in Turkey which also lacks an international consensus in international law, contributes 
such broad sweep of restriction on the right to freedom of expression, without a sufficiently 
close connection to any identifiable harm.6 This type of offence provides an open-ended legal 
basis for national authorities to criminalise almost any type of expression they choose, 
especially when it coincides with the current domestic pathology. Turkey’s political and security 
situation is closely relevant to such pathology. An inverse relationship exists between the 
protection given to right to freedom of expression and the attention paid to security concerns. 
For that reason, when Turkey adopts such a pathological perspective, and if ‘terroristic’ 
activities became intense, an intolerant environment towards unwanted expressions will be 
inevitable to the obvious and serious detriment of its human rights commitments. In such 
pathological times, Turkey’s judicial bodies might even widen restrictions on expressions. In the 
last decade, gradual increase of restrictions on freedom of expression, particularly with regard 
to the media, free speech and bans on social media has been noticed. 7   
 
As explained in the first chapter, Turkish Courts have imposed broad sweep and deeply 
troubling restrictions on freedom of expression especially for the reason of terrorism. Last five 
decades of military “guardianship” with its bureaucratic allies (early 1960s – late 2000s) and 
recent political elites required restraining discussion of political and security issues, ethnic 
identity and history outside the narrow bounds of secular nationalism. There are numerous 
prosecutions on journalists, writers, editors, publishers, translators, civil/political rights 
                                                          
6 See for example, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin, 16 August 2006, A/61/267. para 50 
7 Universal Periodic Review – 21st Session CSW – Stakeholder Submission Turkey (June 2014) 3 
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activists, lawyers, elected officials and students for their dissenting expression.8 There are vast 
number of prosecutions on expression especially regarding criticism of the armed forces and 
critical speech regarding the Kurdish issue in the last two decades.9 There have been arbitrary 
and abusive terrorism trials of mainly Kurdish political activists, journalists, lawyers, and 
students. The international human rights NGOs agreed that a high number of journalist were 
jailed or fined in Turkey for their profession.10 In the recent years, after Gezi Park protests 
(2013), scores of media workers have been unjustifiably dismissed or forced to quit in 
retaliation for their reporting.11 An increasing restriction on freedom of expression, freedom of 
the press, and internet as well as on television content have been imposed. For instance, in 
January 2016, three Turkish academics who signed and read a declaration entitled ‘We won’t 
be part of this crime.’ were arrested on charges of terrorism propaganda.12 In this declaration 
the academics accused the Turkish government of carrying out the “deliberate massacre and 
deportation of Kurdish and other peoples in the region”. They also demanded “an immediate 
end to the violence perpetrated by the state”.13 International human rights NGOs has 
extensively reported arbitrary and abusive terrorism trials of mainly political activists, 
journalists, lawyers, and students who joined protests, were member of pro-Kurdish 
associations and worked as a journalist.14 As sedition-like offences, all those speakers have been 
prosecuted in broad and vague meaning. This means surely premised on a highly attenuated 
causal relationship between the speech concerned and any violent act.  This demonstrates level 
of protection afforded to freedom of expression in present-day Turkey is in trouble and delicate 
issue. 
 
These restrictions on expression might target not only actual ‘terroristic speech’ but also 
political dissent and speech that simply offers a different or counter perspective. It is precisely 
in such periods of alleged emergencies or dire challenges to the stability of the state, as Head 
                                                          
8 ARTICLE 19, the Committee to Protect Journalists, English PEN, Freedom House, P24 and PEN International 
Joint Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review of Turkey (14 June 2014) For consideration at the 21st 
session of the UN working group in January/February 2015, para 11-13; See further; Human Rights Council 
Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Twenty-first session 19–30 January 2015 
(A/HRC/WG.6/21/TUR/3) para 46, 50, and 70 
9 Amnesty International, 104TH Session of the Human Rights Committee – Pre-Sessional Meeting on Turkey (22 
December 2011) p.4 
10 ARTICLE 19, the Committee to Protect Journalists, English PEN, Freedom House, P24 and PEN International 
Joint Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review of Turkey (14 June 2014) For consideration at the 21st 
session of the UN working group in January/February 2015, para 14 
11 Joint NGO Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review (CIVICUS and hCa) 21st Session of the UPR Working 
Group (15 June 2014) 4.9 
12 See, for example; those were among a group of more than 1,000 scholars who in January signed a declaration 
denouncing military operations against the PKK. http://turkishmonitor.com/3-turkish-academics-arrested-over-
terror-propaganda-charges-1438/ 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/three-academics-arrested-on-charges-of-terror-
propaganda.aspx?pageID=238&nID=96517&NewsCatID=509  
13 See the text of the petition here; http://bianet.org/english/human-rights/170978-academics-we-will-not-be-a-
party-to-this-crime 
14 See for instance, Human Rights Watch, Turkey’s Human Rights Rollback Recommendations for Reform, (2014) 
p.14 
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has argued that International Human Rights law is at its most ineffective.15 These are the times 
when it should be providing protection for basic legal and democratic rights by giving immunity 
from far-reaching exemptions like State restrictions which cite ‘national security’ and ‘public 
safety’.16 It is not only at a domestic level that we see this restrictive drive. There are 
international developments, as we saw above, that have led to this ‘preventive turn’ of UN 
Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005), the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention 
of Terrorism (2005), and the Council of the European Union Framework Decision on Combating 
Terrorism (2008) criminalising incitement to terrorism (including indirect incitement). Even the 
ECtHR approved criminalisation of indirect incitement to terrorism in the case of Leroy v. 
France. Using the ideological backdrop of terrorism, these international instruments have 
encouraged state parties to adopt new measures leading to the assimilation of older offences 
of ‘sedition’ and ‘treason’ into modern-day offences relating to ‘terroristic speech’.  
 
This, thesis adopted as a benchmark, the model offence of incitement to terrorism proposed 
by the UN Special Rapporteur on Terrorism, Martin Scheinin in December 2010; 
” It is an offence to intentionally and unlawfully distribute or otherwise make available 
a message to the public with the intent to incite the commission of a terrorist offence, 
where such conduct, whether or not expressly advocating terrorist offences, causes a 
danger that one or more such offences may be committed.”17  
This definition is more precise and more narrowly tailored: if such a definition were adopted in 
domestic law, speakers detained for unwanted expression would be better protected. 
Conviction would require not only mens rea and specific intent relating to the incitement, but 
also a causal connection between the speech and an identifiable and identified social harm. As 
we have seen throughout this thesis, Turkey’s response to ‘terroristic speech’ is far from 
adopting this benchmark in its case law. This is because Turkey’s courts stick to their early case 
law and fail to approach the elements of these offences systematically. More importantly they 
fail to consistently and steadily seek an actual link between speech and harm. Turkey’s courts 
do not address whether any harm did or could arise from ‘terroristic speech’, convicting 
speakers for offences under the Turkish Penal Code (‘TPC’), the Law on the Fight Against 
Terrorism (‘TMK’) – and even more broadly. Turkey’s legislative and judicial bodies should 
ensure that both TMK and TPC actively seek a clear link between expression and harm, in order 
to avoid criminalisation of an extensive array of expressions. Furthermore, criminalisation of 
indirect incitement must be reduced or removed in order to ensure more room for freedom of 
expression. The Rabat Plan of Action would be reliable source for Turkey to which elements 
(six-part threshold test) should be required in determining unlawful incitement. These make 
‘terroristic speech’ offences under TMK and TPC precise and clear, and also become less 
                                                          
15 Michael Head, Crimes against the State from Treason to Terrorism (Ashgate, 2011) 278 
16 Ibid 
17 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
while countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin, 22 December 2010, A/HRC/16/51. 
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restrictive on freedom of expression. More importantly, Turkey’s Constitutional norms should 
be reformulated so as to aim to protect and ensure the right to freedom of expression rather 
than the state itself. These are the major steps that Turkey must take so as to differentiate 
recent ‘terroristic speech’ offences from sedition concept. Thus, in order to guarantee the right 
to freedom of expression for journalists, writers, editors, publishers, translators, civil/political 
rights activists, lawyers, elected officials, academics and students, democratic reforms must 
continue. 
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